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THE POWER OF BELIEF? 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON RELIGION OR BELIEF 
AND EQUALITIES IN GREAT BRITAIN 
THE PROVENANCE OF THIS REPORT 
In December, 2007, the authors of this report were commissioned by a well-known equality and 
human rights organisation to conduct a review of the empirical research on disadvantage and 
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. As well as being restricted to empirical research, 
the review was further limited to: (a) Great Britain, rather than the United Kingdom; (b) religion, 
rather than spirituality; (c) specific religions, and, (c) research carried out between 2000 and 
2008. We were specifically told not to engage with theological debates and – part way through 
the process – not to pursue the cross-cutting issue of social class which we had raised. (Further 
details of the terms of reference to which we worked are provided in Chapter One).  
We endeavoured throughout to produce a review that is written with due regard for sensitivities, 
but which remains true to the data, and which takes its lead from two sources:  
(a)  The new legislative framework in Britain, which is expressly even-handed at the level of 
principle in its treatment of all religions and non-religious belief systems (as explained in 
Chapter One); 
(b)  The evidence for the incidence of inequalities of various kinds relating to religion or 
belief, as revealed by the analysis of empirical sources (see especially Chapter Two).  
Throughout the process, we worked closely with colleagues in the commissioning organisation, 
who subjected successive drafts of the report to a searching process of internal review. In June, 
2008 we were informed that the report required only minor, stylistic, amendments prior to 
publication. Subsequently, however, a decision was taken – at a different level of the 
organisation – not to proceed with publication.  
At this point, we were informed that we could publish the report elsewhere, so long as references 
to the commissioning organisation were withheld. Accordingly, the name of this has been 
replaced throughout with the symbols „XXXX‟.   
We do not feel that it is appropriate to comment further on what turned out to be a most 
unsatisfactory experience from a research point of view. Readers should note, however, that the 
time factor means that additional research will undoubtedly have been published in the sphere of 
religion and belief since we completed the main part of the research review in 2008, and this 
version of the report in early 2009.  
Notwithstanding this, we have chosen to publish it via Bradford Scholars not only as a 
contribution to the historical record, but as an extensive resource for researchers, and because it 
contains some challenging analyses of work in the area which we believe should inform future 
thinking and research.1  
                                                     
1
  Some of the more recent research, and a more detailed discussion of the challenges to which we refer, 
can be found in: Macey, M. (2009) Multiculturalism, Religion and Women: Doing Harm by Doing 
Good? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, and Macey, M. and Carling, A.H. (2010) Ethnic, Racial and 
Religious Inequalities: The Perils of Subjectivity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan [forthcoming]. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
A new legal framework has been developed over the last ten years which protects 
individuals against unfair treatment on the grounds of their religion or belief. This 
framework regards all the major faith groups, secular belief systems (such as Humanism or 
Atheism), and non-belief on formally equal terms. There has also been a rapid growth of 
research interest in religion/belief in contemporary scholarship on equalities.  
This report provides a critical overview of this extensive research base, which has been 
dispersed to date among a wide variety of sources.  
Recurrent Themes  
1. On the basis of the evidence available, it is often difficult to disentangle the social effects of 
religion/belief from the effects of other factors, such as ethnicity, race, gender or social 
class.  
2. Perceptions about the level of social unfairness suffered by religious groups run at a higher 
level than the experience of unfairness reported by individual members of the groups 
concerned, in a number of significant cases. 
3. Research and public debate is often concentrated on particular groups within the whole 
range of religion or belief, and on particular voices from within these groups. 
Main Findings 
Religious Identity, Belief and Practice 
 More people identify with each of the main religious faiths than practise those faiths 
actively. 
 Estimates of the number of practising Christians vary by a factor of ten, from the 6.5% of 
the population who attended any church in England on 8
th
 May, 2005, to the 72% of the 
UK population who answered „Christian‟ in the 2001 Census.  
 About 4% of the population practise one of the minority (non-Christian) faiths. 
 „Christian‟ responses to the question on religion in the 2001 Census for England and Wales 
may be best understood as an acknowledgement by the respondent of a Christian 
background or heritage, with no necessary implications for current Christian practice or 
religious belief.  
 Most of the British population are probably not adherents of one of the organised religious 
faiths, but may belong instead within an alternative spectrum of spiritual, agnostic or 
secular practice and belief.  
 Assertions of religious identity sometimes carry ethnic, cultural or political meanings. 
Inequality of Religion or Belief  
 There is clear evidence of economic and social inequality between groups identified 
wholly or partly in religious terms, in relation to factors such as education, poverty, 
unemployment and housing conditions. 
 It is often „hyphen-groups‟ of combined religion, race and/or ethnicity – such as 
Bangladeshi Muslims or Black African Christians – who share a common social and/or 
economic situation. 
 Some (but not all) Muslim groups and – to a lesser extent – Sikh groups, are often found in 
the least favourable social positions. 
 There is clear evidence of inequality within ethno-religious groups, related to factors such 
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as age, gender, social class and sexual orientation.  
 Unjust treatment on the grounds of religion or belief (or on grounds of race or ethnicity) is 
a possible cause of these inequalities, but there are many other influences potentially 
involved.   
Harms Directed Against Religious Individuals or Organisations    
 In Scotland, it is believed that discrimination against Catholics is widespread; in England 
and Wales, it is also believed that discrimination against Muslims (and „Islamophobia‟ 
more generally) is widespread.  
 The effects on individuals of discrimination or hostility can be profoundly damaging, 
regardless of the general social level of such harms. A single case of unjust treatment on 
the grounds of religion or belief is one case too many.  
 However, a careful analysis of the available evidence reveals a significant gap between 
perception and reality: the extent of anti-Catholic discrimination in Scotland appears to be 
very low and that against Muslims in England and Wales appears to be much lower than is 
commonly believed.  
 The expression of unfounded hostility to Islam – „Islamophobia‟ – in the mainstream 
media has only been subject to extensive and systematic investigation very recently, and 
even then not across the whole range of media. Recent findings for national newspapers 
suggest, however, that stories connected with Muslims frequently carry negative 
associations. This may contribute to wider processes of stereotyping in the public domain. 
Religion or Belief, the Workplace and the Public Services 
 A number of routine, taken-for-granted, aspects of customary workplace practice 
disadvantage adherents of minority religions, and may discriminate against them indirectly. 
These include the general adoption of the Christian calendar for the working year, the lack 
of time or facilities for observance of religion or belief, and the lack of suitable food 
provision, to meet halal or kosher requirements, for example.  
 There are significant differences in the use made of public services by ethno-religious 
groups, and their experience of these. However, research does not support the suggestion 
that this is generally due to discrimination – or even lack of sensitivity – on the part of 
service providers.  
 Cultural and religious beliefs and values sometimes prevent people from making use of 
health services, particularly those in spheres associated with stigma or shame (e.g. 
HIV/AIDS, mental health, and genetic counselling). Concerns about threats to religious 
requirements and cultural values can affect people‟s decision not to use other healthcare 
services, such as facilities for deaf children and young people.  
 Education is an area in which there is intense debate about religion on a range of 
dimensions. It is argued, for example, that secular beliefs are not taught in schools and 
non-religious belief organisations are under-represented on governing bodies. It is also 
argued that separate faith schools should not be publicly funded; that they are inappropriate 
in a secular society, and that separate faith based education contributes to social divisions 
in an already divided society. 
 In fact, the evidence for faith schools impacting negatively on community cohesion is both 
equivocal and contested. For instance, the catchment area system of allocating school 
places results in faith schools often having a student body that is more ethnically and 
religiously diverse than in maintained schools. There is also some evidence that faith 
schools promote greater respect for religious diversity than do „secular‟ schools, though 
this is likely to vary by religion and denomination. Overall, the debate about religion and 
community cohesion would benefit from adequate empirical research. 
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 Though there is generally little evidence of discrimination based on religion (or ethnicity) 
in public service provision as a whole, the criminal justice system – particularly the police 
and prison services – may constitute an exception to this. Although religious 
discrimination has not been proved, there is evidence of racism that may well include a 
religious component. There is also evidence of unfair treatment with respect to the 
provision of resources to enable the practice of religion, including relative lack of access to 
imams in the prison service. 
 There is evidence of hate crimes based on religion, though the difficulty of separating out 
ethnicity and religion needs to be noted here. There was a relatively short-lived increase in 
attacks on Muslim people and property following 9/11 and 7/7, and some attacks on Sikhs, 
who seem to have been confused with Muslims at this time. And there is some evidence of 
religious hate crime directed against Muslim women. It seems, however, that it is Jewish 
people who are generally most at risk from hate crime, from property vandalism to 
physical assault.  
Harms Practised By Religious Individuals and Organisations 
 As well as being subject to discrimination and other harms, religiously motivated 
individuals and faith based organisations [FBOs] may also practice discrimination against 
those who do not share their beliefs. 
 This can apply to both „outsiders‟ and „insiders‟ of their faith, in areas such as 
employment, recognition of branches of a faith, departure of individuals from a faith, or 
religious conversion. 
 There are instances in which feelings of offence have led religious groups to try to impose 
censorship. This has sometimes been accompanied by threatened or actual violence. 
 Inequalities related to gender, sexual orientation and age within ethno-religious groups are 
influenced by discrimination that is clearly rooted in some cases in both religious beliefs 
and cultural traditions. 
 The law forbids expressions of religious hatred in any direction, and some published 
materials of religious groups (especially against lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender 
[LGBT] individuals and secular society) appear to be against the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the law.  
The Government, Social Policy, and Religion or Belief Organisations 
 The Government has recently turned to FBOs to help achieve objectives of social cohesion, 
the prevention of extremism and service provision. There is evidence in this process of 
capacity issues in service provision, and tensions of policy between FBOs, the Government 
and secular agencies. 
 A tension also exists between some religious beliefs and the equalities agenda. 
 There are complaints of unfair treatment in relation to resource allocation between 
different religions, and between secular v. faith based organisations. 
 Research calls into question the representative status of some minority religious leaders at 
local and national levels. Surveys suggest that the voices of women and young people in 
particular are neglected. And it appears that none of the national Islamic organisations are 
accepted widely as speaking for Muslims. 
 „Political literacy‟ is required to understand fully the objectives of some FBOs.  
 Some minority religious groups may use Government funding to control their members 
and to reinforce the boundaries between themselves and wider society. 
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Religion or Belief and Minority Ethnic Communities 
 Policy-makers and practitioners should bear in mind that all communities are 
heterogeneous, and that the needs of their members are different, and sometimes in 
conflict. 
 Consultations with Muslim women suggest that it is often culture, rather than religion, that 
has most impact on their lives and those of other vulnerable categories, such as children 
and young people. The idea of „faith communities‟ can be a misnomer in these 
circumstances. 
 Lack of official knowledge and awareness about cultural, political and religious issues can 
combine with lack of gender awareness and „political correctness‟ (which is in reality 
incorrect) to render invisible such human rights abuses as forced marriage, „honour‟ based 
violence, and child abuse. 
Religion, Gender and Sexual Orientation  
 There is evidence that some minority religious women are disadvantaged in access to, and 
progression within, the labour market. Some of this is due to externally constructed 
barriers, but some is due to religious and cultural traditions that prioritise home and 
childcare. 
 There are examples of LGBT people being excluded from certain sectors of employment, 
including FBOs and faith schools, and being harassed and bullied in the workplace. 
 There is some evidence that minority religious women experience violence and hate crime, 
but most violence against women is perpetrated by partners and family members. LGBT 
people are also the victims of violence and hate crime, but – unlike women – this is mainly 
perpetrated by strangers. 
 Religious ideology and doctrine are implicated in the inequality and oppression 
experienced by both women and LGBT people through patriarchy and heteronormativity.  
Surveys show that many LGBT believers also see religion as encouraging homophobia.  
 Religions and some religious individuals are having considerable difficulty with the sexual 
orientation strand of the equalities legislation. There are instances of workplace conflict 
between Christian and LGBT individuals. There is also some suggestion of „far-right‟ 
Christian groups mobilising against non-heterosexual people. 
Research Coverage and Gaps in the Research Base 
 Despite the large volume of published evidence relating to equality and religion or belief, 
the research coverage remains uneven on most dimensions of interest, including topic area, 
organisational sector, geographical area (within Britain) and grouping of religion or 
belief, as summarised in the following points. 
 Topic Area. There is a particular need for investigation into:  
 The overall distribution of religion or belief in the British population, taking account 
of the distinct dimensions of identity, belief and practice; 
 Patterns of social and economic discrimination relating specifically to religion or 
belief, as opposed to other factors such as race or ethnicity.  
The Census questions on religion or belief are in urgent need of revision for the 2011 
Census, especially in England and Wales, in order to help establish the true extent of 
practice and belief for all the major religions and belief systems, including Christianity. 
The extent of discrimination relating to religion or belief is in urgent need of clarification, 
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especially by the use of direct methods of investigation, such as actor techniques. 
Investigation is also required into the incidence of social prejudice regarding religion or 
belief, as distinct from discrimination on the one hand and from unfavourable attitudes or 
views on the other. 
 There is little research on the relationship between religion or belief and social class, or on 
questions of „mobility of religion or belief‟ (from one faith or belief system to another). 
And very few studies were found that evaluate policy initiatives in relation to religion or 
belief, which the research brief specified as a field of interest. There is also a need for 
philosophical work on the „vision of justice‟ that underlies the current legal framework on 
equalities, including the place of religion or belief within this framework.  
 Organisational Sector. There is more research on religion or belief in relation to public 
sector organisations than private sector organisations, and even in the public sector the 
studies are often conducted on a small scale and/or focussed on highly specific ethnic or 
religious groups or detailed issues of service delivery. 
 Geographical Area. (Intra-Christian) sectarianism remains a live issue for research in 
Scotland, whereas the specific issues for England tend to revolve around the (non-
Christian) minority religions. Wales has less of these particular concerns, but a number of 
studies that are significant for the whole of Britain have been conducted or authored in 
Wales. 
 Grouping of Religion or Belief. Most empirical studies on equality and religion or belief 
published in the period since 2000 refer either to Christianity or to Islam (in roughly equal 
numbers). There is a smaller number of studies concerning Judaism, and very few on 
Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism. There are likewise very few studies on agnostics, or on 
the adherents of secular belief systems or New Religious Movements (NRMs).  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE 
1.1 The Social Context of the Review  
Britain is a liberal democracy, which operates on an ideology of equality of opportunity 
and respect for human rights. It is also a welfare state in which access to many education 
and health services are free at the point of delivery to provide a „safety net‟ for people in 
need. Notwithstanding this, there is clear evidence of widespread and persistent inequality 
in relation to such aspects of „social wealth‟ as education, employment, health and housing 
which is correlated with the social divisions of class, gender and race/ethnicity, as well as 
age and disability. There is also evidence of discrimination on these grounds, much of 
which is institutionalised. One of the principal aims of this review is to establish whether 
this also applies to the sphere of religion or belief.  
1.2 The Legal Framework of the Review  
There is a new framework of law relating to religion or belief (generally referred to as 
religion/belief in the report) established by: 
 The Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA]. 
 The Terrorism Act 2000.2 
 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (Great   Britain) 
[EER]. 
 The Equality Act 2006 (Part 2). 
 The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (England and Wales) [RRHA]. 
In addition, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extended the racially 
aggravated offences contained in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to cover offences 
aggravated by religious hostility, including assault, harassment and public order offences. 
Some other recent legislation includes clauses that refer to religious issues,3 and the Race 
Equality Duty placed on public sector bodies has been extended to include duties of 
Gender Equality and Disablity Equality (Ansari, 2002; Jahangir, 2008; Fredman, 2005). It 
has been confirmed recently by the Attorney General in a statement to Parliament that the 
new single Public Sector Equality Duty will include an Equality Duty in relation to 
Religion or Belief (Hansard, 10 March 2009). Both the Human Rights Act and the 
Employment Equality Regulations 2003 implemented European instruments in the UK 
context (the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR], and the European 
Employment Directive 2000 respectively), and the UK has a number of other international 
obligations relating to equality of religion/belief.4  
                                                     
2
  Religion enters into the legal definition of terrorism via the stipulation that „the use or threat [of a 
terrorist act] is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause‟ 
(Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1,1,1(c)). 
3
 These include the Education and Inspection Act 2006, which gives sixth form pupils at a community, 
foundation or voluntary school the right to be excused from attendance at religious worship and the 
Charities Act 2006 (for England and Wales only), which permits a body or trust to claim charitable 
status for the advancement of religion (if it is for the public benefit). In addition, the Common law has 
long recognised freedom of individuals to adopt, practise and change their religion.  
4
 These include The International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Articles 2,18,20,26, 27; The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Article 13, The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 2; The International Convention 
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The Labour Government has therefore expanded the reach of equalities legislation 
considerably in a variety of different areas (including religion/belief). It is now considering 
whether the current body of equalities legislation should be unified and simplified, and a 
new Single Equality Bill drawn up for Great Britain (Department of Communities and 
Local Government [DCLG], 2007b; Phillips, 2007). Since the Bill is only expected to be 
published in April or May 2009, it is beyond the scope of this review.   
The legal framework on religion/belief (or the lack of such belief) gives new rights to 
individuals, protecting them in various circumstances against: 
 Direct discrimination. 
 Indirect discrimination. 
 Harassment.  
 Victimisation. 
 The threat or commission of Terrorist violence, or 
 Hate crime. 
Direct discrimination involves treating members of a group less favourably than others, 
whereas indirect discrimination involves „provisions, criteria or practices‟ that put 
members of groups defined by religion/belief (or lack thereof) at a comparative 
disadvantage. A corresponding duty is placed on individuals to avoid discriminatory 
practices, in all circumstances regarding direct discrimination, and in cases of indirect 
discrimination where the discrimination is not considered to be „a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim‟ (EER 2003, Part 1, 3,1b; DCLG, 2007a). 
The HRA applies directly to „public authorities‟ alone, which include national or local 
state organisations, and any other person or organisation that „carries out some functions of 
a public nature‟. The main impact is on „vertical proceedings‟ between individuals and 
public authorities, but there can be a „horizontal effect‟ on disputes between private parties 
as a result of the obligation placed on all UK courts and tribunals to comply with the terms 
of the HRA (DCA, 2006: 37).  
The RRHA protects individuals (and groups) against the expression of religious hatred in a 
variety of circumstances. But it also contains a robust defence of freedom of expression on 
matters of religion/belief, that: 
nothing in this [amendment to the Public Order Act 1986] shall be read or given 
effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of 
antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of its adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of 
their adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief 
system to cease practising their religion or belief system. [RRHA 2006, Schedule, 
S.1, 29J]  
The HRA further guarantees an individual‟s freedom of conscience, including the right to 
hold, „manifest‟, „practise or demonstrate‟ religious beliefs in public or in private, and to 
reject or to change religious allegiances (DCA, 2006: 22).  
At the same time, it has been argued that the new framework „recognises that religious 
groups and faiths have rights to order their lives and communities according to their 
beliefs and doctrines‟ (Southwark, 2004: 3), so that in this sense it may confer some group 
rights. In addition there are a number of explicit exemptions that permit Faith Based 
Organisations [FBOs] to act in a manner that would otherwise amount to discrimination on 
                                                                                                                                                                           
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 5, and The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Articles 2,14,30 (Jahangir, 2008). 
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the grounds or religion/belief, or on one or other of the protected grounds, especially 
gender and sexual orientation. The Equality and Human Rights Commission [EHRC] 
describes these exemptions as follows:  
Certain organisations which exist to practise, advance or teach a religion or belief 
may, under certain circumstances, restrict membership to people of that religion or 
belief. They can similarly restrict participation in their activities; the way they 
provide goods, facilities and services as part of their activities; and the use of their 
premises.5  
On the one hand, this new framework serves to distinguish unfair treatment by reason of 
religion/belief from other sources of unfair treatment, especially those arising from race or 
ethnicity. It thus establishes religion in a new way as a distinct focus of legal action. This 
will almost certainly affect the legal treatment of religious individuals who already fall 
within the scope of the law as members of ethnic groups (currently as Sikhs or as Jews), as 
well as bringing other individuals within the scope of the law for the first time in respect of 
this aspect of their identity.6 This generates a new set of opportunities and incentives 
regarding the assertion of religious identity, and, indeed, „belief identity‟. It will be 
interesting to see, for example, whether the new framework leads more people to identify 
themselves more explicitly as „Agnostics‟ or „Atheists‟. 
On the other hand, the new legislation draws religious individuals/believers and their 
organisations into new relationships with each other, with the state and with civil society, 
in two respects especially:  
First, any particular religion or „similar philosophical belief‟ (EER 2003, Part 1, 2, 1) is 
regarded as one among many religions or belief systems, with none given any distinctive 
status under the new laws. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development [CIPD] 
(2003: 6) notes, for example, that the European Court of Human Rights protects the 
Church of Scientology, the Moon sect, Druids, Vegans, the Krishna Consciousness 
movement, Atheists and the Divine Light of Centrum. It is not clear whether religious 
groups – or indeed non-religious belief groups – will feel entirely comfortable within this 
new dispensation. Nevertheless, in historical perspective, this represents a constitutional 
revolution. 
Secondly, the effect of all the new legislation – and the powerful message sent out by the 
establishment of the EHRC as a unified body – is to treat discrimination on the basis of 
religion/belief as just one dimension (or strand) within a broader concern for social 
equality. The other strands are race and ethnicity, gender, disability, age and sexual 
orientation, making six strands in all. There are a number of possible tensions between 
these strands, which are considered at several places in this report. 
1.3 The XXXX Review Brief 
Our brief from the XXXX was to examine recent research in England, Scotland and Wales 
in relation to how issues of religion/belief affect individuals in specific areas of their lives. 
The overall aim of the review is to enable the XXXX to develop its future research and 
policy agenda on the basis of the current state of knowledge (or lack of knowledge) in the 
sphere of religion/belief. The review is also intended to be of use to academics, policy-
makers and practitioners so that we were asked to draw out the implications of the research 
                                                     
5
  FBOs can also restrict membership and services on the grounds of sexual orientation in certain 
circumstances. 
6
  Courts and tribunals have ruled that Muslims, Jehovah‟s Witnesses and Rastafarians are not covered 
by the Race Relations Act 1976, or subsequent amendments (Jahangir, 2008). 
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evidence for a range of key stakeholders, such as central, regional and local government, 
employers and trade unions, service providers and the voluntary sector. These conclusions 
are gathered together in summary form in Section 7.2 below. 
In accordance with the XXXX‟s integrated approach to equalities, we were asked to adopt 
an approach to the review that took account of the intersection and interaction between 
various areas of equality and inequality, such as religion and ethnicity, religion and gender, 
religion and education, religion and employment, etc.  
A recent Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service [ACAS] report commented that: 
a significant challenge for any literature review of religion or belief in the workplace 
is the lack of a strong research base‟, that shows „patterns of discrimination relating 
to religion or belief in isolation from race, ethnicity and culture‟ (Denvir et al., 2007: 
26).7  
Our work on this review confirms this finding – which explains some of the decisions we 
took in conducting it, and some of the conclusions and recommendations that come out of 
it. The outcome of our review process nevertheless qualifies this conclusion, in that more 
than 11,000 references were found, of which over 700 have been selected as the most 
relevant for inclusion in this report. There has undoubtedly been a „turn to religion‟ in the 
contemporary literature on equality. It is also true, however, that this volume of research 
arises from a large variety of different types of source, and that the coverage of research on 
religion/belief remains uneven, in relation to criteria such as geographical area, topic of 
interest and the religion or belief system involved (for more details, see the synopsis in 
Chapter 7). It is hoped that the current report will provide a useful service by drawing 
together a substantial amount of information about this research base within a single 
publication. 
1.4 Methods, Scope and Limitations of the Review 
Methods: the review is grounded in an extensive computer search of social science and 
humanities databases, conducted by a professional consultant. This initial investigation was 
backed by an iterative process of further search, including a thorough review of a large 
range of websites (details of the search process are given in Appendix 1). Advice was also 
sought from key informants in the academic community, religious and secular 
organisations and NGOs.  
Geographical Coverage: as noted above, this review does not deal with the whole of the 
UK, but is limited to England, Scotland and Wales (we were asked to pay particular 
attention to Scotland and Wales). Material from Northern Ireland, other parts of the 
European Union, the Indian sub-continent and North America has been included 
occasionally, however, where we felt that this was pertinent to the review.  
Time Period and Materials Covered: the review is restricted mainly to material produced 
from the year 2000. As with the geographical coverage of the review, we have occasionally 
included material published prior to this date that we consider particularly pertinent, or that 
is the most up-to-date available.  
The focus of the review was specified as empirical research and relevant policy 
documentation (including interventions and their evaluation).  From the outset, however, 
we were aware that we would not be able to restrict the review narrowly to religion/belief, 
but would have to refer on occasion to the literature on ethnicity. This is especially the case 
                                                     
7
  The research team is grateful to Beryl Spink for this reference. 
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in areas where the empirical research relating explicitly to religion is thin on the ground (a 
challenge noted also by Purdam et al., 2007: 156). In addition, we quickly discovered that 
whilst there is an extensive literature on a wide range of aspects of religion/belief, the 
majority of this falls within theoretical, philosophical and theological frameworks. Less 
research has been carried out on the empirical link between belief (whether religious or 
secular) and inequality or discrimination, and this sometimes requires very careful 
interpretation (see Chapter 2). We found very little on the evaluation of policy 
interventions. 
We therefore took two significant decisions: first, to expand the review parameters to 
include non-empirical material that dealt with theoretical and conceptual aspects of 
religion/belief (other than in the theological domain). Secondly, to restrict the initial search 
parameters to articles, reports and policy documents in journals and on websites, with less 
emphasis on books. This decision arose from the judgement that significant empirical 
research is most likely to be published in academic journals or other sources before it 
reaches the pages of a book. The discovery of books in the research process was therefore 
„journal-led‟. 
The main sources of research include: 
 Large-scale recurrent Government surveys, especially the Census and the derived 
„Focus‟ publications (ONS, 2003; 2004; 2005a; 2006e) and the biennial Citizenship 
Surveys 2001-2005, which became continuous after 2007 (Attwood et al., 2003; 
O‟Beirne, 2004; Attwood et al., 2004; Green et al., 2004; Kitchen et al., 2006; 
DCLG, 2007d; 2008a; 2008b). 
 Synoptic reviews (Beckford et al., 2006; Purdam et al., 2007). 
 Reports or responses arising from specific situations, incidents or events of concern 
(Allen and Barrett, 1996; Macpherson, 1999; Ouseley, 2001; Cantle, 2001; Laming, 
2003; CRE, 2003; 2005a; 2005b). 
 The investigation into freedom of religion/belief in the UK by the UN Special 
Rapporteur (Jahangir, 2008). 
 Guides or reviews from professional organisations or other (non-religious) interest 
groups – ACAS, CIPD, Child Poverty Action Group [CPAG]. 
 Contributions from FBOs and belief organisations, including responses to 
Government consultations – Archbishops‟ Council [AC], Archbishop of 
Canterbury‟s Commission on Urban Priority Areas [ACUPA], British Humanist 
Association [BHA], Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales [CBCEW], 
Christian Research, Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism [FAIR], Hizb-ut-
Tahrir [HuT], International Humanist and Ethical Union [IHEU], Islamic Human 
Rights Commission [IHRC], Institute of Islamic Studies [IIS], Jewish Policy 
Research [JPR], Muslim Council of Britain [MCB], William Temple Foundation 
[WTF]. 
 Publications from think-tanks and research foundations – Institute for Public Policy 
Research [IPPR], Institute for Race Relations [IRR], Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
[JRF], Joseph Rowntree Trust [JRT], Policy Exchange, Policy Studies Institute [PSI], 
Runnymede Trust. 
 Reports from monitoring organisations, some of which now include a European 
dimension – Community Safety Trust [CST], European Union Monitoring and 
Advocacy Program [EUMAP], European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Islamophobia [EUMC]. 
 Specially commissioned opinion surveys (Appendix 2), and 
 Consultations with specific groups, such as Muslim women (Appendix 3). 
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In addition, there are a large number of publications or policy initiatives from a wide (and 
sometimes bewildering) range of different Government Departments – Cabinet Office 
[CO], Commission for Racial Equality [CRE], Department of Constitutional Affairs 
[DCA], Department of Communities and Local Government [DCLG], Department for 
Children, Schools and Families [DCSF], Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions [DETR], Department for Education and Employment [DfEE], Department for 
Education and Skills [DfES], Department of Health [DoH], Equal Opportunities 
Commission [EOC], Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], Home Office [HO], 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister [ODPM], Scottish Executive [SE], Scottish 
Government Social Research [SGSR] – or official organisations (especially within the 
Criminal Justice System).   
Ongoing academic research includes specific programmes sponsored by the Economic and 
Social Research Council [ESRC] and/or the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
[AHRC] (Appendix 5).   
A significant influence on this review is that the main research was concentrated within a 
four to five month time period during 2008, as explained above. Although we have 
endeavoured to be as thorough and comprehensive as possible, it would be wise to view 
this report as an introduction to the area, rather than a definitive guide to it. 
Coverage of Religion or Belief: our brief from the XXXX was to limit the review to 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam and Sikhism (the major religions in 
Britain as defined by numbers of self-identified adherents in the 2001 Census), and to such 
non-religious beliefs as Humanism. We were also asked to be alert to „New Religious 
Movements‟ [NRMs]. 
A striking feature of the unevenness of the research coverage is the concentration on 
certain religions. Although the comparative returns to the initial discovery process should 
not be relied on unduly (because, for example, they include US sources as well as British 
ones), they indicate, nevertheless, the high level of research interest in Islam among the 
minority religions (795 references), which actually exceeded the interest in Christianity by 
a small margin (792 references). There is a relatively high interest in Judaism (469 
references), and much less in Hinduism (92 references), Buddhism (48 references) and 
Sikhism (31 references) (see Appendix 1).  
Whilst it is true that self-identified Muslims are the largest of the minority religious groups 
in Britain, there are a number of other reasons for the level of interest in Islam. These are 
perhaps well enough known, but they bear repetition briefly here. They include the facts 
that: 
 In recent years, pressures for Government responses (including legislative change) 
have come much more from organisations claiming to speak on behalf of Muslims 
than from other minority faiths. 
 Issues of social cohesion have arisen more in connection with Muslim individuals 
and causes than with other faiths, including threatened or actual violence committed 
in the name of religion. 
 „Islamophobia‟ is widely regarded as the principal instigator of injustice of religion 
or belief in this country (although this concept requires careful analysis, and the 
perception of injustice exceeds the actual experience of injustice, according to the 
evidence currently available – see Chapter 2).  
 Some – but by no means all – Muslim groups are among those most affected by 
social and economic deprivation (see Chapter 4). 
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 Some situations of contemporary international conflict are commonly interpreted in 
terms of „Islam v. The West‟. 
We found, by contrast, very few empirical studies concerned with individuals in the 
„alternative spectrum‟ of belief (as defined in Chapter 3), who probably comprise a 
majority of the population in Britain. A similar finding relates to „New Religious 
Movements‟ or „Religious Movements‟, both of which terms are the subject of definitional 
debate and, indeed, contestation.8 Again, the literature search yielded very few references 
in this category that fulfilled all the other criteria for inclusion within the review; and 
though some individual Churches might be regarded as Religious Movements, we have 
chosen to refer to them below under their specific titles. We have, however, used generic 
religious categories to refer to the major faith groups, whilst recognising that diversities 
exist within them and – where appropriate – noting these (see also Beckford et al., 2006: 8-
9; Purdam et al., 2007: 163; Baksh et al., 2008).   
Throughout the review we have concentrated on how religion/belief is related to 
inequality, unfair treatment and discrimination. Some reference is made to the 
philosophical foundation of the new legal framework of equalities and human rights and to 
the theological underpinnings of inequality. But neither philosophy nor theology is the 
main focus of the review. We have not therefore covered the arguments for or against the 
existence of God, which have been the focus of a lively recent debate (Dawkins, 2006; 
Dennett, 2006; Hitchens, 2007). 
Nor have „Spirituality‟ or „New Age Spiritualities‟ formed part of this review, for two 
interrelated reasons. First, there is little suggestion from the literature that people will 
experience discrimination because of their individual search for spiritual development, so 
that our focus on religion/belief and inequality would be less relevant to this field of 
interest. Secondly, inclusion of the burgeoning literature on spirituality across the 
theoretical, policy and practice arenas (see, for instance, Heelas, 2001; 2006a and b; 
Furness, 2003; Gilligan and Furness, 2005; Heelas and Woodhead, 2005; Aupers and 
Houtman, 2006) would have tended to divert us from the more central concerns with 
inequality, given the time available for the review. This decision was fully understood by 
prominent authors in this field who were consulted during the review process.   
                                                     
8
  Interest in NRMs (particularly „cults‟) is widespread in the USA, and is of lesser degree, though long-
standing, in Europe and the UK. Eileen Barker, who is Chair and Honorary Director of the 
Information Network Focus on Religious Movements (INFORM), has written extensively in this field 
from the UK (See Barker, 2001; 2004; 2006 – the latter for a clear exposition of the debate on the 
distinction between „cults‟ and NRMs).  
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CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL APPROACH OF THE REVIEW 
2.1 The Dimensions of Religious Experience  
Purdam et al. (2007: 153-4) have emphasised the distinctions between: 
 Identity 
 Belief, and 
 Practice  
as distinct aspects of religious experience.9 These three dimensions of religion or belief do 
not always go together, which has significant implications for the way that individuals or 
groups – and indeed the whole of British society – is described from the point of view of 
religion or belief.10  
The interpretation of research findings will also depend on which aspect(s) of religion or 
belief are the focus of the research design, and these distinctions have legal implications 
too. The CIPD has asked, for example, if: 
a Christian is [legally] protected if he or she has been baptised but does not attend 
church‟ and whether it is „necessary to have made a conscious decision to be an 
Atheist, having considered the issues [in order to establish oneself as an Atheist] 
(CIPD, 2003: 6; 2).  
2.2  Religion, Culture and Ethnicity 
The new legal concern with „religion or belief‟ has emerged from an established context of 
concern for racial and ethnic equality, and there is often a close connection in practice 
between religion on the one hand and ethnicity or culture on the other on all three 
dimensions: 
 Identities can be „hyphenated‟ by religion, ethnicity and/or race – as „white 
Christian‟ or „Bangladeshi Muslim‟. 
 Religious and cultural beliefs can be difficult to disentangle from each other, 
depending in part on (varying) theological interpretations. 
 Practices likewise may be capable of differing interpretations, as either essential or 
incidental to the observance of a particular faith.  
On a more pragmatic level, it is only within the last few years, partly as a by-product of the 
same movement of opinion that led to changes in the law, that quantitative academic 
research has begun to pay attention more explicitly to religion as a variable (Brown, M., 
2000a; Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001; Richardson, 2001; Lindley, 2002; Peach, 2006; Khattab, 
2008). These are regarded below as the „pioneer studies‟ of equality and religion/belief. 
                                                     
9
 They also include „Religious Orientation‟ as a fourth dimension, but this is omitted here because it is 
not very clearly defined.  
10
  Note that there is a systematic ambiguity in the reference of the word „belief‟ in this field. On the one 
hand, „belief‟ is coupled with „religion‟ in the expression „religion or belief‟ to signify any non-
religious philosophical system or personal practice; on the other hand „belief‟ refers to the cognitive 
(propositional) dimension of all such systems of religion or belief (as distinct from the dimensions of 
identity and/or practice). Since the usage has become entrenched for both meanings of „belief‟, no 
attempt has been made to find an alternative terminology for the purposes of this report. The reader 
should bear this potential ambiguity in mind, and it will hopefully be clear in the context below which 
meaning of „belief‟ is intended.   
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The close relationship between ethnicity and religion is explored at a number of points 
below. An emerging theme is that expressions of religious identity can be used to advance 
claims that are more accurately seen as either cultural or political.  
2.3   Toleration, Prejudice and Islamophobia 
Differences of religion or belief tend to involve philosophical or moral world-views that 
are both sharply distinct from each other (in many cases mutually contradictory) and 
deeply felt by their adherents. This point has two immediate consequences:  
First, the law is placed in the unusual position of acting to protect at least some beliefs that 
must be false, since it protects a large range of beliefs that cannot all be true at the same 
time. As most will agree, the law therefore establishes the basic right to be wrong on 
fundamental matters. Persons of religious faith, for example, will look on the law as 
protecting the false belief of the Atheist; Atheists will look on the law as protecting the 
false belief in God. The legal process may have to go into the theological or philosophical 
background to belief – in order to determine, for example, whether an exemption from the 
Employment Equality Regulations claimed by a religious organisation relates to a genuine 
occupational requirement for the post in question – but it cannot go into the veracity of the 
beliefs themselves (DCA, 2006: 22).  
Second, the facts noted above create the first two circumstances of toleration („Difference‟ 
and „Importance‟) outlined by McKinnon (2006: 14). But the second two of McKinnon‟s 
four circumstances also hold, since adherents of religion or belief typically „disapprove 
and/or dislike‟ opposing practices or views („Opposition‟) and enjoy the political 
opportunity to „alter or suppress‟ these practises or views („Power‟).The full circumstances 
of toleration therefore apply to differences of religion or belief.  
Toleration itself is not in these circumstances a passive resignation to difference – merely 
putting up with beliefs or practices of which we disapprove. It assumes a more active 
character, as a deliberate and principled forbearance, which refuses for a variety of 
possible reasons to use a power that is available in an attempt to change the opposing 
practices or beliefs (McKinnon 2006: 15). „Toleration‟ in this social and/or political sense 
is not to be confused therefore with „tolerance‟ in the psychological sense. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, contemporary Britain contains a rich variety of 
religion or belief (including various forms of non-belief). The circumstances of toleration 
are therefore realised here, and disagreements are to be expected about religion or belief. 
As McKinnon‟s discussion implies, such disagreements may harden in some cases into 
disapproval; disapproval into dislike; dislike into hostility and hostility into hatred.  
The targets of these unfavourable attitudes and/or emotions may likewise vary in particular 
cases, from beliefs (or non-beliefs) to practices; and from beliefs or practices to the 
adherents of those beliefs or practices. A scale of discord is thus established from 
disagreement about beliefs at one end, to hatred of persons at the other, and religion or 
belief operates within a social field that is prone to controversy at the least and conflict at 
the extreme.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the approach taken by the British state through the new equalities 
legislation is not to suppress this potential contestation of religion or belief, but to provide 
a framework within which the contest can be regulated. This framework seeks to be even-
handed in principle in its treatment of all religious faiths and non-religious belief systems, 
and to keep the potential conflict between them within certain bounds. As we have seen, 
„discussion, criticism, or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse‟ of 
beliefs or practices (but not of persons) are explicitly exempted from the scope of legal 
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regulation. And it is likewise legal (or, strictly speaking, not illegal) to „proselytis[e] or 
urg[e] adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or 
belief system‟.   
On the other hand, the law draws the line at the range of harms listed in Chapter 1 above, 
which include discrimination, harassment, victimisation, terrorist violence and hate crime. 
The focus here is on the actions that may or may not flow from the underlying attitudes 
and/or emotions, rather than the attitudes or emotions themselves. This distinction needs to 
be borne in mind below.11 
A further distinction relevant to this report is that between unfavourable attitudes in 
general, and prejudice in particular. As its derivation suggests, a prejudice involves an 
element of pre-judgement, that is, an attitude adopted before the facts, or in spite of the 
facts. A finding of prejudice thus requires the demonstration of bias: a specific departure 
from neutral description or impartial judgement. In a similar vein, the influential report on 
Islamophobia commissioned in the 1990s by the Runnymede Trust defined „Islamophobia‟ 
as „unfounded hostility towards Islam‟ (Conway, 1997: 4, hereafter referred to as „The 
Conway Report‟).  Under this definition, it is not sufficient for a finding of Islamophobia to 
show that there is hostility towards Islam. The hostility must in addition be „unfounded‟ –
that is, it must go beyond a reasoned opposition to Islam (or a reasonable emotional 
response to Islam) in some context of application. As its name implies, Islamophobia thus 
requires not just an unfavourable attitude towards the religion, but an element of phobia – 
irrational dread.  
These distinctions may be easy enough to state in principle, but they are more difficult (and 
controversial) to apply in practice. As The Conway Report asked: „How…can one tell the 
difference between legitimate criticism and disagreement on the one hand, and 
Islamophobia on the other?‟12 The distinctions are nevertheless emphasised here because 
they have not always been respected in the literature, which makes it correspondingly 
difficult to orient research and policy to the appropriate issues. Two brief examples will 
hopefully suffice to establish this point. 
As a first example, The Conway Report cites (with apparent approval) the statement from 
one submission that „Islamophobia is a classic demonstration of the formula that 
“prejudice + power = discrimination”‟ (1997: 18). The question, though, is how this 
formula is to be interpreted. It may be intended to mean that whenever religious minorities 
(say, Muslims in Britain) face social prejudice, and also lack social power, then there is a 
danger that they will suffer discrimination (or other forms of social harm or injustice) on 
the basis of their religion. This is a useful way of describing the conditions of toleration, 
and of focussing investigation onto both prejudice and discrimination.   
The statement is much less helpful, however, if it is taken to imply that discrimination (or 
injustice more generally) is inevitable in these circumstances, and that prejudice is 
tantamount to discrimination (granted that religious minorities lack social power). Such a 
conclusion fails to honour the distinction between the attitude („prejudice‟) and the action 
(„discrimination‟), which are distinct phenomena that require independent investigation, 
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 The Equality Act (2006, Chapter 3, Part 1, 10c) does, however, lay a general responsibility on the 
EHRC to „work towards the elimination of prejudice against, hatred of and hostility towards members 
of groups‟. 
12
 The Conway Report (1997: 4-5) attempts to answer its own question by developing a contrast between 
„open‟ (unprejudiced) and „closed‟ (prejudiced) views of Islam. The authors find some difficulty in 
pinning the contrast down, however, and it would be very difficult to operationalise in any case. So the 
definition of „Islamophobia‟ remains elusive.  
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and may run at different levels in any society.13 To treat them as the same („=‟) is to say, in 
effect, that toleration is an impossible goal, because those who both (i) possess social 
power over a particular religion (or its adherents) and (ii) feel prejudice towards it (or 
them) will never exercise the requisite forbearance. This seems to be unwise politically, 
since it closes off the principal means of achieving „good relations‟ between groups of 
religion or belief, which is one of the main objectives of the equalities legislation, and part 
of the remit of the EHRC (www.equalityhumanrights.com). 
The second example focuses on the distinction between a prejudice and an unfavourable 
(or negative) attitude. It is taken from an important survey conducted for the Cabinet 
Office Equalities Review, and published under the title Equality, Diversity and Prejudice 
in Britain (Abrams and Houston, 2006).  This is a significant study because it was the first 
attempt (so far as we are aware) to gain comparative information across all six of the 
equalities strands, and to „establish a baseline and evidence [for the work of the EHRC] 
against which it will be possible to evaluate the extent and forms of prejudice experienced 
by and expressed towards different groups in our society in the years ahead‟ (Abrams and 
Houston, 2006: 7).  
This survey is, unfortunately, not as useful for the strand of religion or belief as might be 
hoped. Abrams and Houston (2006: 16-17) begin by commenting on the difficulty of 
asking people point blank about whether they are prejudiced. They therefore opt for a 
survey question that reads „In general how negative or positive do you feel about the 
following groups in Britain?‟ in relation to named groups including „people under 30‟, 
„disabled people‟ and – the only group of religion or belief about which an opinion is 
sought –„Muslims‟. The answers to this question, which range from „very negative‟ to „very 
positive‟ therefore involve favourable or unfavourable attitudes rather than prejudice. But 
the answers are considered under the heading „Overt Prejudice‟, and are used elsewhere in 
the report to provide „a very basic measure of direct prejudice‟ (Abrams and Houston, 
2006: 86, 33). The effect of this procedure is to elide the distinction between a negative 
attitude and a prejudice, which is particularly unfortunate in an arena of essentially 
contested opinions such as religion or belief. With these caveats in mind, it is interesting to 
note that 19% of the sample expressed negative feelings about Muslims, in comparison 
with 22% who expressed such feelings about gays/lesbians, as against 10% for Black 
people and 8% for people under 30 (Abrams and Houston, 2006: 34, Figure 5).    
The Global Attitudes Project on religion conducted by the Pew Research Center in 
Washington DC is on safer ground conceptually, because the survey questions refer to 
„favourable‟ and „unfavourable‟ opinions, and the term „prejudice‟ does not occur within 
the study. The survey also offers a broader comparative perspective than Abrams and 
Houston, not only through its international coverage, but because it includes more than one 
religion in relation to Britain. The headline findings are that between 14% and 23% of the 
British respondents expressed unfavourable opinions of Muslims in the four surveys 
conducted between 2004 and 2008, which is consistent with the evidence from Abrams and 
Houston. On the other hand, large majorities (of between 63% to 71%) expressed 
favourable opinions about Muslims (Pew, 2008: 53: Q10g). The proportions of 
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 The Conway Report (1997: 1) overrides this distinction by extending the definition of Islamophobia to 
„refer[] to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim 
individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social 
affairs‟. A psychological term is thereby extended to embrace a social phenomenon, which is 
unfortunate, given that hostility is neither necessary nor sufficient for injustice. 
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unfavourable opinions expressed about Christians range between 5 and 7% over the four 
British surveys, and about Jews range between 6% and 9%.14   
These figures for attitudes towards religious groups in Britain may be compared with those 
for countries such as France, where unfavourable opinions of Muslims, Christians and 
Jews were held by 38%, 17% and 20% of the sample respectively in the 2008 survey. The 
equivalent figures for the United States were 23%, 3% and 7%; for China they were 55%, 
55% and 55%; for Turkey 9%, 74% and 76%; for Pakistan 1%, 60% and 76%, and for 
India 56%, 37% and 32% respectively (Pew, 2008: 49-53, Q10e-Q10g).15 
Overall then, large majorities of the British population appear to hold favourable opinions 
of adherents of all the Abrahamic faith groups, with only very small minorities holding 
unfavourable opinions of either Christians or Jews. It is a concern that a sizeable minority 
(of around 20%) are found to hold an unfavourable opinion of Muslims, although this 
proportion is considerably lower than in many other countries, including France, China and 
India. This level of anti-Muslim opinion in Britain is also much lower than the proportions 
who are found to hold unfavourable opinions of Christians and Jews in China or India, or 
of the same groups in countries with predominantly Muslim populations such as Turkey or 
Pakistan. In other words, Britain comes out of these international comparisons quite well.  
More work is evidently required to understand the basis for the unfavourable opinion of 
Muslims among a minority of the British sample, and in particular whether (and, if so, in 
what ways) this involves religious prejudice. The existence of this potential reservoir of 
anti-Muslim feeling forms a „background of concern‟, but it is important to recognise that 
this evidence regarding attitudes does not in itself constitute evidence of religious injustice. 
Generally speaking, a number of injustices of religion or belief (such as discrimination, 
harassment or hate crime) can be reduced either by working to lower the level of prejudice 
(which reduces the motivation for injustice), or by working to increase the level of 
toleration (which reduces the activation of prejudice). This distinction is important because 
these two paths to justice may require different kinds of policy initiatives, as well as 
different strategies for research. Our brief from the XXXX (as well as the legal framework) 
emphasises inequality and injustice, as opposed to prejudice per se, which explains the 
relative priorities given to these topics below.  
2.4 Identities as Multiple and Contextual  
We have adopted the general view that personal identity always has a number of 
dimensions, and that the expression of its different aspects varies according to social 
context. This view is a staple of the theoretical literature, which has been emphasised 
recently in relation to religion by Sen (2006: 19) and emerges from a number of other 
studies, including Burris et al. (2000); Hopkins et al. 2004); Sellick (2004); Hopkins 
(2006) and Modood (2007).  
Ansari (2002: 32) has said that „There is no single, clearly defined perception of British 
Muslim identity; on the contrary, the notion is complex, diverse and equivocal‟ and Peach 
(2006: 354) echoes the thought that „Identity is nested and contingent‟. Focus group 
research has also emphasised: „[the] need to recognise that people have „multiple‟ 
identities – they are never just black or female or gay or disabled, for example. Those 
promoting fair treatment for all and tackling discrimination need to emphasise this.‟ 
(EOC, 2003: 9). This view is already implicit in the formation of the EHRC as a unified 
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  The differences in the results of the four surveys are broadly within the error margin of 4% quoted for 
the British sample, which included about 750 respondents in 2008 (Pew, 2008: 43). Similar points 
should be borne in mind regarding any international comparisons.  
15
  Appendix 2 provides additional detail from both the Pew research and the Abrams and Houston report.  
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body, and part of the case for such a body is that it can „tackle issues of multiple 
discrimination‟ (Southwark, 2004: 2). This view stands opposed to an „essentialist‟ 
theoretical alternative, which privileges one or more dimensions of identity over others as a 
matter of course, regardless of social context or the character of lived experience.16 
This does not mean, however, that every dimension of identity is equally in play in every 
social context; it merely means that their relative priorities are the subject of investigation. 
In particular, a number of studies suggest that the Muslim religious identity has been 
increasingly prioritised by adherents in recent years (Macey 1999a; Dwyer, 2000; Archer, 
2001; Mirza et al., 2007). This point is pursued in Chapters 4 and 5.  
2.5 The Relevance of Social Class 
We were asked specifically to identify gaps in the research base, and research on religion 
and social class is a case in point. Very little research refers explicitly to social class (or 
related expressions of social difference), despite the salience of social class to many issues 
covered by this report. Social class has aspects of identity, belief and practice; for example, 
it correlates highly with many measures of inequality; it has communal attributes in some 
cases, and members of some social classes suffer discrimination and/or stigmatisation in 
society and ridicule in the mass media. Social class enters into any personal decision that 
depends on the availability of material resources, which is nearly every personal decision. 
Just as it is possible that some religious inequalities turn out on closer inspection to have 
ethnic causes, it may be that others have roots in social class (Edwards and Hatch, 2004). 
And social class might contribute to social cohesion, since class identities and interests 
might unite individuals across boundaries of religion, race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability 
or sexual orientation.  
Killeen (2008) has emphasised the general importance of social class within a human 
rights framework, and we would underline its relevance to all the equality strands. 
Attention is drawn below to a number of cases where the findings of empirical research on 
religion/belief are weakened by the absence of a social class dimension. There is, indeed, a 
case for including social class as a „seventh strand‟ within the new equalities framework, 
but this argument is not developed further here.   
2.6  Inequality, Disadvantage and Discrimination 
In this report, „religious inequality‟ (or „inequality of religion or belief‟) will be used as an 
ethically-neutral descriptive term to denote any variation in socio-economic conditions or 
other circumstances between members of religious (or belief) groups.  
Following Weller et al. (2001: 8), the term „religious disadvantage‟ (or „disadvantage of 
religion or belief‟) will be used to denote the position of particular groups of religion (or 
belief) which are treated less favourably than other groups through lack of equal 
recognition in official or institutional contexts, including the law. The new legal 
framework in itself eliminates some aspects of previous religious disadvantage, by drawing 
all groups of religion or belief into the same framework on formally equal terms.
 
The 
recent repeal of the Blasphemy Law has worked in the same direction, by removing an 
advantage previously enjoyed by the Christian, especially Anglican, Church. It should be 
emphasised that formal equality is neither necessary nor sufficient for substantive equality. 
It is not sufficient because equal recognition of groups of religion or belief does not 
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 Modood (2007) adopts the perspective of „multiple identities‟ and argues that it is still possible to talk 
about cultures as social realities within this perspective. This position leaves open the policy option of 
multiculturalism for advocates of „multiple identity‟. 
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automatically translate into equal treatment of members of those groups; and it may not be 
necessary because ways may be found to address religious interests informally, in the 
absence of formal recognition (see, for example, CRE, 2005b).  
The term „religious discrimination‟ will be used in the legal sense(s) defined above, with 
the distinctions „direct‟ or „indirect‟ as appropriate. For clarity, the term „discrimination‟ 
will be confined to inequalities that are regarded as unjust. The distinction between 
inequality and discrimination is required because „not all inequality stems from 
discrimination, and therefore not all inequality can be addressed by legal remedy.‟ 
(Phillips, 2007: 37) 
Although the coverage of religion by quantitative work is in its early stages, the pioneer 
studies mentioned above create an emerging picture of the relationship between inequality 
and religion/belief that has a number of common elements. At the risk of some 
oversimplification, these are that: 
 Many inequalities of social condition exist for groups defined (in whole or in part) by 
religious self-ascription. 
 The incidence of these inequalities is often differentiated by a combination of 
religion, race and/or ethnicity, creating distinct „hyphen-groups‟ with a shared 
situation. 
 The incidence of inequality varies (a) between the hyphen-groups, and (b) between 
contexts for each group. 
 The inequalities are probably caused by a combination of (a) factors internal to a 
group and/or its members (including cultural values and economic factor 
endowments) and (b) factors in the external social environment of the group and/or 
its members (including religious, racial and/or ethnic discrimination).  
 The balance between these two kinds of factors (and of the three kinds of 
discrimination) varies among the hyphen-groups, and between contexts for each 
group. 
2.7  Perception and Experience of Religious Discrimination 
The operative distinction here is between third-party opinions about discrimination (or 
other harms) suffered by others on the basis of the others‟ religion or belief, and the first-
person actuality of such discrimination (or harm), as suffered by individuals themselves. 
These will be termed the „perception‟ and the „experience‟ of religious discrimination (or 
other harms) respectively.  
The distinction between the perception and the experience of inequality and/or injustice is 
relevant to a number of significant studies in the field, including Conway, 1997; Weller et 
al., 2001; Allen and Nielson, 2002; EOC, 2003; Walls and Williams, 2003; Ameli et al., 
2004; EUMC, 2004; 2006; Bruce et al., 2005; Kitchen et al., 2006; Patterson and Iannelli, 
2006; Abrams and Houston, 2007 and Jahangir, 2008. 
A careful analysis of the evidence from these and other sources suggests two general 
conclusions: 
First, it is widely perceived that religious discrimination is widespread; 
Second, the (self-reported) experience of religious discrimination is less frequent than it is 
widely perceived to be (at least for most religious groups, including Muslims, in most 
contexts). 
These conclusions apply independently to the (differing) situations in Scotland and in 
England and Wales, and this point is sufficiently significant for the whole review to 
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warrant a brief explication here. 
The main concern with religious injustice in Scotland has centred historically on 
(Christian) sectarianism, so that „many Scots believe religious discrimination [directed 
against Catholics] to be common‟ (Bruce et al., 2005: 165, and see Walls and Williams, 
2003; Adams and Burke, 2006; Bradley, 2006). Yet Bruce finds that there is „a gulf 
between perception and experience‟ illustrated by the fact that „98.3 per cent of Catholics 
in [one] Glasgow survey declined the chance to claim to have been victims of 
discrimination‟ (Bruce et al., 2005: 165, 162). Since there is also very little inequality in 
socio-economic terms between Catholics and others (in all but the oldest age cohorts), 
Bruce and his colleagues conclude that „such patterns as we find are entirely consistent 
with an explanation in which discrimination plays no part‟ (Bruce et al., 2005: 166). 
According to this evidence, then, contemporary Scotland presents a case in which there is 
(i) a widespread perception of widespread (intra-Christian) discrimination, but (ii) little 
(self-reported) experience of it, and (iii) low levels of religious (intra-Christian) inequality 
in social or economic terms. 
The main concern in England and Wales lies not with Christian sectarianism, but with 
discrimination directed against members of the minority (non-Christian) faiths, especially 
Muslims (Weller, 2006: 309). One of the most influential recent studies of the question 
was entitled Religious Discrimination in England and Wales (Weller et al., 2001) 
(hereafter „The Weller Report‟). The brief given to Weller and his colleagues by the Home 
Office was „to assess the evidence of religious discrimination in England and Wales, both 
actual and perceived.‟ (Weller et al., 2001: vi)  
The principal research instrument chosen for the study was a survey question addressed to 
representatives of a wide range of religious organisations, as follows: „do your members 
experience unfair treatment because of their religion in any of the following areas?‟ 
(Weller et al., 2001: 136, Annex A). As the researchers comment, „the representative from 
each organisation who completed the questionnaire was set the difficult task of trying to 
reflect the collective experience of his or her membership‟. (Weller et al., 2001: 5) This 
survey was backed by interviews with a very small sample of individuals (N=29) „who 
claim to have experienced discrimination on the basis of religion‟ (Weller et al., 2001: 
161).  
It follows that the evidence provided by The Weller Report is nearly all concerned with the 
third-party perception rather than the first-person experience of religious discrimination – 
„perceived‟ rather than „actual‟ discrimination, according to the terms set out in the Home 
Office brief to the Weller research team. And the element of the research design which 
comes closest to the first-person experience of discrimination (the „biographical‟ interview 
process) involves a self-selected (non-random) sample, which cannot provide any 
independent evidence of the general social extent of discrimination. The Weller Report is 
nevertheless cited prominently in recent surveys as contributing significant evidence for 
the incidence of religious discrimination as it is actually experienced in England and Wales 
(see, for example, Purdam, et al., 2007: 148, 160; Denvir, et al., 2007).17 
The main finding of The Weller Report is that religious discrimination is widely perceived 
by (representatives of) minority religious organisations to be a widespread problem 
affecting their members. A majority of Muslim organisations reported very frequent unfair 
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  Denvir et al. (2007) in an ACAS review article that described The Weller Report as „the main study 
documenting religion or belief discrimination in the workplace, and wider society‟ and as „a 
comprehensive and detailed empirical study of the experience of discrimination on grounds of religion 
or belief‟. (26-27, emphasis added) 
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treatment across every institutional domain, with Hindu and Sikh organisations reporting 
relatively high levels of unfair treatment. (Weller et al., 2001: vii-viii)  
High levels of perceived unfairness were also found by the 2005 Citizenship Survey, which 
is the most recent large-scale enquiry into the current issue conducted with a general 
population sample (N>9,600). Almost two-thirds of respondents (64%) believed that there 
was a considerable amount of religious prejudice, and a remarkable 93% named Muslims 
(without prompting) as a group against whom prejudice had recently increased. (Kitchen et 
al., 2006: 48-53, Tables 17-26). 
The 2005 Citizenship Survey also asked, however, about respondents‟ first-person 
experience of religious discrimination, which allows perceptions and experience to be 
compared directly for the same large (and carefully-constructed) random sample. The main 
findings are that just 2% of respondents reported that they had been discriminated against 
because of their religion by any organisation, rising to 7% for Hindu respondents, 12% for 
Sikhs and 13% for Muslims. (Kitchen et al., 2006: 59, Table 34). A separate set of 
questions regarding the experience of discrimination in employment found that just 1% of 
the white respondents with adverse employment experiences specified religion as a reason 
for refusal of a job, and 2% specified religion as a reason for unfair treatment regarding 
promotion. The corresponding figures for black respondents were 2% and 4%, and for 
Asian respondents 10% and 16% respectively (Kitchen et al., 2006: 30, Figures 22 and 
23).18  
If the employment experience is analysed by the respondent‟s religion (as opposed to the 
respondent‟s ethnicity) a distinctive pattern emerges in which 26% of Muslims cite religion 
as a reason in relation to job refusal, and no less than 44% in relation to promotion –
considerably higher than the comparable figures of 10% and 16% for the „Asian' 
respondents. This compares with figures of 1% in both cases for Christians; 1% and 7% for 
Hindus, and 8% and 7% for Sikhs (Kitchen et al., 2006: 84, Tables 49-50). These figures 
relate, however, to a sub-sample containing the small minority of the population who 
report adverse employment experiences. The actual number of Muslim respondents who 
reported adverse treatment in employment by reason of religion can be calculated as just 
over 2.5% – that is just over one in forty – of the Muslim respondents in the relevant 
samples in each case. Thus the figures support the view that (self-reported) adverse 
treatment in employment is relatively rare for members of all religious groups, with the 
proviso that amongst the relatively small number of such cases, a relatively high proportion 
of Muslims believe that religion or belief is a reason for their adverse treatment. 
Three other studies have recorded higher levels of self-reported discrimination against 
Muslims, but there are questions in all three cases about whether they provide a reliable 
indicator of the general level of discrimination against Muslims in society.  
 
In the first case, it seems that the sample may not be random (Ameli, 2004: 42). In the 
second case, the results are obtained from non-random „snowball sampling‟ and the 
authors themselves volunteer that „it is not possible to generalise the results of this 
research‟ (Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008: 15). The relevant sample size is also small 
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 The aggregate figure for the whole sample is that just 2% of those with adverse employment 
experiences cited religion as a factor in the experience – the same figure for both refusal of a job and 
refusal of promotion. By comparison, the figures for job refusal on the grounds of age is 23%, race 
and/or colour is 10% and gender is 3%. The corresponding figures for refusal of promotion are age 
27%, race and/or colour 19% and gender 22%. (Kitchen et al., 2006: 82, Table 46). In summary, 
religion is consistently the weakest of the specific social factors identified by this research regarding 
adverse employment experiences. 
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(N=155). A third case involves the report by Abrams and Houston (2006) discussed above 
in relation to prejudice. They asked respondents about their recent personal experiences of 
either prejudice or unfair treatment. 59% of the Muslim respondents reported such 
experiences, but this figure referred to all the possible bases of prejudice or unfair 
treatment, not just religion. The most frequent basis of prejudice or unfair treatment was 
ethnicity (56%), followed by religion (46%), gender (37%) and age (35%) (Abrams and 
Houston, 2006: 37, Figure 7; 42, Figure 11). The size of the Muslim sub-sample was also 
small (N=128), with a 95% confidence interval for the cited percentages of up to +/-10% 
(Abrams and Houston, 23; 21, n.3).  
The figure for the experience of self-reported prejudice or unfair treatment against 
Muslims on grounds of religion thus lies in a large range between 36% to 56%, but it is not 
known how much of this is attributable to unfair treatment as opposed to prejudice, and 
unfair treatment does not necessarily involve discrimination in any case.19 There are also 
some grounds for doubting the approach that respondents took to the very general question 
– referring both to prejudice and unfair treatment – used by Abrams and Houston.20 By 
contrast, the 2005 Citizenship survey used a much larger sample size, and asked 
specifically about discrimination in ways that directed respondents towards specific social 
contexts, such as employment, health care or criminal justice. 
In terms of other studies, Marsh (2002: 4) found a very low total of less than 2% self-
reported religious discrimination in a Europe-wide sample. And the most recent 
Citizenship Survey (which took place from April 2007 to March 2008) is much less useful 
for this report than its 2005 predecessor, since it does not deal with religious discrimination 
as a separate issue, asking instead „whether racial or religious harassment is a problem in 
your local area‟, and does not report results separately for religious (as opposed to ethnic) 
groups (DCLG, 2008b: 16-17). 
The two general conclusions reported above in relation to England and Wales thus rely on 
a combination of i) the evidence contained in both The Weller Report and the 2005 
Citizenship Survey regarding the high levels of perceived unfairness (including 
discrimination) against religious minorities, ii) the evidence contained in the 2005 
Citizenship Survey for the lower levels of discrimination experienced by these minorities, 
and iii) the absence of counter evidence on the experience of discrimination that asks the 
relevant questions in random samples of an adequate size. This is why the reported 
conclusions are offered as the most appropriate summary judgement on the basis of the 
evidence currently available.  
In terms of the existence of Bruce et al.‟s „gulf between perception and experience‟, the 
situation with minority religions in England and Wales thus resembles the situation found 
with Christian sectarianism in Scotland. But the two cases differ in other respects, and the 
overall situation in England and Wales is characterised by (i) a widespread perception of 
widespread discrimination against religious minorities, especially Muslims, with (ii) less 
(self-reported) experience of it, accompanied by (iii) considerable evidence of religious 
inequality in social or economic terms (see Section 2.6 above). 
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 Note that although Abrams and Houston (2006: 86) ask the question in terms of unfair treatment, they 
discuss the results of the survey in terms of „discrimination‟, as if there is no difference between the 
two concepts. This difficulty is similar to that created by their interpretation of the results of a question 
about negative feelings in terms of „prejudice‟, as noted above.  
20
 For example, 9% of heterosexuals reported personal experience of prejudice or unfair treatment on the 
basis of their sexuality, and no less than 11% of non-disabled respondents reported such adverse 
experiences on the basis of their disability (which they do not possess). (Abrams and Houston, 2006: 
40, Figure 9; 44, Figure 13).  
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It should be emphasised, however, that all these findings rely on respondents‟ self-reports 
to provide evidence for the experience of religious discrimination. This evidence is 
certainly „closer to the action‟ than the evidence from third-party perceptions, but it is not 
by itself conclusive. On the one hand, self-reports may underestimate the extent of 
discrimination, because respondents may not be aware of the actions that affect them, or 
because the social climate discourages disclosure (Ameli, 2004: 23). On the other hand, 
self-reports may overestimate the extent of discrimination, because respondents mistake 
their own experiences as examples of discrimination, or the grounds on which it occurs –
believing, for example, that the unfair treatment arises from religious discrimination, rather 
than from ethnic or racial discrimination. There is also the problem of whether respondents 
share the investigators‟ (or the legal) understanding of terms such as „unfair treatment‟ or 
‟discrimination‟, since „in [some] contexts, religious individuals can come close to 
claiming that others are discriminating against them because they do not happen to share 
the same values‟. (Weller et al., 2001: 116).21  
It has been claimed in the past that „clear proof of any form of discrimination is often hard 
to obtain since admissions by the perpetrators are rare„ (Conway et al., 1997: 58), and it is 
certainly true that „proof of religious discrimination is difficult to establish in the absence 
of hard statistics‟ (Brown, 2000b: 1037). But these verdicts should not be taken as a 
counsel of despair, since evidence amounting to „clear proof‟ and/or „hard statistics‟ can 
come from two sources especially:  
First is the evidence from case law. This will evolve as the new legal framework takes 
effect, but some early indications are available from the ACAS analysis of claims brought 
under the legislation on religion or belief, which include cases of harassment, bullying and 
violence (Savage, 2007). The analysis of specific legal cases was beyond the remit given to 
the authors by the XXXX, but it is interesting to note that two-thirds of these claims cited 
race as a secondary jurisdiction to religion or belief.   
Second, the evidence can come from discrimination testing, using actor techniques, for 
example. It was the use of such techniques that provided compelling evidence for the 
incidence of racial discrimination in Britain in the 1970s, by catching the perpetrators in 
the act (Smith, 1977: 124). These techniques have not been adapted to the case of religious 
discrimination in recent academic work, so far as we can establish – our search process has 
revealed just one report of such an exercise conducted in Britain, on behalf of BBC Radio 
Five Live with about fifty employers (EUMC, 2006: 44).22 
Our preference for hard evidence – „reality‟ – does not imply that we treat the creation, 
collection and analysis of statistics as unproblematic. Statistical evidence is only valid if 
the correct questions are addressed appropriately to representative samples of adequate 
size, and interpreted correctly in the light of all the technical assumption involved. Nor 
should it be assumed that we dismiss the importance of „perceptions‟. Quite the reverse, for 
people‟s perceptions create/define reality for them and thus influence their attitudes and 
actions. Our concern here is with those instances where a distance is established between 
perceptions and reality, generating the impression of widespread discrimination against 
Catholics in Scotland, for example, or of discrimination against the members of minority 
religions in England and Wales. These misleading impressions can gain their own facticity 
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  See also Jayaweera and Choudhury (2008) on this topic and on the relationship between religious and 
ethnic or racial discrimination. 
22
 The National Employment Panel has recently advocated a similar approach to the measurement of 
racial and ethnic discrimination, using the testing methodology of the International Labour 
Organisation (Pell, 2007: 22; ILO, 2004). We are grateful to Sukhvinder Singh for this reference. 
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by continuous repetition, so that „what everybody knows‟ becomes a self-sustaining 
fallacy.  
It is worth drawing out two interim conclusions of this analysis for stakeholders.  
First, the emergence of hyphen-groups as the most appropriate focus of academic analysis 
reinforces the decision to treat religion, race and ethnicity within a single legal and 
organisational framework. Instances of discrimination are unlikely to be pure examples 
involving just one of these three factors – a point reinforced by the ACAS tabulation of 
cases mentioned above. 
Second, there is only one component in the inequality experienced by religious groups that 
is caused by discrimination, and there is only one component of such discrimination that is 
religious discrimination. It follows that the best way to improve the situation of members 
of minority religious groups may be to focus on aspects of their situation other than 
religious discrimination, including discrimination by ethnicity or race (or on other 
protected grounds), and aspects of their situation that may not involve these kinds of unfair 
treatment in any way, such as poverty or educational attainment. That seems to be part of 
the lesson that can be learned in England and Wales from the history of religious 
sectarianism in Scotland – where improvements in educational attainment appear to have 
paved the way towards social equality (Paterson and Iannelli, 2006) – as well as the current 
findings of research (see especially Phillips, 2007; Clark and Drinkwater, 2008). These 
points will be amplified in the chapters below. 
2.8 Philosophical and Normative Issues 
a. The Individual and the Community 
One of the main issues in the debate about ethnicity, religion and the state is the question 
of whether the rights of social groups should be recognised as well as the rights of 
individuals, and, if so, what the relationship should be between these two sets of rights 
(Kymlicka, 1995; Barry, 2001; Kelly, 2002). 
The resolution of this issue will affect the character of the recognition that is given by the 
state to collective entities such as communities or religious organisations. This will reflect, 
in turn, on the nature or extent of the control which the community or organisation can 
exert over its own members. A key issue is whether the rights of the collective can ever 
over-ride (what would otherwise be) the rights of the individual. One factor to note here is 
that the relationship between the individual and the community may be seen in different 
ways in Western traditions, on the one hand, and in some African and South Asian 
traditions, on the other. Ballard (1994) has observed, for example, that: „The ghar 
[family/household] is an institution governed by ideals of corporate loyalty which assert 
priority for family obligation over the personal self‟. (cited in Bhatti, 2007: 25) 
The issues raised by these differences in perspective cannot be resolved here, except to 
note the following points: 
Individuals who come together in a group bring with them all the rights they enjoy as 
individuals. Article 9.1 of the ECHR holds, for example, that freedom of conscience allows 
for the manifestation of religious life „either alone or in community with others‟ (DCA, 
2006: 43). These pooled rights create a very substantial scope for the operations of 
religious organisations, and of religiously based community, which is perfectly compatible 
with liberal individualism. And the idea of freedom of conscience, is in any case, a hard-
won historical achievement of Western liberalism: „this [liberal] model of citizenship was 
developed in response to the wars of religion that made much of Europe a living hell in the 
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries‟ (Barry, 2001:  21). 
Ansari (2002: 23) has commented on the way that Muslims in particular have been able to 
use the common law principle that „everything is permitted except what is expressly 
forbidden‟ (Poulter, 1992: 266) to develop Islamic practices within the UK context.  
Ramadan (2004: 77) has developed the concept of dar al-shahada („area of testimony‟) to 
characterise the situation of Muslims in North America and Europe, where „fundamental 
rights are guaranteed that allow [Muslims] to feel at home‟ (2004: 70). Lewis places this 
development in a longer historical perspective, suggesting that: 
In most tests of tolerance, Islam, both in theory and in practice, compares 
unfavourably with the Western democracies as they have developed during the last 
two or three centuries, but very favourably with most other Christian and post-
Christian societies and regimes. (2004: 127) 
And more recently, Jahangir has observed that:  
almost all of the [UN] Special Rapporteur‟s interlocutors agreed that there was a 
very satisfactory amount of freedom of religion or belief in the United Kingdom. 
Many of them added that the situation of their respective communities was far better 
than in those countries where they had emigrated from. (2008: 8) 
We are not seeking to deny that there may be value-based differences between religious or 
cultural traditions and secular moral or legal frameworks – the legal exemptions discussed 
in the next section offer a good example. The point is rather that it may be misleading to 
couch these differences in terms of a straightforward contrast between the rights of 
individuals and the rights of collectivities. The appropriate questions will always be:  
 Which individual rights are subject to infringement? 
 In what circumstances and in which respects?, and,  
 In the name of which alternative religious, moral or legal principles? 
b. Visions of Justice and Concepts of Equality 
A number of authors have noted that a „vision of justice‟ underlies (or should underlie) the 
recent development of equalities legislation (Fredman, 2002a and b; Bamforth, 2004), and 
Choudhury (2007: 100) speaks of „a vision of religious equality‟ in a similar context. 
Recent candidates for the contents of this vision include „a culture of fairness, 
participation and mutual respect‟ from the Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of England and 
Wales [CBCEW], 2007: 2). The Equalities Review concludes that „an equal society: 
 Protects and promotes equal, real freedom and substantive opportunity to live in the 
ways people value and would choose, so that everyone can flourish. 
 Recognises people‟s different needs, situations and goals and removes the barriers 
that limit what people can do and can be‟ (Phillips, 2007: 14).  
Fredman (2002b: iv) has argued that „equality ought to encompass four central aims: 
 To break the cycle of disadvantage associated with out-groups. 
 To promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all, redressing stigma, 
stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of membership of an out-group. 
 To affirm community identities. 
 To facilitate full participation in society‟.  
There are, in addition, a number of discussions about whether the existing legal provisions 
go far enough: should the focus be changed from the protection of individuals against 
specific harms, in favour of an institutional commitment to promote substantive equality? 
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(Baker et al., 2004; Fredman, 2005; Choudhury, 2007). Questions of positive 
discrimination (which remains illegal in the UK) and affirmative action arise in this 
context, and the public sector Equality Duties mentioned above are related to this 
developing conception.  
Once again the full evaluation of all these issues lies beyond the remit of this review, but 
two specific points are noteworthy: 
First, there is a general need for further inquiry into the normative foundations of the 
current Government approach to equality. This includes the debate about the different 
concepts of equality (Jewson and Mason, 1986; Fredman, 2002a and b; Clayton and 
Williams, 2002; Baker et. al, 2004) and the balance of equality with diversity, which 
figures in all three conceptions cited above. Bamforth (2004: 710) also raises the point that 
the understandable concern with equality may arise from deeper values such as „the 
recognition that the well-being of all human beings counts‟ (Raz, 1986: 218, n.75, cited by 
Bamforth, 2004: 713; Westen, 1982).  
Second, it is necessary to recognise frankly that the inclusion of religion or belief within a 
unified equalities framework is not without its tensions, precisely because of the 
„circumstances of toleration‟ outlined above. The diversity of values and opinions may 
occur between the practices and values of the religious traditions on the one hand and the 
normative foundations of the new laws on the other, including the vision of justice that they 
promote.  
Fredman has said, for example, that: 
an individual‟s religious values cannot be overridden by a mere assertion of 
dominant values. However, religion cannot in itself be used to justify an infringement 
on the equal rights and dignity of others, in particular, in respect of women, children 
or gay, lesbian or bisexual people. (2002b: iv) 
This suggests that the writ of the law runs wide.  
As noted in Chapter 1, religious groups have, however, gained wide-ranging exemptions 
from the law in certain areas, which shield their activities from the full and/or immediate 
effects of equalities legislation. The terms in which the (Anglican) Archbishop‟s Council 
(AC, 2003) and the Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of England and Wales (CBCEW, 2007) 
have sometimes conducted the argument implies a refusal moreover to accept that full 
„equal rights and dignity‟ apply to gays and lesbians in particular, and contains also (in the 
Anglican case) a wide-ranging claim for the non-interference by the state in the activities 
of „Churches and other faith based organisations‟ (see Crockett and Voas, 2003, and 
Hicks, 2003, for a fuller discussion of the issues relating to sexual orientation).   
This outcome means that an area of society has been established that lies beyond the writ 
of the new legislation. It is not yet clear how far the exemptions will go, because this will 
depend on the evolution of case law, but the reserved area could be quite extensive, 
especially as (or if) the practice of subcontracting public services to FBOs develops (BHA, 
2007). Although the UN Special Rapporteur concluded that the UK‟s anti-discrimination 
legislation „seems to be quite balanced‟ (Jahangir, 2008: 17), it remains a matter of some 
concern that prominent organisations in the field of religion or belief enter reservations 
about the vision of justice that underlies the new framework, and make efforts to exempt 
themselves from the claims of the law as it now applies to the rest of society.23  
                                                     
23
 The Archbishops‟ Council does not „challenge [ ] the principle that homosexuals should have full 
equality and protection before the law‟. (AC, 2003: 4) The argument seems to be that the legal 
protections are acceptable as long as they are not applied to the activities of religious organisations. 
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These circumstances underline the need to remain alert to two kinds of unfair treatment in 
the field of religion or belief: 
 Discrimination or other harms suffered generally by individuals in the workplace, 
civil society and/or the public services on the basis of the sufferer‟s religion or belief. 
 Discrimination or other harms suffered by individuals at the hands of religious 
organisations or religiously motivated individuals, either on the basis of the 
sufferer‟s religion or belief or on other protected grounds.24  
This dual perspective will be adopted throughout this report. 
                                                     
24
  Although the immediate concerns in this area relate to gender and sexual orientation, age is likely to 
become relevant as well, in relation to children and young people‟s rights to freedom of religion or 
belief, for example.   
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CHAPTER 3  
BRITAIN’S LANDSCAPE OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 
3.1 Religious Institutions as Welfare Providers 
 Historically, religious institutions played a central role in the direct provision of education, 
health and social welfare in Britain. This lessened over time, as the state assumed 
responsibility for these areas, but well into the twentieth century, the Anglican and 
Nonconformist churches continued to provide important welfare support at times of 
economic crisis. And in the present day, FBOs make a considerable contribution to the 
routine provision of a wide range of social welfare programmes and projects, as discussed 
below. Additionally, there is little doubt that the development of public social policy in 
Britain was significantly influenced by Christian social thought (Farnell et al., 1994), so 
that religion continued to play a role – albeit less overtly – in an apparently secular context.  
3.2 Britain: Secular or Religious?  
In the sociological literature, secularisation is linked to Enlightenment thinking and the 
process of modernisation. Secularisation is defined as a long-term process by which 
religious thinking, practice and institutions lose their significance, so that religion „ceases 
to be significant in the working of the social system‟ (Wilson, 1982: 150). Secularisation in 
the West is seen to be highly advanced and to operate at the socio-structural, cultural and 
individual levels (Berger, 1967). The view of Britain as a secular society is supported by 
reference to statistics on church attendance, which shows a steep, progressive decline 
(Brierley, 2000; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2008; ONS, 2003; Bruce, 2002; Bruce, 2006; Voas 
and Bruce, 2006; Crockett and Voas, 2006), and the diminishing role of religion in law-
making, education, culture, welfare service provision, and – perhaps – individual 
consciousness. One of the reports from the organisation „Christian Research‟ on decreasing 
attendances is dramatically entitled Pulling Out of the Nosedive (Brierley, 2006a). The 
research shows that attendance declines with each successive age cohort and does not seem 
to be a response to the allegedly distinctive experience of WWII or the 1960s. There is 
some evidence of decline by generation among immigrant families of both Christian and 
non-Christian religion (Coleman et al., 2004; Crockett and Voas, 2006). 
However, the view of Britain as a secular society is open to challenge on a number of 
fronts.  
First, England has an established church which retains some influence over the legal 
system via its twenty-six seats in the House of Lords (The Lords Spiritual), and its general 
social presence.25 Crockett and Voas suggest that organised religion „acts as a brake on 
innovation, even if it cannot stand in the way of the new indefinitely‟. (2003: 1.2) Thus the 
Anglican presence in the House of Lords may have significant implications for human 
rights in such areas as gender and sexuality, or assisted dying. This influence is apparent in 
the progress of the legislation on religion/belief through Government and Parliament (see 
Chapter 1.2 above). The ruling monarch is also the Supreme Governor of the Church of 
England, which means that no heir to the throne can be a Catholic or married to a Catholic. 
                                                     
25
  In Scotland the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland is the national church, whilst the Church in Wales, 
which is a member of the Anglican Communion, is disestablished. 
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These and related constitutional provisions give Anglicanism an ongoing religious 
advantage over all other religions and belief systems (in the terms defined in Chapter 2).26 
Second, the faith sector continues to make a huge contribution to welfare provision across 
all areas, including community development, health and social care, post-compulsory 
education, criminal justice, asylum and refugee services, welfare-to-work, job creation, the 
rural economy and the arts and cultural economy. In fact, the Church of England is the 
largest voluntary organisation in the UK. (Yorkshire Churches, 2002; Furbey et al., 2006; 
Annette and Creasy, 2007; Grieve et al., 2007; Jochum et al., 2007; Smith and Lowndes, 
2007; Church of England, 2008; Davis, 2008).  
Third, the secularisation thesis in its basic form fails to take account of the distinct 
dimensions of identifying with, believing in, and practising religion. There is little doubt, 
for instance, that the Anglican Church‟s high level of service provision and the widespread 
involvement of millions of volunteers in this is motivated and sustained by what CULF 
(2007) and Davis (2008) describe as spiritual capital.  
Finally – and perhaps most importantly – the definition of Britain as a secular society fails 
to take account of the changing demography of Britain (and wider Europe) brought about 
by migration, particularly that from non-European countries (Allen and Macey, 1994) and 
that involving non-Christian religions. 
The provision for the first time of questions on religion/belief in the Census of Scotland 
and the Census of England and Wales in 2001 (which were different in the two cases) took 
place after considerable debate (Southworth, 1998; Weller and Andrews, 1998; Aspinall, 
2000; MCB, 2003; Weller, 2004). The Census data has transformed the quantity of 
information available about the social dimensions of religion in general (Beckford et al., 
2006; Purdam et al., 2007), including the secularisation thesis, and in relation to specific 
fields such as housing (Sellick, 2004), areas of the country (Peach, 2006) and religious 
groups (Graham et al., 2007; Hussain, 2004).27 
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of self-identification by religion/belief in the UK from 
the 2001 Census, and Figure 3.1 adds detail on the Christian population for Scotland.  
                                                     
26
  Prime Minister Gordon Brown has announced a consultation over the issue of succession to the throne, 
although not on other aspects of Anglican constitutional advantage (www.guardian.co.uk, 27 March 
2009). This initiative is in line with the general trend of recent equalities legislation. 
27
  The fact that the Census treatment of religion (and ethnicity) varied between the England and Wales 
enquiry and the Scottish enquiry (which both differed from the N. Ireland enquiry) should be borne in 
mind when aggregate figures on religion and/or ethnicity are presented for either Great Britain or the 
UK. More detailed overviews of the Census data are available from the National Statistics website 
(www.statistics.gov.uk), and from the „Focus‟ series of publications (ONS, 2004; 2005a; 2006e). 
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Table 3.1 UK Population by Self-identified Religion or Belief 
Census  2001. Weller (2004: 4,Table 1) 
 
Religion or Belief England  Scotland Wales N.Ireland UK Total UK % 
Christian  35,251,244 3,294,545 2,087,242 1,446,386 42,079,417 71.6 
No Religion 7,171,332 1,394,460 537,935 * 9,103,727 15.5 
Muslim 1,524,887 42,557 21,739 1,943 1,591,126 2.7 
Hindu 546,982 5,564 5,439 825 558,810 1.0 
Sikh 327,343 6,572 2,015 219 336,149 0.6 
Jewish 257,671 6,448 2,256 365 266,740 0.5 
Buddhist 139,046 6,830 5,407 533 151,816 0.3 
Other Religion 143,811 26,974 6,909 1,143 178,837 0.3 
Total Rel. or 
Belief 45,362,316 4,783,950 2,668,942 1,451,414 54,266,622 92.3 
Not Stated* 3,776,515 278,061 234,143 233,853 4,522,572 7.7 
Total 49,138,831 5,062,011 2,903,085 1,685,267 58,789,194 100.0 
 
*'Not Stated' includes 'No religion' in N. Ireland       
Christians form the largest category in every case, followed by „No Religion‟, Muslims 
and Hindus, with smaller numbers of Sikhs, Jews and Buddhists. In Scotland, a similar 
pattern applies, with those of „No Religion‟ outnumbering the Catholic population by some 
margin, but also showing considerably smaller numbers than those attached to the largest 
Christian denomination, the Church of Scotland.28  
Figure 3.1 Scottish Population by Self-identified 
Religion or Belief.  Census 2001. SE, 2005. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Not Stated
Other Religion
Muslim
Other Christian
Roman Catholic
No Religion
Church of Scotland
Percentage
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28
 The equivalent information was not sought in England and Wales. The estimated Catholic population 
for England and Wales was 4,136,284 in 2001, which can, however, be added to the Census return for 
Scotland to yield an estimate for Great Britain of just over 4,940,000 (Catholic Church, 2003; 
McAspurren, 2005). 
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Table 3.2 Followers of ‘Other Religions’ by Self-identified Religion. 
England and Wales. Census 2001. ONS, 2004. 
 
Other Religions Number 
Spiritualists 32,000 
Pagans 31,000 
Jain 15,000 
Wicca 7,000 
Rastafarian 5,000 
Bahaí‟í 5,000 
Zoroastrian 4,000 
Other 52,000 
Total 151,000 
 
Table 3.2 displays for interest the most frequent followings of „other religions‟ in England 
and Wales. 
The fact that 71.6% of the UK population defined themselves as „Christian‟, and 76.8% 
identified themselves with one or other of the main religious traditions lends credence to 
Davie‟s work (1994; 2001; 2002; 2004), which suggests that the secularisation thesis is 
over-stated, since it is perfectly possible to believe in God without being attached to an 
organised religion („believing without belonging‟ or „praying alone‟). 
The issue is, nevertheless, a difficult one to assess on the information currently available. It 
has been suggested that the answer schedule supplied for the Census question in England 
and Wales („What is your religion?‟) encouraged a „Christian‟ response as a statement of a 
national (or ethnic) identity rather than a religious identity (Voas and Bruce, 2004: 28), or 
as a statement about religious upbringing rather than current allegiance (SE, 2005: fn. 2).29 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Census figure for England and Wales is much higher than 
that from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of the same year, which yielded a 54% 
„Christian‟ response to the (somewhat different) question „Do you regard yourself as 
belonging to a particular religion?‟ (Voas and Bruce, 2004: 24; ONS, 2006e: 4). Davie 
poses the key questions: „What did the 72% who declared themselves to be Christian really 
mean [ ]. Did they mean they were not secular? Or did they mean they were not Muslim (or 
indeed any other world faith)?‟  (2004: 58). 
A good deal hangs on the answer to these questions, in terms of characterising Britain by 
religion, because small differences of interpretation can easily shift millions of individuals 
from the „religious‟ to the „non-religious‟ sides of the categorisation. If Christian 
engagement is measured for example by the returns from the latest (2005) English Church 
Census – which found 6.3% of the population in church on May 8, 2005 (Brierley, 2006a: 
12) – then religion becomes an interest of a very small minority, with under 11% of the 
total population – that is, less than one-in-eight – probably involved.30 If the (UK National) 
Census of 2001 is taken at face value, then the figure for the religious population is over 
three-quarters, as we have seen. Under the first interpretation, it would be difficult to 
                                                     
29
  The Scottish Census asked two questions: „What religion, religious denomination or body do you 
belong to?‟ and „What religion, religious denomination or body were you brought up in?‟ The N. 
Ireland Census used the same two questions, but began with a third: „Do you regard yourself as 
belonging to any particular religion?‟ (ONS, 2006e: 17). 
30
 This figure comes from adding an estimate of 4% of the population practising non-Christian faiths to 
the Church Census total. This estimate derives from the conservative assumption (in terms of 
maximising religious allegiance) that 80% of those who identify with minority religions are practising 
members of their faiths. (See Kitchen et al., 2006: 49, Table 19).  
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describe Britain as either „a religious country‟ or „a Christian country‟; under the second it 
would not.  
Yet another answer – intermediate between these two figures – can be derived from the 
2005 Citizenship Survey which found that 79% of Muslims were „actively practising‟, 
compared with 73% of Hindus, 74% of Sikhs, 54% of „Other Religions‟ and just 38% of 
Christians (Kitchen, et al., 2006: 49, Table 19). On this basis, it can be estimated that just 
over a third of the population (34%) practises one of the major faiths, mostly Christian 
(29%).  
This huge range in the estimates of the religious population – amounting to a factor of ten 
in the case of the Christian population of England – creates a corresponding uncertainty 
about the most basic feature of the landscape of religion or belief in Britain. This is 
perhaps the most striking of all the evidence gaps revealed by the current research project. 
The main difficulty with any of these estimates is the lack of precision (and lack of 
consensus among observers) about what it means to practise, or indeed to believe in, 
particular faiths. It has been noted in one official source that „the approach adopted for the 
2001 Census was a deliberate decision to use a measure [for religion] based on identity 
rather than practice‟ (ONS, 2006e: 2). But this decision left out of account everything that 
seems distinctive about religious allegiances, which are not just a matter of identity, but 
imply a commitment to certain propositions that serve to define a faith, to ritual 
observances, and to broader ways of life, typically including more or less detailed precepts 
of conduct. It is also true that these aspects of religious experience all vary by religion, and 
by branch of religion; that they are all subject in practice to interpretation over historical 
time, and are not infrequently subject to contestation, both from within and without each 
tradition. The difficulties these observations create for the statistical characterisation of 
religion or belief are captured nicely by a response from a western Buddhist cited in Weller 
(2004: 10): „To the question “Are you a Buddhist?” all less than Buddha must say „to some 
extent yes, to some extent no‟. 
If the basic enumeration of the religious population is thus fraught with difficulties – 
which perhaps do not exist in the same way for the basic data relating to some other 
equality strands such as age or gender – it seems important, nevertheless, to attempt an 
estimate that narrows the range of uncertainty created by the differences between the two 
major sources in the field – the national Census of 2001 and the English Church Census of 
2005.    
First, the issue evidently turns on the findings for Christian practice and belief, given the 
numerical predominance of Christians according to the Census return (and the findings for 
England, given the numerical share of the English population within Britain).  
Second, the Church Census figure of 6.5% underestimates Christian churchgoing in 
England, since it excludes those who happened to be absent on the appointed Sunday. 
Brierley (2005: 2.2) gives a figure of 8% for „regular churchgoers‟ in 2000, representing a 
decline of over a quarter from the 1980 figure of 11%. The 2005 Church Census also 
recorded a figure of 8% for those attending church at least quarterly. This rises sharply, 
however, to 14.5% of the English population who attend church at least once a year – a 
rise caused mainly by those who attend just at Christmas (Brierley, 2006a: 151). If church 
attendance is made the litmus test of Christian practice, there is thus still a considerable 
range in the estimated proportion of practising Christians, between 8% and 14.5% of the 
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population, depending on the threshold chosen for „minimal Christian practice‟: should this 
involve attendance at least four times a year or at least once a year? 31  
These estimates leave a proportion of somewhere between 40% and 64% of the entire 
population who are „nominal‟ or „notional‟ Christians who rarely attend church, to use 
Brierley‟s terms (2005: 2.2), depending on whether the BSA estimate or the UK Census 
return is chosen as more appropriate for the „Christian‟ total. Davie (2004: 54) has 
suggested that „most British people (and indeed most Northern Europeans)‟ are believers 
but not belongers, who „retain some sort of belief in God (or a life force), but rarely attend 
a place of worship‟. This claim may be slightly overstated, but it is consistent with the 
range of uncertainty created by the major sources.  
Third, the resolution of the general issue of secularisation depends on how the „nominal 
and notional Christians‟ are characterised. This group can be subdivided into three distinct 
subgroups. First are the genuine „believers but not belongers‟ who retain a faith in a 
recognisably Christian personal God. The second subgroup are spiritual believers (in, for 
example, Davie‟s „life force‟). In terms of the distinction between these two subgroups, 
there must come a point at which the attenuation of conventional religious belief moves the 
believer out of the sphere of organised religion (as properly understood) and into another, 
non-religious (yet „spiritual‟) dimension of experience. The third subgroup is composed of 
„ethnic‟ Christian identifiers who are neither „religious‟ nor „spiritual‟ in their practice or 
beliefs, but identify with Christianity (at least to some extent or on some occasions) solely 
by reason of upbringing or heritage.  
Fourth, there is a convergence of findings from other inquiries which suggests that the 
Census question for England and Wales was indeed interpreted in many cases as a request 
for information about religious background rather than current religious affiliation. In 
particular, the „Christian‟ results for England and Wales are very close to the results 
generated by the „religious background‟ question in the Scottish Census (78% and 79% 
respectively of those who answered the question in each case). Both figures were also very 
close to the 80% of „Christian‟ responses given to the Labour Force Survey question: „what 
is your religion, even if you are not currently practising?‟ On the other hand, the figure 
returned to the Scottish question regarding religious belonging (as opposed to religious 
background) showed a lower figure of 69%.   
These comparisons led to a significant decision by the ONS to aggregate the results for 
Great Britain by adding the figures for the Scottish „background‟ question to those from 
the single question on religion in England and Wales. This decision confers a degree of 
official recognition on the assumption that the Census returns regarding the Christian 
religion in England and Wales refer to background or heritage rather than current 
affiliation or religious practice  (ONS, 2006e: Table 1.5, 3-9). It follows that it may be 
more appropriate to use the BSA figure of 54% in relation to Christian affiliation than the 
Census figure of 72% (of the total population in each case), and the discrepancy between 
the two (18%) may give some indication of the number of people for whom the „Christian‟ 
                                                     
31
  These estimates apply in the first instance to England alone, but will extend to Britain as a whole if it 
can be assumed that the patterns of Christian attendance in Scotland and Wales are sufficiently similar 
to those in England. No assumptions are made for estimation purposes about those who did not answer 
the Census question on religion. And there will be some (unknown) number of individuals who are 
practising Christians, but who are prevented from attending church by personal circumstances, such as 
illness or disability. A similar point will apply to any positive test for the practice of any other faith. 
Some might propose an even more relaxed test for Christian practice, such as „praying or reading the 
Bible, but not going to church‟ (Brierley, 2006a: 152). This would include within the total of 
„practising Christians‟ those believers who stay out of church by choice as well as circumstance. 
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answer in the Census was given for reasons other than current Christian affiliation. This 
figure thus supplies some indication at least of the size of the third subgroup of „ethnic‟ 
Christian identifiers defined above (at least in England and Wales).32 
Fifth, there is some evidence that the spiritual believers (in the second subgroup) are more 
numerous than the religious „believers but not belongers‟ who make up the first subgroup 
(Brierley, 2005, 2.3). One authority has claimed emphatically that „other surveys … show 
that something quite extraordinary is happening. In Britain, let alone other European 
countries  (especially in the north), the number of people believing in a personal God [of 
Christian tradition] has become considerably smaller than the number of people believing 
in the God within or some sort of spirit or life force‟ (Heelas, in Brierley 2006b: 0.4).  
If this is so, then a conservative assumption (that is, one designed to maximize the finding 
of religious affiliation) would be that at most half of those with a Christian background 
who believe in some form of God are Christian believers (in the sense of also believing in 
a recognisably Christian deity). Applying this assumption to the BSA figure of 54% 
suggests that at most 27% of the population is affiliated to organised Christian religion 
according to their fundamental beliefs. Even if the higher Census total (of 72%) were taken 
as the starting point for this calculation (which is equivalent to the assumption that no-one 
answered the Census question as an indication solely of a Christian background), the result 
would still be a Christian total of just 36%. If the estimate for those practising non-
Christian religions (4%) is added in, the estimated figure for the population percentage 
affiliated to organised religion as a whole lies between 31% and 40%.   
Granted that these estimates are all made on the basis of data that is far from satisfactory, it 
seems very unlikely that a majority of the population can be regarded as religious, even on 
the most relaxed definitions of what it means to practise or to believe in Christianity, and 
even after making the statistical assumptions most favourable to the total for organised 
religion.  
The remainder of the population are ranged within an alternative spectrum of spiritual, 
agnostic or secular practice and belief, including individuals who: 
 Adopt spiritual beliefs, leanings and/or practices which lie outside the organisational 
and theological frameworks of the major faith traditions (including here the 
individuals in the second subgroup defined above). 
 Hold agnostic views of a kind that do not serve to align them with any specific 
system of religious, spiritual or secular practice or belief. 
 Reject religious and spiritual belief systems, and may identify themselves explicitly 
with a secular belief system, such as Humanism or Atheism.  
 Have no religious or spiritual views (or any comparable non-religious outlook).33 
According to the estimates above, it follows that the occupants of the alternative spectrum 
probably form a majority of the population. In order to underline this conclusion, it may be 
noted that 40% of the respondents to the BSA survey reported that they had no religion 
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 For Scotland, the discrepancy is smaller, at just over 10% of the whole sample. 
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 The „No Religion‟ category includes 390,000 adults (0.66% of the population) who defined 
themselves as Jedi Knights in the 2001 Census (ONS; Weiss, 2004). Notice that these figures make 
„Jedi Knights‟ as numerous as all but the Muslims and the Hindus among the minority religious 
groups. If the definition of religion or belief is confined to identity, and the answers given to the 
Census question are regarded as sufficient to determine identity, then it would become very difficult to 
refuse consideration to the Jedi Knights as a substantial „group of religion or belief‟ on this basis. This 
underlines the problem of relying as the Census does on identity alone for the ascription of religion or 
belief.  
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(ONS, 2006e: 4). The full spectrum includes, however, those with spiritual or agnostic 
views, who may be unwilling to assert that they have „no religion‟, and yet are to be 
reckoned as part of the alternative majority. The most recent report from the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project (2008: 68, Q83) found that a majority of British respondents saw religion 
as being either „not at all important‟ in their lives (34%), or „not too important‟ (23%). 
Members of the alternative spectrum may still, however, identify themselves as „Christian‟ 
(by heritage and/or upbringing) in various social contexts or for various social purposes 
(such as answering the Census question about religion).  
The account has focused so far on the variations of Christian identity, practice and belief, 
but the same issues arise for all religions and belief systems. Ameli et al. (2004: 21) and 
Brown (2000a: 89) refer to „cultural and secular‟ or to „nominal‟ and „sociological‟ 
Muslims respectively in this context and Graham (2003) distinguishes similarly between 
„secular‟ and „religious‟ Jews. Modood et al. (1997) found that 95% of Muslims, 89% of 
Hindus and 86% of Sikhs defined religion as „very‟ or „fairly‟ important in their lives, 
relative to 46% of Anglicans and 69% of Catholics. The 2001 Citizenship Survey found a 
similar gradient for the importance of religion compared with other aspects of personal 
identity, with 67% of Muslim, 61% of Sikh, 51% of Hindu and just 21% of Christian 
respondents who „said that their religion said something important about them‟ (ONS, 
2006e: 4). However, the figures cited above from the 2005 Citizenship Survey suggest that 
the proportions who practise are lower in each case than are suggested by Modood‟s 
figures for the minority religions, and Zubaida (2004: 417) puts the total for Muslims 
throughout Europe much lower (at around 30%, with 70% as „secular or cultural 
Muslims‟). Mirza et al. (2007) note that their Muslim respondents vary in the extent to 
which they observe religious prohibitions on alcohol, for example, or interest-bearing 
mortgages. A survey conducted by Channel 4 Dispatches (2006) found that although 89% 
of Muslim respondents rated religion as „very‟ or „fairly‟ important, 48% of the same 
sample never attended mosque (see Appendix 2). Again, it may be a matter of judgment 
(or a matter of doctrine) as to what constitutes „minimal practice‟ for any religion, but the 
figures are nonetheless suggestive.  
Turning to secular belief systems, a person can identify as a Humanist by, for example, 
becoming a member of the British Humanist Association. The 2005 Citizenship Survey 
perhaps suggested that there is no distinction between a practising and a non-practising 
Atheist by categorising all those of „No Religion‟ as „not actively practising‟ (Kitchen, 
2006: 49, Table 19). Yet recent publications have raised interesting issues about Humanist 
or Atheistic identification, practice and belief (Belden and Grayling, 2005; Dennett, 2006, 
and Grayling, 2007), whilst Kemp (2003) discusses „New Age‟ allegiances, and Brierley 
(2008: 10.6-10.7) provides a statistical digest of NRMs.34 
The remainder of this report will focus mainly on religious groups rather than occupants of 
the alternative spectrum, but it is important to emphasise here that this focus can create a 
misleading impression of Britain‟s landscape of religion/belief taken as a whole: there is a 
good deal of religion in Britain, but there is probably more belief (and non-belief) than 
there is religion. And alternative belief (and non-belief) is now protected by the law, so 
that the alternative majority possess legal rights that compare fully with the rights of the 
religious minority – a point underlined by the UN Special Rapporteur (Jahangir, 2008: 18).  
The specific recommendation that emerges from the analysis above is the urgent need to 
reformulate the Census for 2011 (especially in England and Wales) so that the question(s) 
on religion or belief provide clearer information relating to the dimensions of practice and 
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 Dennett proposes that Atheists should style themselves „brights‟ (2006: 21), whereas Grayling prefers 
„naturalists‟ (2007: 475). 
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belief, in addition to identity. For although the 2001 Census has transformed the quantity 
of data available on religion or belief, it has not brought about a comparable transformation 
in the quality of that information. Although this concern is prompted especially by the 
uncertainties surrounding the „Christian‟ response to the Census question on religion, the 
recommendation applies to information obtained from the Census for all religions and 
belief systems. 
A balanced appraisal of the currently available evidence thus bears out the secularisation 
thesis to a greater extent than appears to be the case from the Census data considered at 
face value. But it does not follow that the process of secularisation is bound to continue, 
because a number of counter-trends are also evident. Mirza et al. (2007) found that belief is 
systematically more intense among younger than older cohorts of Muslims, and the 
dramatic reduction in the number of observant Christians does not apply uniformly. A 
notable exception to the secular trend is the Pentecostal tradition generally and the more 
recent West African movements in particular (Hunt and Lightly 2001; Hunt 2002; 
Christian Research, 2005). Vulliamy (2006) noted that migration from Eastern European is 
helping to revive inner city Catholic churches in some areas. Smith (2000) records the 
growth of a number of new religious groups in Newham (East London) – Hindu, Muslim 
and Sikh, as well as Pentecostal Christian. Indeed, 94 out of the 171 religious groups 
studied (especially the Pentecostal churches) had been founded since 1971, which suggests 
that the secularisation process is far from consistent over time. Similarly, Hunt and Lightly 
(2001) and Hunt (2002) describe one Nigerian church, established in London in 1994 that 
had developed 50 congregations in England with a combined membership of 
approximately 170,000.  
Davie has described the conservative evangelical church as „the success story of late 
twentieth century churchgoing.‟ (2006: 28) This success is reflected in the growing 
evangelical presence among Anglican ordinands (Gilliat-Ray, 2001) which has reversed 
earlier predictions of a trend towards a liberal ministry (Towler and Coxon, 1979). And 
Brierley estimates that 100,000 people started to attend church through Alpha courses in 
the years from 1998 to 2005 (2006a: 202). 
Kaufmann (2007a and b) has contributed another element to the debate by linking 
secularisation with demographic factors. He investigated the three Abrahamic faiths in 
Europe, North America and Israel, and found consistently higher birth rates among 
religious than non-religious families, and among conservative families of each tradition 
than non-conservative families. Projecting these trends forward for Europe, he concludes 
that „by 2045, the proportion of secular people will have peaked, and de-secularisation 
will begin, albeit gently‟ (Kaufmann, 2007b: 7). The most recent issue of Religious Trends 
has also attempted to predict the future balance of numbers between different faith groups 
(Brierley, 2008).   
Kaufmann‟s and Brierley‟s work raises the issue of the transmission of religion or belief, 
both within and between generations. These twin aspects of religious continuity-cum-
change are comparable theoretically to intra- and inter-generational social mobility, and 
might be termed mobility of religion or belief. They are relevant to policy because of the 
freedom of conscience clauses of the European Convention of Human Rights. Although 
the credibility of Kaufmann‟s and Brierley‟s detailed predictions are dependent on more 
information becoming available about religious mobility (see the discussions in Kaufmann 
and Voas, 2007, and Moore et al., 2008), these contributions reinforce the argument that 
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there is nothing inevitable about secularisation.35 A case in point is considered in the next 
section.  
3.3 The (Re-) Sacralisation of Policy  
There has been a long history of immigration into Britain, which has often included people 
of particular ethno-religious backgrounds, such as the Jewish migration of the early 20
th
. 
Century. Following WWII, Britain, along with other West European countries, found itself 
confronted by serious labour shortages which it met by calling on its colonies and former 
colonies. This resulted in the large-scale migration into Britain of people of non-European 
backgrounds and non-Christian faiths in a context that was singularly unwelcoming and 
intolerant of difference. This, in turn, led to the development of ideologies of adjustment 
that shifted and changed over time from assimilation to integration, from multiculturalism 
to anti-racism and back to (a slightly amended) multiculturalism (Macey, 2006; Ballard, 
2007).  
These developments were accompanied by changing conceptions of equality, first seeing 
equality as implying „sameness‟, then moving to viewing „difference‟ as a requirement for 
recognition of diverse attitudes and values. Nevertheless, the emphasis on racial equality 
was the dominant focus of both grassroots and Government thinking until the 1980s. The 
impetus for the subsequent „shift towards religion‟ came from both above and below the 
level of the nation-state. The pressure from above came from the European Union, and that 
from below came largely from the minority religions themselves. 
Ansari suggests that the „mushrooming‟ of Muslim organisations and their increasing use 
of politics at both local and national levels from the 1980s onwards has had the greatest 
long-term impact on re-introducing religion into the social policy arena (2002: 18). Most of 
the calls put forward were (and are) based on ethno-religious requirements or consist of 
protests based on perceptions of religious offence. An example of the former is the demand 
for the provision of halal meat in schools (which, like kosher provision, required an 
exemption from the Slaughter of Poultry Act 1967 and the Slaughterhouses Act 1974). An 
example of the latter is the demand to withdraw Salman Rushdie‟s novel, The Satanic 
Verses, from sale in the UK. Both demands were accompanied by some public disorder 
and the latter included a seriously intended threat of death against the author.  
But Muslims are by no means alone in campaigning politically for minority religious 
rights. Hindu organisations petitioned the Government strongly, but without success, over 
the compulsory slaughter of the sacred bull, Shambo, at a Welsh temple and the sacred 
cow, Gangotri, at an English one in 2007. Both Sikhs and Rastafarians have applied in the 
past for exemptions from requirements that are legally binding on other citizens. The 
Rastafarian claim for exemption from the law prohibiting cannabis use on the grounds that 
this was part of their religious practice was unsuccessful. However, Sikhs succeeded in 
bringing about changes to the law on wearing safety helmets when riding motorbikes or 
working on construction sites (the Motor-Cycle Helmets [Religious Exemptions] Act 1976 
and the Employment Act 1989). They also gained exemption from the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 which prohibits the carrying of knives and other dangerous weapons in public, but 
makes a specific exception for knives that are carried for religious reasons. A further 
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 We found very little research evidence on religious mobility, even though the religion questions in the 
2001 Census enquiries for Scotland and for N.Ireland (though not for England and Wales) would 
allow comparisons of religious background with current allegiance. A related issue is how to treat the 
identity and allegiance of children and young people in relation to religion or belief. See, for example, 
Dawkins (2006: 337-340).  
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acknowledgement of religious differences is the fact that Jews and Muslims are allowed to 
trade on Sundays (Bellamy, 2000). 
Nevertheless, it is only recently that the Government has become more overtly receptive to 
any faith-based initiative. During the 1980s, far from accepting that religion had a role to 
play in politics (broadly defined), the Government – in the shape of Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher – reacted to the publication of the Church of England report Faith in the 
City (ACUPA, 1985) by stating vehemently that religion had no place in politics. Yet 
twenty years later, for reasons analysed in detail by Furbey and Macey (2005), the 
relationship has changed and Government is engaged in what appears to be little short of a 
„love affair‟ with faith communities (HO, 2004). The intellectual background to this 
development includes New Labour‟s „modernisation‟ of social democracy („The Third 
Way‟), a renewed emphasis on social integration, and the interest in communitarianism.  
Tony Blair made these links explicit in a speech that can be seen as a turning point for the 
new approach by Government: 
Our major faith traditions – all of them more historic and deeply rooted than any 
political party or ideology – play a fundamental role in supporting and propagating 
values which bind us together as a nation (Blair, 2001). 
In addition to the personal values (and indeed religious beliefs) of key individuals (Farnell 
et al., 2003), the wider social context of the Labour Government‟s new-found focus on 
communities in general, and faith communities in particular, is linked to a number of 
factors. These include the social facts of continuing inequality and deprivation, particularly 
in inner city areas; the well-established fact that many black and minority ethnic [BME] 
groups are disproportionately disadvantaged (Modood et al., 1997), and the awareness of 
minority ethnic, notably Muslim, youth frustration expressed especially in the „Northern 
riots‟ of 2001 (see Cantle, 2001, and Ballard, 2007, for general accounts; DCLG, 2006, for 
the 2001 disturbances in Burnley and Oldham; Allen, 2003; Carling et al., 2004, and 
Macey, 2005, for Bradford in 2001, and Allen and Barrett, 1996, and Macey, 1999a; 2005, 
for Bradford in 1995 and 2001).  
The inquiries that followed these events, particularly that by Cantle (2001) threw into sharp 
focus the notion (and issue) of social exclusion and proposed community/social cohesion 
as the remedy for this (see Ballard, 2007, for a critical review of this process). In a sense, 
this was a logical development of the Government‟s focus in the 1990s on the role of faith 
communities in accessing „hard to reach‟ groups in order to involve them in local 
regeneration (DETR, 1997; 1998; 2001; LGA, 2002). 
It should be noted, however, that the love affair between the Government and faith 
communities has not always proceeded smoothly. The follow-up report published twenty 
years after Faith in the City noted that the objectives, values and working styles of 
religious groups do not always mesh with those of Government. Christian religious groups 
resist attempts to co-opt them into a grand political scheme, and resent the myriad 
bureaucratic demands made upon them (CULF, 2007). Baker (2007) refers to „blurred 
encounters‟ between faith groups and secular regeneration programmes where the former 
struggle to adapt to secular understandings that involve different conceptual frameworks. 
This can lead to the perception that religious values and language are „hijacked‟ for the 
sake of ticking the right boxes, leaving people feeling exploited and excluded from the 
tables of power (Baker and Skinner, 2005).  
Harris et al. (2003) make similar points about the Jewish voluntary sector. Leavey (2007) 
notes the tensions in the enlistment of FBOs in mental health provision in relation to 
therapeutic knowledge, competing values and capacity constraints. And Lewis (2006) 
discusses the difficulties in trying to enlist Muslim faith leaders as exponents of „bridging 
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capital‟ in supporting Government agendas related to extremism and cohesion. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the new relationship between Government and FBOs has 
also created tensions and disputes between FBOs, which are sometimes competing against 
each other (and secular organisations) for attention and/or resources. A number of 
participants in Farnell et al.‟s (2003) research were convinced about the uneven – indeed, 
discriminatory – distribution of funding and saw this as the result of the dominance of a 
strongly secular ideology, high levels of religious illiteracy and a focus on minority ethnic 
faiths, particularly Islam, at the expense of Christianity. Such findings are seconded (and 
indeed expanded considerably) in the recent report „Moral But No Compass‟36 (Davis et al., 
2008). Interviews with over 300 leaders and activists in the faith and community sectors 
revealed similar views about unfair treatment of Christian organisations by Government 
(with an alleged bias towards Muslim organisations), with additional complaints about lack 
of interest in Church social programmes, anti-religious hostility in secular charities and 
local Government – with one county council equalities officer allegedly commenting that 
„Churches are just not good for society‟ (Davis et al., 2008, 17) – coupled with lack of 
understanding by the Charity Commissioners, incoherence of policy, and a struggle 
between political parties over the role of the state vis-à-vis the voluntary sector.  
The question of religious bias has also been raised from another direction, in connection 
with a unanimous resolution from Hindu organisations that the „Government has failed the 
British Hindu community‟ over the deaths of the sacred animals noted above. Sudarshan 
Bhatia, President of the National Council of Hindu Temples, has claimed that:  
This Government has no regard for the needs of communities that do not shout … If 
this had been some other community, the Government would have rushed to find a 
solution. Just because Hindus are quiet, we are ignored, isolated and sidelined. 
(Hindu Forum of Britain, 2008) 
Our consultations have also revealed strongly expressed concerns in some quarters that the 
willingness of the Government to engage with FBOs will neglect the interests of the non-
religious population, and jeopardise work on equality, by placing it in the hands of those 
who either do not understand or do not accept the equalities agenda taken as a whole. 
It is evidently not an easy matter to adjudicate all the claims of religion/belief, once these 
are brought more fully into the public arena, or to establish the appropriate priorities for 
action and support. Hazel Blears, Minister of State for Communities and Local 
Government, denied the suggestion made by the Moral but no Compass report, for 
example, that the Government has shown bias towards Muslim organisations. She added, 
however, that: „It‟s just common sense … If you have a situation where you need to build 
the resilience of young Muslim men and women to be able to withstand an extremist 
message, then of course you do that kind of work, but it doesn‟t mean you do it 
exclusively.‟ (Blears, cited by Pigott, 2008) The next section alludes briefly to a further 
dimension of these complex relationships.  
3.4 The New Global Context of Religion or Belief  
Relationships between religious groups, the Government and civil society are also shaped 
by a new global context. Briefly, globalisation can be seen to have exacerbated inequality 
and poverty in white and BME working class communities, particularly – but not only – in 
relation to the wholesale loss of the manufacturing sector in which these groups were often 
employed, with consequent unemployment of large numbers of unskilled workers. Poverty 
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  The title would appear to be a play on Gordon Brown‟s words on becoming Prime Minister when he 
emphasised the strength of his „moral compass‟. 
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will always place pressure on communal relationships, and thereby affect the context in 
which religious activity occurs. The onset of economic recession in 2008 has added to 
these pressures. 
New communications technology and ease of transport enter the equation by making it 
much easier for some minority ethnic groups to maintain ongoing relationships with their 
countries of origin through financial transfers, arranged marriages, education, religious 
relationships or simply the rapid transfer of information and knowledge about the country 
of origin to the new environment. Indeed the older connotations of „migration‟ as a once-
for-all movement of resettlement from a „country of origin‟ to a new „host society‟ no 
longer apply with the same force (see Samad, 1992; 1998; Ballard, 2003 and Carling, 
2006; 2008).  
These factors exert complicated effects on the lived experiences of „diasporic 
communities‟ and their collective (or individual) strategies of adjustment – including the 
alternatives of separation, integration or accommodation – which have been central to the 
Government‟s discourse on „social cohesion‟.37  
The international context has a direct impact at the political and cultural levels, too, 
especially in the light of 9/11, and Government responses to that event (including foreign 
policy and domestic security), by individual citizens of all religious persuasions, and by 
institutions of civil society, especially the mass media. It seems clear that the decision to 
legislate in the area of religion/belief was taken well before 9/11, or indeed the Northern 
disturbances earlier in the year 2001. Nevertheless, 9/11 affected profoundly the 
circumstances in which the legislation was implemented and discussed, the corresponding 
pressures on Government and other interested parties, and the ways in which the question 
of religion/belief was seen. Relevant issues here include: 
 The debates over multiculturalism – specifically whether it involves a divisive 
politics of identity (Mirza et al., 2007) or not (Modood, 2007). 
 The tendency to emphasise integration and unity rather than difference and diversity, 
including the search for common values, and the issue of national identity (Blunkett, 
2003; CRE, 2005a; Reid, 2006; Smith, 2008).  
 The impact of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 The balance between social cohesion and domestic security policy.  
 The electoral calculations of the major political parties (see Anwar, 1994; Ansari, 
2002). 
The point is simply that the circumstances in which the EHRC now begins its work on 
religion/belief are very different – and considerably more fraught – than the circumstances 
in which this part of the equalities framework was first conceived.  
3.5  Key Points 
 The provision of questions on religion for the first time in the 2001 Censuses in 
Scotland and in England and Wales has transformed the quantity of information 
available on the topics of this review, but not always the quality of this information. 
There is a correspondingly urgent need to reformulate the religion questions in time 
for the 2011 Census to address the dimensions of religious practice and belief, in 
addition to religious identity.   
 The available evidence suggests that there is a substantial religious (mainly 
Christian) presence in the population and in the main institutions of Britain, although 
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 For discussions of these issues as they apply to the specific situation in Bradford, see Ballard (2002), 
Carling (2008) and Macey (2007a). 
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the majority of the population probably belongs within an alternative spectrum of 
spiritual, agnostic or secular practice and belief. 
 Arguably, the New Labour Government has moved to recognise religious identities 
and groups more than have former Governments in the recent past, but this process is 
not without its tensions and difficulties, especially regarding the enlistment of FBOs 
in service provision. 
 The evolution of religion/belief in Britain is affected by its global context in a 
number of significant respects, and this context has become more fraught as a result 
of 9/11 and its manifold consequences.    
It is worth recalling, nevertheless, that some of the basic issues covered in this review exist 
independently of the latter events. We found the following comment published in 2000 to 
be remarkably prescient about the most general issues raised by the inclusion of 
religion/belief in the new equalities framework: 
The significant motifs in public discourse will be individual freedom of choice and 
human rights, the political representation of group identity based around religious 
affiliation, and equality of opportunity and social justice for all religious groups as 
they participate in civil society. A second concern will be the articulation and 
application in policy of values drawn explicitly or implicitly from the major faith 
traditions, as they encounter each other and secular enlightenment values, in the 
context of rapid technological and social transformations, globalised 
communications and information technology. (Smith, 2000: 36) 
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CHAPTER 4  
RELIGION AND ETHNICITY – COMMUNITY AND REPRESENTATION 
4.1 Religion and Ethnicity  
Ethnicity is a concept that has largely replaced „race‟ in academic and popular discourses 
as „race‟ came to be seen as not only lacking scientific or biological validity, but being 
associated with the deterministic (often negative) ascription of characteristics based on 
such phenotypical features as skin colour. Put at its simplest, ethnicity refers not to 
physical, but to cultural characteristics, i.e. to those shared aspects of social existence that 
characterise groups of human beings.38 These can include language, religion, customs and, 
more problematically, a sense of shared history and community that Anderson (1991) 
suggests can be real or imagined. 
While conceptually separable, there is often a close relationship between religion and 
ethnicity, which can be looked at from two aspects: either the religious composition of 
ethnic groups or the ethnic composition of religions. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 convey these two 
aspects of the relationship respectively for the population of England and Wales at the 
2001 Census.39  
Figure 4.1 Ethnicity by Religion. England and Wales. 
Census 2001. ONS, 2003.
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It can be seen from Figure 4.1 that the black Caribbean and white groupings have a similar 
religious composition, with largely Christian self-identifications, and similar proportions of 
„No Religion‟. The black African group has a much lower proportion of „No Religion‟ than 
the black Caribbean group, and a significant Muslim component (22%). The Indian group 
is the most mixed by religion, containing Hindus (47%), Sikhs (30%), Muslims (13%) and 
Christians (5%). By contrast, members of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups are almost 
exclusively Muslim (98% in both cases). 
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  Mason (2000) provides a clear exposition of the distinctions between race and ethnicity. 
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  The cross-classification of religion and ethnicity is not available from the standard tables of the 
Scottish Census.  
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Figure 4.2 Religion by Ethnicity. England and Wales.  
Census 2001. ONS, 2003.
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Turning to Figure 4.2, it can be seen that the „No Religion‟, Christian and Jewish groups 
are almost entirely white (with proportions from 95% to 97% respectively). The Hindus 
and Sikhs in Britain are largely of South Asian origin and of Indian ethnicity (84% and 
91% respectively), although some people of Indian heritage came to Britain from East 
Africa following mass expulsions (especially those orchestrated by Idi Amin in 1972). 
Such migrants brought with them levels of social capital that may help to account for some 
of their families‟ subsequent attainment. The Muslims from the Indian sub-continent 
originate mainly in Bangladesh (17%) and Pakistan (43%), with India contributing 9%. 
Muslims as a whole in Britain are, however, more heterogeneous than other religious 
groups: although two-thirds are South Asian, 12% are white; 6% are „other Asian‟; 7% are 
black; 4% are from „other‟ ethnic groups, and 4% are of „mixed parentage‟ (Beckford et 
al., 2006; ONS, 2006e: 72). For slightly different reasons, Buddhists are one of the most 
diverse groups, with 39% white and 51% „other ethnicity‟ (which includes Chinese). 
The variations in these relationships indicate the dangers of essentialising the 
characteristics of either ethnic or religious groups, and of using religious and ethnic 
descriptions as substitutes for one another. We saw in Chapter 3 that self-identification 
under a religious heading may imply a socio-political (secular) identification rather than 
allegiance to a faith. The issue here is rather the relationship between religious and ethnic 
self-identification. In some circumstances it may be reasonable to align the two, by treating 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi respondents as Muslim, for example. But it is, in general, less 
reasonable to treat South Asians as Muslims, or vice versa.  
4.2 Religion and Residence  
One of the main findings from the 2001 Census is the extent to which the minority 
religious (non-Christian) population is localised in particular areas of the country. These 
areas include England (in contrast with both Wales and Scotland); London (which is 
unique among major conurbations for the range and size of its minority religious 
population) and a number of other English urban areas outside London – but by no means 
always those with the largest populations (ONS, 2006e: 60-67). Table 4.1 presents data on 
  
 
54 
the numerical strength of the minority religious population for all those areas in which this 
exceeds 15% of the local population.40 
 
Table 4.1 Non-Christian Religious Population of Nations in the UK and  
Selected English Cities. Census 2001: Thousands. ONS, 2003. 
 
  Non-Christian 
Religious 
 Population (Th.) 
  
% of Total 
Local  
Population 
London 1244  17% 
Birmingham 196  20% 
Bradford 86  18% 
Leicester City 86  31% 
Luton 35  19% 
Slough 33  28% 
Blackburn  28  20% 
England   2940 6% 
Wales   44 2% 
Scotland  95 2% 
N Ireland   5 <1% 
 
It will be seen that the minority religious population of London – almost 1.25m – dwarves 
that of any other place, making up over 40% of the UK total, and over thirteen times that of 
Scotland. But Birmingham has over twice the Scottish total, and both Bradford and 
Leicester almost as many. No fewer than ten London Boroughs each have larger minority 
religious populations than the whole of Wales. Luton has seven times that of Northern 
Ireland. The eight English areas listed, including London, contain over 56% of the minority 
religious populations of the UK. The issues raised by minority religions are (in numerical 
terms at least) issues primarily for London, and a rather small number of other local 
authorities in England. This point has potentially far-reaching implications for policy in 
the field of religion or belief, but the issue will not be pursued at length here. To give just 
one example: Coles and Bonney (2003) consider the pressures imposed on the education 
system as a result of geographical concentration. 
The religious composition of these populations is set out in Figure 4.3. 
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 The threshold proportion of 15% is chosen because it seems to be a natural „break point‟ in the rank 
order distribution of Local Authority areas in England and Wales: there are no LA areas with 
proportions of either 15% or 16%. 
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Figure 4.3 Non-Christian Religious Population of Selected Areas 
by Religion. GB. Census 2001. ONS, 2003.  
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The non-Christian religious populations of Blackburn and Bradford are largely Muslim 
(over 85%). In both these cases, it is known that the Muslim population not only comes 
from one country – Pakistan – but one particular area of that country, linked to each other 
moreover by close ties of kinship.41 
Scotland and Wales, London, Leicester and Slough are, by contrast, much more 
heterogeneous in their minority religious composition, although Muslims form the largest 
grouping in all cases (except in Leicester). Luton and Birmingham fall between these two 
poles. This difference in composition underlines the geographical concentrations of 
particular minority religions: there are more Muslims in Bradford (75,000) than in the 
whole of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland combined (66,000). And 56% of the Jewish 
population of the UK resides in London (ONS, 2006e: 66).  
Turning to residential patterns within (rather than between) cities, Peach (2006) contains a 
detailed analysis of ethno-religious residential separation in London, based on Census data. 
This „pioneer study‟ is, so far as we are aware, the first to make religion an explicit 
variable in the quantitative analysis of residential separation.42 Taking the main religious 
groups as a whole, it was found that Sikhs and Jews are highly separated residentially – 
that is, they tend to live in specific areas of London in which members of their own group 
are represented much more frequently than their average throughout the conurbation. 
Hindus are moderately separated; Muslims have low separation and Christians have very 
low separation. 
However, the low Muslim result, which suggests that Muslims are dispersed relatively 
evenly throughout London, turns out to be a consequence of the fact that the various 
Muslim populations of different ethnicity are highly separated from each other (in different 
                                                     
41
  For example, at least 70% of the „Pakistani Muslim‟ population of Bradford originates from the Mirpur 
region of Azad Kashmir, and some sources put this closer to 90% (Moss, 2006). For further 
description of the society of this region, see Ballard (2003).  
42
 The study omits social class, however, which is the primary determinant of residential inclusion and 
exclusion, through the affordability of housing in different areas. 
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parts of London), as well as from the general population, and from other ethno-religious 
groups. „Despite some strong linkages, such as [that between] the Indian and Pakistani 
Muslims…,‟ Peach (2006: 364) reports that: „[the] residential pattern of Muslim groups in 
London is largely fragmented along ethnic lines‟ and that „the Ummah exists spiritually, 
but is not manifested in residential terms‟. He concludes that „there is not a single Muslim 
community but a community of communities.‟ (Peach, 2006: 368)  
Both Peach‟s findings and the statistical distributions of ethnicity and religion summarised 
above reinforce the view that it may be more appropriate to speak of „hyphenated‟ ethno-
religious groups – that is, groups defined by the intersection of religion, ethnicity and/or 
race – than of either ethnic or religious groups considered by themselves (see also Chapter 
2 above).    
The established academic discussion on residential separation has focussed, like Peach, on 
separation within particular cities, and found it to exist at levels that are subject to much 
debate (see Simpson, 2002; 2004; 2005; Johnston et al., 2002; 2005; Poulsen, 2005; 
Carling, 2008). Unlike Peach, this literature has tended to deploy ethnic categories as a 
proxy for religion and/or race, although Phillips (2006) and her colleagues (Phillips et al., 
2002; 2005) have provided some evidence of religious self-separation in West Yorkshire –
that is, families or individuals choosing to live in certain areas in order to enjoy proximity 
to co-religionists.  
4.3   Religion and Housing  
The fact that minority religious populations tend to be concentrated in particular cities, and 
in particular areas of each city (see the previous section), already suggests that inequalities 
of housing situation by religion are likely to be found. Beckford et al. (2006: 62) provide a 
detailed account of these issues. As in other fields, the „turn to religion‟ has been a recent 
development in research on housing, driven partly by Government concerns with managing 
diversity and neighbourhood renewal/regeneration (Sellick, 2004). Consequently, there is 
only limited data available on the quality of housing for the minority religions, with more 
attention paid to Muslims, however, who tend to live in poorer housing stock.  
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Figure 4.4: Religion of Household Reference Person 
by Housing Tenure. GB. Census 2001. ONS 2006e.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Total
Muslim
Buddhist
Other
No Religion
Christian
Hindu
Jewish
Sikh
Owner occupied
Social rented
Private rented
Rent free
 
Figure 4.4 presents data on housing tenure from the 2001 Census. Sikhs, Jews and Hindus 
were most likely to own their own homes (82%, 77% and 74% respectively), followed by 
Muslims (52%) and Buddhists (54%) (ONS, 2004; Graham et al., 2007). Muslims were the 
most likely to be living in social rented accommodation that was rented from the council or 
a housing association. In 2001, 28 per cent of Muslim households were living in social 
rented accommodation compared to 8 and 9 per cent of Hindu, Sikh and Jewish 
households. Buddhists were the most likely to be living in private rented accommodation 
(24%). A very small percentage of all households lived rent-free (2%), but Muslim 
households were twice as likely as other households to do so (4%). This data as a whole 
runs counter to the stereotype of Muslim owner-occupation. 
There is a broad correlation between ethno-religious groups and location with Hindus 
tending to live in more affluent locations; Sikhs are more likely to live in middle class 
areas and Muslims in poorer housing (Beckford et al., 2006). Muslims form 10.2% of the 
population resident in the most deprived decile of residential neighbourhoods (an over-
representation of more than three times) and there is a tendency, though less pronounced, 
for Hindus and Sikhs to share this residential deprivation (ONS, 2003: Table S104). A 
similar variation of circumstances was found in a study of BME housing in Wales 
conducted by the Welsh Assembly (2005). The least disadvantaged were Indian and 
Chinese residents and the most disadvantaged were Black-Caribbean, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi residents (who in the latter two cases can be assumed to be mostly Muslim).   
The number of rooms in a house relative to the number of occupants is commonly used to 
determine housing deprivation. Of all households, 40% Muslim, 26% Hindu and 22% Sikh 
experience housing deprivation (Beckford et al., 2006: 38). In 2001, just 6 per cent of 
Christian households experienced overcrowding. The high proportions for Muslim, Sikh 
and Hindu households in these totals are to some extent a reflection of their larger sizes –
their average numbers being 3.8, 3.6 and 3.2 people respectively, compared with 2.3 
people among Christian, Buddhist and Jewish households (ONS, 2001; 2006e: 93).  
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Overcrowding can be seen, however, as a Eurocentric measure of deprivation, which does 
not take into account lifestyle preferences and other financial and familial advantages of 
living together as an extended family. The need for larger housing to accommodate 
extended and intergenerational families was raised by Hindu and Muslim respondents to 
the consultation for The Weller Report (Weller et al., 2001: 64). Beckford et al. (2006) also 
raise the issue of shari‟a compliance in relation to the acquisition and management of 
properties as a directly religious factor in Muslim housing needs. At the same time, a 
careful study conducted by Sellick (2004: 5) for the Housing Corporation brought to light 
another dimension of the issue, that „the 15% of Muslim one person households reflect not 
only the independent status of high achieving independent professionals, but also the 
marginality of ex-offenders and the mentally ill.‟ 
Some two-thirds of the Muslim organisations contacted by Weller reported the perception 
of frequent or occasional unfair treatment of Muslims by housing providers, and about half 
recorded a perception of unfair treatment by estate agents. Christian, Jewish, Buddhist and 
Bahá‟í organisations were less likely to perceive unfair treatment in housing than Muslims, 
Sikhs and Hindus. On the other hand, the 2005 Citizenship Survey found vanishing 
proportions of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim respondents who claimed to have been 
discriminated against either by a local authority housing department or housing association 
(0%, 1% and 2% respectively), or by a private landlord or letting agent (1% in all cases). 
This survey involved sample sizes of the three religious groups of N=706, 365 and 1,489 
respectively (Kitchen et al., 2006: 59, Table 34). As argued in general terms in Chapter 2, 
the findings of The Weller Report should therefore be treated with extreme caution as a 
statement of the levels of discrimination in the housing market actually experienced by 
members of minority religions, and thus as a measure of the possible impact of 
discrimination on the housing inequalities noted above. 
Overall, the Welsh Assembly report (2005) recommended that housing providers recognise 
the diversity of housing needs among minority groups, and Beckford et al. (2006) added a 
recommendation for further research into how best to meet the religious and cultural 
housing needs of specific communities, bearing in mind also the broader issues of social 
cohesion and residential separation. Sellick‟s considered view on the housing situation of 
Muslims can perhaps stand as a conclusion on the housing needs of the minority religions 
more generally: „[this] report has … highlighted the diversity within the […] population 
and the need for sensitivity to the differences borne not only of religion but also of socio-
economic position, age, gender, locality and transnational commitments.‟ (Sellick, 2004:5) 
4.4 Community  
The concept of „community‟ is frequently linked in the literature to both ethnicity and faith 
(as in the quotation from Peach above) and rests on notions of shared interests and/or 
values. A distinction is commonly made between geographical communities (place-based) 
and communities of interest or identification (Mayo, 2000). Furbey and Macey (2005) 
point to the difficulty of sustaining this distinction, and, indeed, a considerable amount of 
the literature on religion and community is focused around a definition of communities as 
both neighbourhood and faith based. This conception is reinforced for Britain by the 
geographical concentrations noted above, which owe much to patterns of residential 
settlement by the non-European migrants who came to Britain after the Second World 
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War,43 for some of whom, religion was, and is, an important – if not central – part of 
identity.  
This conception remains somewhat simplified, however, and caution needs to be exercised 
in placing religion, rather than ethnicity, at centre stage in so-called „faith communities‟ 
(Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Peach, 2006; Raj, 2000). Equally, the tendency to regard 
communities as rooted in the locality ignores both the international (globalised) dimension 
of religion and ethnicity, particularly, perhaps, the ummah (see McRoy, 2006), as well as 
the transcendental orientation that is an inherent aspect of religious belief.  
It is important to note, too, that no matter how homogeneous communities might appear 
from the „outside‟, the reality is that they are all cross-cut by such divisions as age, gender, 
social class and migration-generation and that these factors intersect and interact in their 
impact on individuals‟ lived experiences and opportunities, as Sellick (2004) underlines in 
relation to housing issues. And, of course, all cultures are, by definition, dynamic rather 
than static, so that change over time is inevitable. Thus, the experiences, attitudes and 
identities of a „third generation‟, Bradford-born Muslim young man of Pakistani heritage 
will be significantly different from those of his immigrant grandfather. They will also be 
significantly different from those of his sister – which raises the issue of gender and 
generational differences and the possibility of inequality and oppression within 
communities.  
This observation points to the fact that communities have both positive and negative 
features (Furbey and Macey, 2005). For although communities can provide their members 
with support and security, they can also impose pressures towards conformity, limit contact 
with others outside the community and thus restrict both choice and change. Communities, 
particularly minority ethnic/faith communities, can provide a means of resisting (or coping 
with) the impact of externally imposed inequalities, such as racism, discrimination and 
social exclusion. On the other hand, their internal dynamics can reinforce inequalities of 
gender, sexual orientation, age or generation. And the ordinary operations of a market 
economy over time will tend to create internal class differentiation as well.  
In addition, all communities and religions are bounded and involve definitions of „us‟ 
versus „them‟. In situations where communities have become somewhat separated 
residentially and/or socially, this has implications for inter-ethnic interaction and identities 
(Wallman, 1986; Macey, 2007a). This will tend to be the case especially where there is a 
local or historical context of ethnic difference between two (or more) groups, each (or all) 
of which can draw on narratives containing the potential for mutual antagonism, and which 
are capable of feeding off each other. These are, roughly speaking, McKinnon‟s 
„circumstances for toleration‟ (2006: 14). But the outcome of toleration – that is, success in 
the search for acceptable ways to live with difference – may not always be achieved, 
because it is possible for ethnic differences to become politicised and conflictual in a 
process that can be described as „polarization‟ (Modood et al., 1997; Carling, 2008) which 
carries with it a tendency to the reinforcement of community traditions (Parekh, 2000).  
The dual character of community arises from the way in which internal solidarity, which 
can create many benefits for the in-group, may simultaneously provide a platform for 
external hostility directed towards some out-group. A number of commentaries emphasise 
the exceptional importance of communication and dialogue between groups in such 
circumstances (Smith, 2000; DCLG, 2006; Angoy, 2007; Ballard, 2007; Carling, 2008).  
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 Among these were black Christians from the Caribbean who were the first to settle in England in 
significant numbers in the late 1940s, followed by Hindus and Sikhs from India, then Muslims from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Many of these remarks apply to communities of all kinds. But it should be evident that 
(and why) religions can play a very important role in the maintenance of communities, 
including their dual aspects. Religion is historically a most effective source of identity, 
which contributes to the boundedness of any community that makes faith a membership 
condition, or (in effect) a condition of marriage. This is particularly relevant in the context 
of the European Convention right to change religion or belief, which is pursued further in 
Section 4.8. Religions involve ritual and other observance that simultaneously unite 
members and separate them from non-members (Raj, 2000; Hunt, 2002). They create value 
systems which can underwrite egalitarian practises – such as the ideals of Christian service 
that motivate so much effort in the voluntary sector, or the Muslim practise of zakat, which 
creates as a matter of justice an obligation to the poor „that the rich, those who have 
possessions, must never forget, for in their property, as the Qur‟an says, is “the right of the 
beggar and the disinherited”‟ (Ramadan, 2004: 179).  
Yet the same value systems can also underwrite unequal treatment, as in the Anglican and 
Catholic approaches to sexual orientation, and the access of women to the priesthood, or 
the effective exclusion of Muslim women from many mosques, on which more will be said 
in the next chapter. And nearly all religious traditions contain resources of history and 
doctrine that can be drawn upon to sustain, and even legitimise, hostility to those defined 
as beyond the pale of faith – at the extreme, political Crusade and violent forms of jihad.   
The point is simply that faith community, like community of all kinds, creates a double-
edged sword, and this needs to be borne in mind by Government whenever the choice is 
made to work through faith communities to achieve policy goals.  
4.5 Religious Identity and Political Representation 
It was noted in the last chapter that there are tensions and contradictions in the attempt by 
Government to enlist FBOs in service delivery. Similar points apply here to the 
Government‟s attempt to involve the leaders of faith communities in the more general aims 
of promoting social cohesion and preventing the growth of radicalism among young men. 
This section is mainly concerned with „community leadership‟ at local or national levels, 
rather than the political representation of minority religious groups through the electoral 
process. As in so many other areas, there is more research on the latter issue in relation to 
minority ethnicity than minority religion (see Purdam et al., 2002; Maxwell, 2005), 
although there is one pioneer study in this field about the religious determinants of voting 
in the 1997 General Election (Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001), and some other discussions of 
local party politics, all involving Muslims (Purdam, 2000; Lewis, 2002: 220-22).  
The first point about community leadership is that „community leaders‟ may be self-styled, 
rather than drawn from a representative range of community members (Macey, 1999b; 
2007a; Puri, 2005; Farnell et al., 2003; Baxter, 2006; McKerl, 2007). Alternative voices 
(often of young people or of women) may question the interpretation of community 
interests given by these „leaders‟, who are (typically) older men (Ansari, 2002). This issue 
is sometimes expressed in the language of „gate-keeping‟ (Johal, 2003; Phillips and Dustin, 
2004; Baksh et al., 2008; Wollaston, 2008). It should be noted, however, that „gatekeeping‟ 
is a feature of most social organisation, and can have positive as well as negative effects 
(Virdee et al., 2006 and Robinson et al., 2007 provide examples of the former). 
Second, community leaders may or may not have their own political agendas, which can 
include the use of religious claims for (non-religious) political purposes. And the dynamics 
of identity politics – which now occur in a global arena for all the major faiths – are not 
easy for the Government to contain or to stage-manage. Raj (2008) has written, for 
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example, about the development of a nationalist version of religious identity among young 
Hindu men, which supports the findings of Mukta (2000) and Searle-Chatterjee (2000). His 
focus on young male activists and the influence of globalisation complements that of 
Hopkins and Khani-Hopkins (2004) in relation to young Muslim men. He criticises the 
„ethnicization of religion‟, which he traces back through Van der Veer (1995), Saifullah-
Khan (1977) and Anwar (1976) to Desai (1963), and notes how Hindus are increasingly 
conscious of being part of a global „Eternal‟ religion (Raj, 2008: 537, 540). Bright has 
emphasised the problems nationally and internationally of the Government (including the 
Foreign Office) working with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which in his 
judgement has a radical Islamist agenda „with origins in the sectarian politics of Pakistan.‟ 
(2006: 6) 
The 2005 Citizenship Survey (Kitchen et al., 2006) has been cited already to the effect that 
minority religions have higher proportions of practising members than the Christian faiths. 
Other evidence suggests that for Muslims in particular religion has become the key 
signifier of identity, particularly among young people (Modood et al., 1997; Dwyer, 1999; 
2000; Macey, 2005; 2007b; Alam and Husband, 2006; Hopkins, 2006; Billings and 
Holden, 2007; Mirza et al., 2007). Some of these authors also discuss the conflicting – and 
sometimes extreme – influences on young Western European/Muslim men (see also 
Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Abbas, 2007; 
Hamid, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Marranci, 2007). As usual, however, care needs to be taken in 
making inferences from religious identity to religious practise, and, indeed, from religious 
identity to religious community. Billings and Holden, for example, suggest that in the 
North West of England, young people have little contact with their local mosques (2007: 
18). Mahoney and Taj (2006) found that the Muslim women in their Welsh consultation 
challenged the common definition of communities on the basis of religion, suggesting that 
culture, rather than religion, is the key determinant of behaviour. This makes the point that 
the perception of community from within may depend on the respondent‟s position in the 
community. And Graham (2003: 39) reaches a similar conclusion about religion and 
culture, suggesting that the binding force or „glue‟ that unites the highly complex and 
segmented Jewish community has a distinctively cultural flavour, and is not primarily 
religious.  
Third, competition may occur between different groups within a faith community to catch 
the ear of Government, and so be given, in effect, a position of recognised community 
leadership.44  
Singh (2006: 159) has noted, for example, that Sikhism involves a number of independent 
branches and that there is no national body recognised as legitimately representing the 
interests of all Sikhs.  
Regarding Muslim representation, Ansari mentions „the tensions that persist within Muslim 
communities themselves‟ in this context among others (2002: 387). Baksh et al. (2008) 
provide a useful survey of intra-Muslim political organisation. And Hopkins and Khani-
Hopkins (2004) analyse the relationships among the MPGB; UKACIA; the MCB; the 
Imams‟ and Mosques‟ Council, and the IPB as competing exponents of „the Muslim 
voice‟. 
These organisations have differing interpretations of their potentially divided loyalties to 
Britain on the one hand and the world-wide Muslim ummah on the other. As a result, they 
take correspondingly different positions on the issues of social integration versus 
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 Phillips (2003) discusses how the extension of the law (and exemptions to the law) to religion/belief 
can similarly strengthen the power of „leaders‟ over other community members. 
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separation, and co-operation or confrontation with the Government. For the sake of 
completeness, it should be noted that the range of Muslim voices include those arguing 
strongly for accommodation (Ramadan, 2004) as well as a number of critical and 
dissenting voices (Warraq, 2003; Manji, 2004; Engineer, 2009). 
Smith (2000) explores similar issues for a variety of faiths in East London. Mirza et al. say 
that: 
there is clearly a conflict within British Islam between a moderate majority that 
accepts the norms of Western democracy and a growing minority that does not … 
Islamist groups have gained influence at local and national level by playing the 
politics of identity and demanding for Muslims the “right to be different”. (2007: 5-
6)  
Furbey et al. echo this concern over social and political separation: 
The divisiveness of religion receives ultimate expression in violence. But faith 
communities can be characterised by other powerful forms of disconnection from 
other groups or wider society. Religious understanding that establishes a strong 
boundary with the rest of the world can produce passive retreat or a more active 
(and sometimes destructive) assertion of distinctiveness. (2006: 2) 
Weller has made a similar point in connection with the new level of official recognition 
accorded to religions by the inclusion of the Census question, expressing the concern that:  
it is possible that religion, as one part of the contemporary „politics of identity‟ might 
all too easily be transmuted into the service of an „identity politics‟ that turns 
religious identities into absolutes within competitive, conflictual, and potentially 
destructive „communalist‟ projects. (2004: 18) 
No outcome in this area should be regarded as a foregone conclusion. Kaufmann‟s views 
about the inevitable growth of religious conservatism (see Chapter 3) can be set alongside 
Casanova‟s thoughtful discussion (2001) of whether the Muslim tradition could (or will) 
experience a counterpart of „Vatican II‟ in the history of Catholicism, so that it becomes 
more fully reconciled with liberal modernism. A good deal is evidently at stake over the 
question „who speaks for faith communities?‟ as well as „what shall they say?‟ And here it 
is a striking finding of the survey by Channel 4 Dispatches (2006) that only 9% of Muslim 
respondents named any of the national organisations mentioned above as representative of 
Islam in Britain (see Appendix 2). 
4.6 Religion, Ethnicity and Relative Deprivation  
In terms of relative deprivation, the statistics paint a clear and consistent picture showing 
minority ethnic groups as a whole being in more deprived positions than their white 
counterparts across such key areas as economic well-being, employment, health, housing 
and education. For example:  
 Over half of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black African children are growing up in 
poverty (Platt, 2002; 2007a,b,c).   
 Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Africans and African-Caribbeans experience significantly 
higher levels of unemployment than white people, with Bangladeshi men having an 
unemployment rate of 20% – four times that of white men (ONS, 2002).   
 Muslims have the most deprived socio-economic profile of the minority religious 
groups with an unemployment rate of just under 14% for all those aged 25 and over, 
compared with 6% for Sikhs, 5% for Hindus and 4% for the population as a whole 
(Beckford et al., 2006).  
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 Muslim unemployment is particularly significant in the context of extended family 
living and higher than average birth rates simply because one unemployed 
„breadwinner‟ could impact on many people. 
 Muslim vulnerability to poverty is further compounded by the very low participation 
of women in the labour market (Platt, 2007a), high levels of ill-health and disability 
(Health Education Authority [HEA], 2000), and low educational achievement (CRE, 
2007). 
 There are, however, some important variations by ethnic group within religious 
populations which support the hyphen-group perspective. Thus, unemployment rates 
among Muslim men of working age (between 16-64) range from nearly 30% for 
Black African Muslims to between 15% and 20% for Bangladeshi, Pakistani and 
White British Muslims, down to just over 10% for Indian Muslims. Unemployment 
rates for Muslim women show a similar range and pattern by ethnicity (ONS, 3006e: 
123, Table 5.13).  
As we emphasise throughout this report, the relative deprivation – that is, the sheer 
inequality that can be observed in the social conditions of different groups – does not by 
itself prove that the deprived groups have been subject to discrimination or any other form 
of unfair treatment. And the fact that the deprivation is suffered by a group that is given a 
religious label does not by itself establish that any religious factor has caused the 
deprivation. Just as statistical analysis can try to make ethnic categories speak for religion, 
so religious categories may actually be speaking for ethnicity or social class. And minority 
religious communities have all been established long enough in Britain for class 
differentiation to have taken place within them, so that there are issues of economic 
inequality within as well as between the communities and the rest of society. Ansari 
(2002), for example, reports that there are over 5,000 Muslim millionaires in Britain, with 
combined liquid assets above £3.6 billion.45  
Census data shows clearly that class differentiation exists within each of the religious 
groups, but also demonstrates the patterns of variation between the different religious 
groups, with associated variations by both gender and ethnicity. Thus, both men and 
women from Jewish and Buddhist groups have higher proportions of managerial and 
professional occupations than the population at large (68% and 57% for Jewish men and 
women respectively, and 53% and 47% for Buddhist men and women, compared with the 
population averages for men and women of 42% and 38% respectively). Jewish men and 
women have very low representation among semi-routine and routine occupations (6% and 
11%, compared to population averages of 24% and 29% respectively). Buddhist men and 
women have higher representation among these routine occupations, at 17% and 24% 
respectively, but still below the corresponding averages (ONS, 2006e: 155, Table A5.7). 
By contrast, Muslims and Sikhs have lower representation than the population average 
among managerial and professional occupations, and higher representation among semi-
routine and routine occupations. This applies to both men and women of both groups.46 
Again, there is some variation by ethnicity within religion, with Indian Muslim men having 
a somewhat more „middle class‟ employment profile than Pakistani Muslim men, who in 
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 See Bolognani (2007a) and Ballard (2003) on the trans-national dispersion of funds and the 
importance of a cash economy among Pakistani Muslims, both of which must be taken into account to 
estimate the true economic position of the community.  
46
 The comparable class proportions (for managerial and routine occupations respectively) are 32% and 
33% for Muslim men; 35% and 32% for Muslim women; 35% and 29% for Sikh men, and 31% and 
36% for Sikh women (ONS, 2006e: 155, Table A5.7). 
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turn have a more middle class profile than Bangladeshi Muslim men. Interestingly, Muslim 
women‟s employment profiles show less ethnic variation than Muslim men‟s.47 
In line with the general „turn to religion‟, it is only recently that academic research has 
begun to focus specifically on religion rather than ethnicity. We will concentrate in this 
section on three of these pioneer studies, whose findings are interesting in their own right, 
and serve to illustrate the general points about this field made in 2.6 above. Further 
information on employment-related inequalities will be given in the section on the 
workplace in Chapter 6. 
Brown (2000b) reports the results of an analysis of the 1994 National Survey of Ethnic 
Minorities, with a large sample of men and women in Britain (N=3,795). His study is the 
most prominent early example in which religion is made explicit. The research design 
relates economic activity levels, grade of employment (in effect, social class), and earnings 
to religion as well as to ethnicity and gender. It is also important because it prefigures the 
2001 Census data reported above.  
Brown‟s findings show clear differences between Sikhs and Hindus among those with 
Indian backgrounds, with Hindus in the better position. There are also differences among 
Muslims, with Indian Muslims better placed than Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslims. In 
other words, it looks as if both ethnic background and religion are independently 
significant for economic outcomes. This study therefore lends further support to the idea 
that „hyphen-groups‟ of joint racial, ethnic and religious composition might form the most 
appropriate units of socio-economic analysis. 
Brown comments: „whilst it is relatively straightforward to demonstrate differences 
between religious groups in economic activity, it is harder to establish causality‟ (2000b: 
1058) and „proof of religious discrimination is difficult to establish in the absence of hard 
statistics‟ (Brown 2000b: 1037). This is because religion may either be acting as a proxy 
for other factors relating to culture of origin, or it might operate historically by contributing 
„indirectly to differences in factor endowments of migrants entering Britain.‟ (Brown 
2000b: 1059) His conclusion on the issue of discrimination is worth quoting in full because 
of its broad relevance: 
A more direct effect [of religious affiliation] may be at work in the form of religious 
discrimination. The relatively disadvantaged position of Muslims, in particular, may 
tie in with the view (discussed earlier) that Muslims (and Islam) are increasingly 
experiencing a negative profile within the British media and society at large. 
However, the revealing of a relatively advantaged Indian Muslim minority would 
seem to challenge this thesis (though there may be differences between Indian, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in the expression of their faith that might have a 
bearing on their identification as Muslim and exposure to discrimination). Finally, a 
direct effect may operate through attitudinal and aspirational differences between 
religious groups, that impinge on, and may affect the „success‟ of, labour market 
participation. (Brown, 2000b: 1059) 
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 Among men, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have 37%, 29% and 22% managerial 
occupations respectively. The corresponding figures for women are 33%, 33% and 31% (ONS, 2006e: 
156, Table A5.8). The profile of Hindu groups in these analyses tends to lie between those of Jewish 
and Buddhist groups on the one hand, and Muslim and Sikh groups on the other. No analysis is given 
for „Christian‟ groups because of the problems of interpreting Census data noted in the previous 
chapter. 
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Lindley (2002) conducted a similar analysis on the same data set, but using slightly 
different statistical techniques. Her conclusions, perhaps unsurprisingly, were in broad 
agreement with Brown‟s (Lindley, 2002: 438). She did, however, conduct a specific 
analysis on the position of Muslims, which concluded that: „Muslims do experience some 
unexplainable employment penalty, relative to other non-white religions, over and above 
all other characteristics (including ethnic differences and language fluency)‟. This is 
consistent with the operation of direct or indirect discrimination in the employment 
relationship, but the results also suggest that „Muslims appear to be less assimilated and/or 
have less transferable human capital than other non-whites‟ (Lindley, 2002: 439). 
A more recent study by Khattab (2009) focuses on the way that different ethno-religious 
groups convert their educational qualifications into occupational positions. The focus is 
thus on both the outcomes of education (whether or not groups gain higher than average 
qualifications – this is „educational advantage‟) and the use of education (whether or not 
groups gain higher than average employment position, given their level of qualifications). 
If a group has employment status higher than their qualifications (i.e. if they are 
underqualified for the jobs they hold), this would suggest they have „occupational 
advantage‟; conversely, if they are overqualified (which suggests that they are unable to 
find work commensurate with their qualifications), they suffer „occupational 
disadvantage‟.  
The Christian White British (CWB) group is taken as the reference group. The database is 
a sub-sample of the Census for England and Wales (N=250,000), and the study is the first 
we have discovered to make „No Religion‟ a category in quantitative work. The patterns of 
educational and educational „advantage‟ and „disadvantage‟ (compared with the CWB 
reference group) create an interesting and complex picture: 
(a) Groups with both educational and occupational advantage: Jewish White British; Non 
Religious White British and Other White British.48  
(b) A group with educational advantage but neither occupational advantage nor 
disadvantage: Hindu Indians. 
(c) A group with educational disadvantage but neither occupational advantage nor 
disadvantage: Muslim Indians.49 
(d) Groups with educational advantage and occupational disadvantage: Christian Black 
Caribbeans; Christian Black African. 
(e)  Groups with both educational and occupational disadvantage: Muslim Bangladeshis; 
Muslim Pakistanis; Muslim Whites; Sikh Indians.50   
These findings suggest once again that it is a combination of race, ethnicity and religion 
that is important to the relative experiences of the different groups. They also suggest that 
these relative experiences vary between the two fields considered – the outcome of 
education and the use of the qualifications obtained.  
It is not even clear that „religion‟ as a whole plays a straightforward role, since there is at 
least one minority ethno-religious group – the Jewish White British – that is placed 
favourably on both dimensions, and the attribute of „No Religion‟ (and „Other‟ religion) 
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 These are groups whose members have higher qualifications than the CWB group, but who also have 
higher occupations relative to their qualifications than the CWB. Please note that the terms 
„advantage‟ and „disadvantage‟ are being used here in Khattab‟s sense, which is more general than 
elsewhere in this report.  
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  These two groups are about the same as the CWB group at converting qualifications into occupational 
position (at two different educational levels). 
50
 These are groups who have lower qualifications, but do less well than CWBs occupationally, even 
accounting for their lower qualifications. 
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seems to create a similar situation for these other sub-groups of Christian White British 
ethnicity.51 Hindu Indians are also placed favourably vis-à-vis education, but are neutral 
occupationally. These findings compare with others which show Indian (or Chinese) 
minorities in a relatively favourable position educationally, sometimes, however, with 
much smaller sample sizes (Social Exclusion Unit, 2003; Skelton et al., 2007:  34).   
Although Khattab does not couch a conclusion in quite these terms, the obvious 
interpretation, which corresponds to the findings of both Brown and Lindley, is that it is 
also a combination of external factors (including the possibility of racial, ethnic and 
religious discrimination and the effects of local labour market conditions) and internal 
factors (including Brown‟s „attitudinal and aspirational differences‟ and a range of 
cultural differences) that are responsible for the observed patterns.52 The whole pattern of 
findings involving the Black groups especially suggest that where discrimination is 
involved, it may consist of racial rather than religious discrimination.  
In the remainder of this chapter, attention focuses on aspects of religious disadvantage (in 
the special sense used in this report), and on the discrimination practised by (rather than 
suffered by) members of religious groups. Reports of research into violence involving 
members of religious groups, and of religious „hate crimes‟ more generally – which are 
important components of lived inequality – are reserved for the section on the Criminal 
Justice System in Chapter 6 below.  
4.7  Religious Representation in the Public Realm 
Position of the Christian Church: The privileged recognition of the Christian churches –
and above all the Established Anglican Church – in the official life of the nation was noted 
in Chapter 2. Christianity has been prominent in Europe for at least 1,500 years (Billings 
and Holden, 2007); until the repeal of the law this year, it was the only religion to which 
the Blasphemy Law applied, and it still plays the major role in ceremonial state affairs 
(Weller, 2005), though more recently these have been opened up to other faiths. Although 
the British polity is perhaps moving step-by-step towards „equal advantage of religion or 
belief‟, the process is by no means complete.  
Religious Buildings: One aspect of the Christian heritage is its dominance of the British 
skyline. The question of discrimination against minority faiths in relation to planning 
permission for religious buildings has attracted considerable attention in recent years (Nye, 
2001; Weller et al., 2001; Edge, 2002; Gayle and Naylor, 2002; Gale, 2004, 2005). 
Beckford et al., summarise the position by saying that planning processes surrounding the 
religious buildings of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs „have frequently been problematic‟ 
(2006: 54).  
Nevertheless, Vertovek and Peach (1997) state that by the mid-1990s there were at least 
839 mosques and a further 950 Muslim organisations in Britain, and McLoughlin refers to 
„the pervasive Islamisation of the inner city‟ in Bradford (2005: 1046), noting that the 
majority of Bradford‟s 75,000 Pakistani Muslims live within 5 square miles of the city 
centre, and that this area contains 44 mosques. There are currently 144 Hindu mandirs in 
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 Any inference from this finding nevertheless needs to be made with great care, because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the „Christian‟ response to the religion question in the 2001 Census in 
England and Wales (see Chapter 3 above).  
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 Khattab say that „it is probably not the colour of skin, although it is still important, but the meaning 
and values that the dominant group attaches to the skills and who possesses them [that makes the 
difference to occupational advantage]‟ (2008:12). This comment seems to exclude the influence of the 
skills differentials themselves, as opposed to the perception of these differentials.  
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the UK –121 in England; 3 in Northern Ireland, 4 in Scotland and 15 in Wales (National 
Council of Hindu Temples [UK], 2008). Singh says that the modern gurdwara movement 
in Britain now embraces 250 Sikh institutions, including the £17 million building opened 
in Southall in 2003.53 He calls this „the premier symbol of Sikh presence in Britain, one of 
the new, emerging, “cathedrals” of multicultural Britain‟ (2006: 147). Singh also points to 
the changing role of gurdwaras over time, with social involvements including the 
provision of advice and learning centres, care for the elderly, „one stop shops‟ for local 
agencies, and acting as centres of community development. 
Planning processes in Britain may well have been „problematic‟ in the past, but the 
significant number of religious buildings stand in stark contrast to the situation in France, 
for example, where it was not until the 1990s that any real change in attitudes towards 
minority religious buildings took place (de Galembert, 2005). This underlines the point that 
in addition to their important spiritual and social (or communal) functions (see, e.g. Singh, 
2006), religious buildings symbolise the assertion by minority faiths of their right to 
representation in the public domain. This has far wider implications than the creation of 
sacred spaces, but can be seen to involve challenges to the secularisation process, 
Enlightenment thinking on the necessity of distinquishing the public and private domains, 
and, indeed, to the hegemonic Western definition of modernity itself (Eisenstadt, 2000). 
The Media, Minority Religions and ‘Islamophobia’: On a different level, but one that is 
powerfully related to both religious recognition and representation, is the question of the 
way that minority faiths are treated in the media.  
In this arena, it has been claimed that unacceptable anti-Islamic attitudes, or Islamophobia, 
are institutionalised, particularly in television. This might be seen as an aspect of religious 
disadvantage, since it involves unequal recognition or treatment in a public context, and 
there is said to be quite extensive research evidence for it (Conway, 1997; Allan, 1997; 
Ansari, 2002; The Media Diversity Institute, 2002; Poole, 2002; Allen, 2004 and 2007; 
Ameli et al., 2007; INSTED, 2007; Richardson, 2007).  
The difficulty with this evidence is that it rarely derives from studies conducted with 
random samples of reasonable size in the given domain of interest, which also conform to 
the full requirements of quantitative and/or qualitative social science methodologies. As 
such, much of it is best described as „anecdotal‟. It often consists of the reproduction of 
examples from the mainstream press that are regarded as displaying hostile stereotypes of 
Islam, with little analysis or commentary, as if the verdict of „Islamophobia‟ were self-
evident. There are a few studies of the reception of news coverage, especially of dramatic 
events such as 9/11, in (typically) small samples (Ahmad, 2006; Banaji et al., 2006; Harb 
and Bessaiso, 2006). And there are some recent studies of (Christian) sectarianism in the 
media in Scotland, including sports coverage of the proverbial contest between Glasgow 
Celtic and Glasgow Rangers (Adams and Burke, 2006; Bradley, 2006). There is also 
discussion of „Anglophobia‟ in the Scottish sources, but this does not appear to have any 
religious dimensions (Bruce and Glendinning, 2003; McAspurren, 2005).  
The problems in this area can be traced at least as far back as The Conway Report –
Islamophobia: a Challenge for us All. This report probably did more to establish the 
currency of the term „Islamophobia‟ in public life in Britain than any other single source.   
As noted in Chapter 2, The Conway Report defines „Islamophobia‟ in the first instance 
with reference to attitudes or emotions („unfounded hostility‟) and then extends it as a 
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  In 2001, the figure was 202 in England and Wales, including 5 in Wales, 11 in Scotland and 1 in 
Northern Ireland (Weller, 2003). 
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concept to include their „practical consequences‟, such as discrimination and exclusion. 
The main focus in this section will be on the direct expression of unfounded hostility in the 
media and elsewhere, but it is worth noting that the evidence provided by The Conway 
Report itself of adverse practical consequences suffered by Muslims is not extensive. 
There are descriptions of at most four specific incidents involving religious hostility or 
discrimination (Conway, 1997: 38, Box 16),54 and the authors acknowledge that the 
analysis of the data available to them about social inequality and racist activity led to 
conclusions about a specifically religious component that were „speculative‟. (Conway, 
1997: 41) Nevertheless, the report claimed that „Islamophobia‟ „describes a real and 
growing phenomenon – an ugly word for an ugly reality‟ (Conway, 1997: iii).  
The Conway Report does, however, reproduce a number of examples of individuals 
identified in context as Muslim and represented in the media in an unsympathetic or 
unflattering light. As such, the examples constitute evidence of opposition, or even 
hostility to, Islam within the mainstream media. But this may not be sufficient by itself to 
constitute evidence of Islamophobia, for several reasons.  
First, the definition of Islamophobia refers to „unfounded hostility‟, so that it is not enough 
to show simply that hostility exists towards Muslims in order to demonstrate Islamophobia. 
It is necessary, in addition, to defend the judgement that the hostility is „unfounded‟ in the 
context of any given example; to show, in other words, that the description or the portrayal 
is an unreasonable one, given the specific individuals or events portrayed (see the 
discussion in 2.3 above). 
Second, the genre of representation is a factor that must be taken into account in the 
analysis of meaning, in that cartoons, for example, involve caricature – that is, deliberate 
exaggeration or distortion.  
Third, Islam will suffer a religious disadvantage (so that Islamophobia involves a specific 
virulence towards Islam) only if it is portrayed less favourably than other religions or belief 
systems (Is the portrayal of imams more hostile than the portrayal of bishops?). There is a 
need, in other words, to distinguish between general criticism of the way the media 
operates in Britain (which may be exemplified in some cases by its treatment of Islam or of 
Muslims), and an accusation of specific animosity. The reason for making the distinction is 
that the remedy differs between the two cases: either raise the general standards of media 
coverage on the one hand, or deal with anti-Muslim bias on the other. 
Fourth, the guidance now offered by the law on religious hatred provides latitude for 
„expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the 
beliefs or practices of its adherents‟ (RRHA 2006, Schedule, S.1, 29J). Is Islamophobia 
only involved when expressions of this type cross the line into incitements of hatred, or is 
it defined more narrowly, to include, say, every instance of dislike, ridicule or insult?  
Fifth, it must be recognised that much of the British media coverage of Islam and of 
Muslims in the recent past has been related to armed conflicts between states that are 
sometimes seen to be defined in part in religious terms, or to social disorder involving the 
members of Muslim communities in Britain, or to specific terrorist acts aimed at civilian 
populations that are conducted – whether authentically or not – in the name of religion. It 
is not at all surprising that events of this kind will dominate the news. How often, then, 
does the presentation or the interpretation of events such as these amount to „fair 
comment‟, and where, and if so how, does it cross the line into prejudice or discrimination 
aimed against Muslims? And in the absence of dramatic news events of these kinds, how 
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much coverage of religious or other issues relating to Islam or to Muslims might one 
expect to see in the mainstream media? What, therefore, are the benchmarks against which 
an allegation of Islamophobia is to be judged? 
It is not argued here that it is an easy matter to draw any of these lines, or to make 
judgements about every individual case. The point, rather, is that The Conway Report did 
not dwell on the need to draw these lines, or the difficulties of judging cases, and in this it 
has been followed by much of the subsequent literature on Islamophobia, which now refers 
to Europe as well as the UK (EUMC, 2006a and b).55  It is interesting to note that by 2004, 
Christopher Allen, whose work with both EUMC and FAIR has done much to popularise 
the idea of Islamophobia over the last decade, had reached a similar conclusion about this 
lack of empirical substantiation: „the reality remains that very little research [on religion] 
has actually been undertaken that offers any concretised or grounded evidence‟ (Allen, 
2004: 11). 
One exception to this general paucity of research is an article by Richardson (2001), which 
counts as the „pioneer study‟ in this field. This paper analysed the coverage of Muslims in 
broadsheet newspapers in Britain over the period from October 1997 to January 1998. It 
found a tendency to associate Islam and Muslims only with negative news contexts (which 
may, of course, be the majority of news contexts), and to exclude Muslim voices from the 
coverage. The coverage was nearly all of non-British Muslims – nearly 90% of the reports 
(Richardson, 2001: 227) – reflecting the international situation of the time.  
It is surprising that Richardson‟s approach was not pursued systematically until very 
recently, when a similar study appeared in July 2008 – after the literature review for this 
report had been completed. This is a study conducted by a team from the Cardiff School of 
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies (Moore et al., 2008) of the coverage of Islam (and 
of Muslims) in the national UK press from 2000-2008. The findings show that the volume 
of news stories referring to Islam in Britain (or British Muslims) increased quite sharply in 
2001-2 and 2005-6 – immediately following the 9/11 attack in the US and the 7/7 attack in 
London. These local peaks in coverage, however, combined with a steadily rising trend, 
which saw coverage increase almost tenfold over the review period, from 350 stories a 
year in 2000 to an estimate of nearly 3500 in 2008 (Mason et al., 2008: 9, Table 1). 
Richardson‟s coverage of international events had by now become thoroughly 
domesticated.  
A sample of almost 1000 of these stories was chosen for further analysis (about 5% of all 
the news stories). The coverage in the sample was dominated by three „news hooks‟: 
terrorism (or the war on terror), religious and cultural issues, and Muslim extremism, 
amounting to 36%, 22% and 11% of coverage respectively. The relative proportions of 
these stories, which together account for over two-thirds of coverage on British Muslims, 
were similar for the broadsheet and the tabloid press.  
The most frequent discourses within this coverage linked Muslims to the threat of 
terrorism; viewed Islam as dangerous, backward or irrational; covered Islam in relation to 
multiculturalism, or spoke of Islam in terms of „a clash of civilisations‟ or as a threat to the 
British way of life. As the authors comment „four of the five most common discourses 
about Muslims in Britain in the British press associate Islam/Muslims with threats, 
problems or in opposition to British values‟ (Mason et al., 2008: 15). 
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Further, an analysis of word associations found that a majority of the most commonly used 
nouns and adjectives held negative connotations – including „terrorist‟, „extremist‟, 
„cleric‟, „Islamist‟, „suicide bomber‟, „convert‟, and „militant‟, „radical‟, „fanatical‟, 
„fundamentalist‟, „extremist‟, „militant‟, „moderate‟, and „evil‟. The authors point out that: 
this is not to say that these nouns were used inaccurately or indiscriminately: as our 
other findings suggest, if British Muslims are most likely to feature in news about 
terrorism, extremism or religious and cultural differences, then it is not surprising if 
the nouns used reflect these topics. What these findings do indicate, however, is the 
extent to which the dominant “news hooks” have implications on [sic] the way 
British Muslims are generally described (Mason et al., 2008: 15).  
If the negative portrayal of Islam thus followed on from the newspapers‟ choice of 
newsworthy topics, it was also compounded in some cases by ordinary kinds of journalistic 
faults, such as „decontextualisation, exaggeration and misinformation‟ (Mason et al., 2008: 
32). These problems are traced out in several stories that dominated headlines at various 
times in 2007-8, including the genetic dangers posed by first-cousin marriage, the analogy 
between Islamophobia and the situation in 1930s Germany, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury‟s 2008 statement on shar‟ia law, the existence of social separation in Britain 
along religious lines, and future demographic trends (Mason et al., 2008: 29-39).56   
An analysis of the sources quoted within the newspaper articles themselves creates a strong 
impression of the way in which Muslims are talked about – by politicians, other public 
figures, Criminal Justice professionals or campaign groups, for example – rather than 
spoken with. These four types of source account for over a half of all quotations about 
British Muslims, whereas The MCB accounts for 8% of quotations, radical Islamic groups 
4% and Muslim religious leaders 3%. Although „the Muslim community‟ is frequently the 
topic of debate, community sources were used in just 1% of quotations (fifteen in all), 
slightly ahead of the BNP‟s nine quotations as a source of information about Muslims used 
by the mainstream national press! (Mason et al., 2008: 20, Table 4).  
Overall, these studies add to the general sense that the public and official discourses 
surrounding Islam – in politics and the media, as well as sometimes in the academic world 
– take place in their own realm, which is established at some distance from the experience 
of participants closer to the ground. In the same way that Government policy-makers seek 
out (and in the process help to create) „community leaders‟ to articulate a community view, 
so do newspapers – when they attend to Muslim voices at all – seek out community 
spokespeople to provide a Muslim reaction to the news of the day. It appears that the MCB 
fulfils this role for the national print media more than any other Muslim organisation, even 
though a very small fraction of Muslims name the organisation in surveys as representative 
of their interests or views.57      
It is possible that the focus on national media in these studies gives a slightly misleading 
view of press coverage in its totality, because local newspapers in areas with higher 
Muslim populations may cover a broader range of issues, with a more balanced 
representation of Muslim voices – this is our informal impression, for example, of the 
coverage in the Bradford Telegraph and Argus. 
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 We make no detailed assessment of whether Mason et al.‟s strictures of the press are justified in all 
these cases. The analysis of demographic trends is a complex business, for example, and there are 
known to be concerns among health professionals about the incidence of genetic conditions among the 
children of first-cousin marriages (see Chapter 6 below). Whether or not particular press reports are 
well-founded, concern with these issues is by no means a „tabloid invention‟.  
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 The fraction is 4% according to the Channel 4 Dispatches survey, and 6% according to the Policy 
Exchange survey by Mirza et al., 2008. 
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The tendency of the national press to promulgate partial descriptions of Islam and Muslims 
in negative news contexts nevertheless seems bound to generate broader effects, although 
it is not easy to establish exactly what these effects on general social relations are liable to 
be. There may well be a tendency to reinforce stereotypes among different sections of the 
national press readership. And, as has been mentioned, there is very little systematic 
research into television coverage. 
Access to Alternative Media: When considering the question of the overall effects of 
media representation, it is important to remember that members of minority religions have 
access to a range of alternative media. For example, the Muslim population in Britain has 
widespread access to Arab television, such as Al-Jazeera, which provides them with 
alternative views of the world and enables them to judge British media representations and 
news reporting.  
Harb and Bessaiso‟s research with British Arab Muslims in Wales notes both polarised 
„East v. West‟ views and the spread of conspiracy theories with respect to the bombing of 
the twin towers. Their survey, which was carried out for Channel 4 Dispatches (2006), 
found that 45% of their respondents believed that 9/11 was a conspiracy, and 38% believed 
the same in respect to Princess Diana‟s death. Harb and Bessaiso link their findings to anti-
Americanism and anti-semitism, tied to a strong religious identity and a sense of 
persecution. They observe that such views are notoriously difficult to shift, especially 
when reinforced by selective media viewing that supports, rather than challenges, them 
(Harb and Bessaiso, 2008: 1063). 
Whatever the impact of the media on either Muslims or non-Muslims, modern 
communications technology can be used to propagate negative, conflictual views of the 
world and the stereotypical „other‟. Thus, the development of new means of 
communication can result, paradoxically, in the closure of dialogue between groups, rather 
than the opening out of new occasions for understanding. 
Protests Against Cultural Representations of Religion: A different aspect of religion and 
cultural representation relates to protests by religious groups on the grounds of hurt, 
offence or „blasphemy‟. One of the first such objections was to the publication of Salman 
Rushdie‟s novel The Satanic Verses in 1988, protest against which involved a ritual 
burning of the book, public disorder, and the issuing of a fatwa by the Iranian Ayatollah 
Khomeini, sentencing the author to death (see Elst, 2001 for a general account, and M. 
Phillips, 2006a and b for the responses of the British Government). This incident can be 
said to have played a significant role in the political mobilisation of British Muslims 
(Samad, 1992) and to have thrown into sharp relief the conflicts that can occur between 
religious values and secular, democratic ones, such as freedom of speech and artistic 
expression, as well as what constitutes acceptable styles of protest. 
More recent examples of religious protest in relation to the media are that by Christians 
against the televising of Jerry Springer: The Opera, which was first shown in London in 
1993 and began touring the UK in 1995. And in 2004, Sikhs protested against the staging 
of the play Behzti in Birmingham, written by a Sikh woman, Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti. Protest 
against „Jerry Springer‟ was led by the far-right organisation Christian Voice and was 
condemned by a number of Christian organisations/denominations; that against Behzti 
involved both local and national Sikh organisations, some of which, such as the Sikh 
Federation, were condemned by others as „militants‟ (Bassey, 2005).  
Finally, the publication of twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish 
newspaper in 2005 provoked another storm of protest by Muslims across the world, as well 
as leading to intensive argument in Britain about the apparently conflicting rights to 
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freedom of speech versus the right not to be exposed to religious offence (or racism). 
Despite – or perhaps because – the British Government discouraged publication of the 
cartoons, there was widespread debate about these issues, some of which were legally 
„solved‟ by the passing of the Incitement to Religious Hatred Act in 2006 amongst 
widespread, and, indeed, ongoing, debate (see, for instance, Cohen, 2004; Baggini, 2004; 
Bleich, 2006; Carens, 2006; Hansen, 2006; Modood, 2006; O‟Leary, 2006; Sivanandan, 
2006; Goodell, 2007; Modood, 2007; Archbishop of Canterbury, 2008; British Humanist 
Association, 2008). 
There are evidently some difficult issues involved in balancing the right to freedom of 
expression against the rights felt by the religious to protection from offence, although the 
repeal of the Blasphemy Law, and its replacement (in effect) by the Law on Religious 
Hatred have broadened the latitude of expression in recent years from the legal point of 
view.  
The protests considered here raise some important sociological questions. For example, 
protest against religious offence has generally been dominated by Muslims, and it is a 
moot question as to whether other religious groups have been influenced by the apparent 
success of such action. Grillo reports: „Only when protests turned violent, militants 
claimed, did anyone listen‟, citing a number of statements by young Sikhs that appear to 
support this view:  
if some fool thinks he/she can mock our religion, mock our faith, use our faith as a 
joke and to humiliate us, then they got another think coming, mate‟. [Muslims] hit 
hard anything that makes a mockery of them, so much so that people are afraid to 
tackle issues involving Islam.  
And: „[When they burned the Satanic Verses], that soon put a stop to it‟ (cited in Grillo, 
2007: 13). Nor is it only young Sikhs or Muslims who feel that it is only street level – often 
violent – protest that is effective (see the Hindu comments reported in Chapter 3). 
Casciani‟s (2004) comment offers an apt conclusion to this section:  
If you had to write a theatrical pitch for what Birmingham has just witnessed over 
the play Behzti, you could do it in seven words: play offends community, community 
protests, play cancelled. But that simple three act performance conceals a far more 
complex drama about how we all share the same space in a pluralistic society. 
4.8  Disadvantage and Discrimination Practised by Religious Groups 
Members of religious groups may be the main intended beneficiaries of the new legal 
framework, but they are also subject to it. A balanced presentation of the evidence must 
include examples where religious groups or individuals act to sustain inequality, unfair 
treatment or hostility. 
Discrimination and Disadvantage in Employment or Service Provision: Savage (2007) 
refers to cases brought against Catholic schools by non-Catholics and Farnell et al. (2003) 
cite similar examples by FBOs in the community and voluntary sector. These are 
employment cases where it would be difficult to claim that religious exemptions applied. 
Humanists claim that non-religious belief systems are not accorded equal weight to 
religious ones in schools. They also claim that they are inadequately represented on 
governing bodies and other consultative committees (BHA, 2005). The latter would fall 
under the heading of „belief disadvantage‟ in the terminology of this report.  
Additional issues are raised by Harris et al. (2003), who found that religious contributors to 
FBOs often expect their money to be spent on members of that religion. They also found 
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that older people expect to be cared for „by their own‟ in times of need. Is this an 
acceptable facet of multiculturalism or an instance of religious discrimination? There are 
clearly some difficult justice issues to be resolved in this area.  
Denial of Religious Recognition: A very clear example of discrimination practised by 
religious groups involves the denial of legitimacy to denominations or branches of 
religions. One illustration of this is Judaism‟s refusal to accept Messianic Jews as part of 
the Jewish faith, despite their fulfilling all the biological and doctrinal criteria of 
„Jewishness‟, other than that relating to the coming of the Messiah. Antagonism to 
Messianic Jews is reported to come not only from Jews, but from members of some 
Christian denominations (Kollontai, 2004). Another example is Islam‟s rejection of 
Ahmadis‟ claim to be Muslims.  
Expressions of Religious Antagonism: Another dimension that falls broadly under this 
heading consists of expressions of antagonism by one faith towards another, or against 
people who hold non-religious views, or against particular categories of people, such as 
gay men and lesbians. An example of this is the use of both electronic and print media in 
ways that are frequently offensive and sometimes come close to incitement to religious 
hatred. A cursory reading of some Islamist websites illustrates this graphically, but so, too, 
do printed publications. The Westophobia Report (London Bible College, 1999) cites 
numerous examples of comments from a range of Muslim publications that can most 
charitably be described as unlikely to enhance inter-faith relationships. Publications by 
such groups as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (1995; 1997; 2000a and b; 2002) are even more extreme in 
their descriptions of Western society and Christianity. And some right wing Christian 
websites contain material on non-heterosexuality that expresses what many would regard 
as decidedly un-Christian views.  
Religious Conversion: An important aspect of the legislation on religion or belief centres 
around the right to believe, or not to believe, in a God or a religion and the right to change 
one‟s religion. Under the heading of discrimination by religious groups in contemporary 
Britain, it is probably the issue of conversion which is most problematic for some 
organised religions. 
In one sense, the treatment of the Messianic Jews by mainstream Judaism (above) 
illustrates this clearly, for as Kollontai points out, modern Judaism is happy to accept as 
Jews people who do not practise their religion. What it is not willing (or able) to do is 
accept Jews who takes on a new spiritual identity (2004: 198). She comments: 
A Jew who professes a belief in Jesus as Messiah, recognises the importance of 
Torah and continues to live a Jewish life is proclaimed a non-Jew, while a Jew who 
has rejected belief in God, places little, if any, importance on the Torah and does not 
practice a Jewish life-style remains a Jew in the eyes of the Jewish authorities. 
(Kollontai, 2004: 203) 
Islamic attitudes to conversion are strictly one-way – that is, individuals can convert to 
Islam, but Muslims cannot convert to another religion. In some parts of the world apostasy 
still carries the death penalty, and even where this is not the case, apostates are subjected to 
gross human rights abuses (Meral, 2008). While this is not the case in Britain, there have 
been cases of harassment and violence practised against converts from Islam to 
Christianity, including death threats, vandalism and physical assaults (Meral, 2008; 
Telegraph & Argus, 2008). 
Engineer (2008) says that this is a jurists‟ injunction, rather than a Qur‟anic one. Writing 
of the current situation in India, he observes that Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees 
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individuals the right to convert to any religion, but that rumours of Christians attempting to 
convert Muslims are currently leading to extreme violence, including the murder of priests 
and doctors. He cites Heredia‟s writing on the issue of conversion: „conversion can 
destabilize the life of a people, unsettle painfully balanced boundaries, scramble carefully 
constructed identities …In situations of sharp and hostile religious boundaries between 
communities, conversion represents the ultimate betrayal.‟ (Engineer, 2008) The situation 
in the UK differs significantly from that on the Indian sub-continent, of course, but the 
existence of transnational networks and associations means that the production and 
consumption of media, politics and religion in Britain are strongly affected by structures, 
relationships and events in India and Pakistan (Samad, 1992; 1998; Allen and Barrett, 
1996).  
It may be, too, that these observations go some way towards explaining the reluctance of 
some Muslim communities to mix, or allow their children to mix, with non-Muslims in 
certain contexts and the pressure they put on their young adults to marry kin (often from 
specific areas of the Indian sub-continent). This brings us back to ethno-religious 
communities in Britain and raises issues for the religion or belief strand of the equalities 
agenda.  
4.9 Key Points 
 There is considerable ethnic variation within minority (non-Christian) religious 
groups in Britain, and religious variation within black and Asian minority ethnic 
groups. 
 The minority religious population of the UK is heavily concentrated geographically, 
in London and a small number of other urban centres in England. 
 Groups defined by religious self-ascription suffer a range of socio-economic 
inequalities in relation to fields such as housing, education, employment and 
economic participation, but it is more difficult to show that religious identity plays an 
independent role in creating the inequality.  
 Minority religious groups suffer from religious disadvantage in a number of respects. 
 There is a widespread belief in the prevalence of both religious discrimination and 
Islamophobia in the media, but much less systematic evidence to support either 
belief.  There is, however, some work on the national print media that shows how the 
selection of news topics, possibly exacerbated by other journalistic techniques, works 
to create a generally unfavourable media image of Islam (and Muslims) in Britain.  
 Faith communities: 
 Have a dual aspect, promoting equality in some respects and sustaining 
inequality in other respects. 
 Are cross cut by social divisions of age, gender, social class and other factors. 
 May be based on common culture as much as shared religion. 
 Can sustain both internal solidarity and external hostility.  
 (Ostensibly) religious organisation and leadership can be used to promote non-
religious political agendas, and it is not always clear who speaks for minority 
religious communities. 
 There is some evidence of minority religious groups perpetrating disadvantage, 
discrimination and hostility against non-members, and in some cases against ex-
members or would-be members. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RELIGION: GENDER AND SEXUALITY 
5.1 Introduction 
We have allocated a separate chapter to gender and sexuality because (a) both are central 
to religious reproduction and thus assume a high profile with respect to the religion/belief 
legislation; (b) they highlight a number of potential tensions between different equality 
spheres (see Appendix 4), and (c) the Government emphasis on FBOs is accompanied by a 
new-found interest in women, particularly Muslims, as is illustrated by the large number of 
documents, speeches, reviews and consultations now circulating (e.g. Blunkett, 2003; 
Home Office, 2004; Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raj, 2006; WEU, 2006; DCLG, 2007). 
We feel it is important to contextualise our discussion on religion, gender and sexuality 
against a backdrop of the inequality, oppression and violence experienced by women and 
LGBT people more generally. This chapter, then, is divided into four sections. The first 
focuses on disadvantage and discrimination on the basis of gender; the second analyses the 
role of religion in relation to women‟s inequality and oppression; the third looks at 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the fourth analyses the role of 
religion in the oppression of non-heterosexual people. 
There are five important points to keep in mind throughout the chapter: 
1. The literature frequently fails to distinguish between ethnicity and religion, and 
sometimes uses the former as a proxy for the latter. 
2. Cultural practices are sometimes confused with religious requirements.  
3. There is an important distinction between theology/doctrine and its interpretation/ use.  
4. The interpretation of theology/doctrine varies by both strand (or branch) of religion, as 
well as by individuals. 
5. Religious self-definitions can conceal secular and/or political orientations and actions. 
SECTION 1: DISADVANTAGE AND DISCRIMINATION – GENDER  
5.2 Gender Inequality, Disadvantage or Discrimination: The Wider Context 
The term „gender‟ is a relational concept applying to both men and women, though much 
of the literature uses the term as if it applies only to women. This is not, perhaps, 
surprising, since women are systematically disadvantaged relative to men in virtually all 
spheres of the public and private arenas.58 They are generally poorer than men, not least 
because much of their work is in the home, which is unpaid (Skinner, 2006; Moullin, 
2007). They have less power than men because they are less likely to hold decision-making 
roles (EOC, 2007b and c).59 They also suffer high levels of physical and mental violence, 
from forced marriage, through domestic violence, to murder (Home Affairs Select 
Committee, 2008). 
There is a vast literature on gender inequality in Britain that can only be touched on here, 
but which clearly demonstrates women‟s inequality relative to men, and it is within this 
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  Two exceptions here are that young men‟s experience of violent, stranger, crime is 80% higher than 
young women‟s (Walker et al., 2006) and that women live longer than men – albeit in relative poverty 
since their retirement income is 40% less than men‟s (WEU, 2006). 
59
  Only 20% of MPs are women (EOC, 2007a; UK Parliament, 2007); only 10% of FTSE 100 
Directorships are held by women (EOC, 2007a and b), and only 9% of High Court and more senior 
judges are women (EOC, 2007b). 
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broader context that the potential additional disadvantage/discrimination on the basis of 
religion and ethnicity needs to be assessed. The material below is a brief summary of a 
wide range of material from the WEU (2005), the EOC (2006b; 2007a and b) and Sigle-
Rushton and Perrons (2006). Perhaps the most striking document in this sphere is the 
EOC‟s Gender Equality Index (2007c). This not only produces a raft of statistics on 
women‟s inequality in contemporary Britain, but projects the (shocking) number of years – 
on present progress – that it will take women to „catch up‟ with men. The EOC 
acknowledges considerable progress in some spheres, but comments: „progress has often 
been painfully slow … [in some areas] the index suggests that the agenda has stalled or 
worse yet we‟re actually going backwards. Unless further action is taken, nothing will ever 
change.‟ (2007c: 1). 
Education: though girls are out-performing boys educationally (DfES, 2006), gendered 
subject choices (at „A‟ level and in post-compulsory education/training) have long-term 
consequences for jobs and salaries. Boys‟ choices prepare them for well-paid jobs 
involving science and technology, whilst girls‟ choices lead to low paid „caring‟ and 
administrative roles (DfES, 2005; HESA, 2005; Learning and Skills Council, 2005). Partly 
as a consequence of this, 65% of jobs are gender segregated (ONS, 2006b; EOC, 2007c). 
Employment Sectors and Pay: (See Chapter 6) there is an overall pay gap between men 
and women of 17% [15% in the EU]  (EC, 2008). Women in full-time work are paid on 
average 17% less per hour than men, and 38% less when part-time pay is compared (ONS, 
2006; EOC, 2007c). Women‟s family responsibilities mean that they are more likely than 
men to be in part-time work. Women are significantly under-represented in 
managerial/executive posts (EOC, 2007c) and in the political arena (EOC, 2007b). 
Labour Market Participation, Families and Care: domestic and childcare responsibilities 
result in women moving in and out of the labour market over the life cycle which has 
significant consequences for pay, promotion and pensions (Sigle-Rushton and Perrons, 
2006). This varies by religion: Muslim women have the highest economic inactivity rate of 
all faith groups – 68% compared with 28% for Christians and around 35% for Hindus and 
Sikhs (Open Society Institute, 2005a). Religion is also associated with labour market re-
entry and there are particularly low rates of return to work for Muslims and Sikhs.  
An EOC survey looked specifically at barriers to employment and promotion for VME 
women in Scotland (EOC, 2006a). However: (1) this research is almost entirely about 
perceptions; (2) the examples of „discrimination‟ provided are not entirely convincing; (3) 
many of the „barriers‟ identified as impacting adversely on minority women apply equally 
to majority ones, and (4) many barriers that are specific to minority ethnic women relate to 
personal/community issues, rather than discrimination – lack of language skills, overseas 
qualifications, lack of support for family and childcare responsibilities. Nevertheless, it 
was found that:  
 Attitudes to Muslim women wearing the hijab are seen to be associated with post 
9/11 reactions. 
 The examples of discrimination given relate more strongly to racism than to age, 
class or gender. 
The EOC‟s (2007a) statutory investigation into Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black 
Caribbean women and work in England, Scotland and Wales represents an important 
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breakthrough in attempting to overcome the failure of statistics to combine gender and 
ethnicity.60  It identifies five „employment gaps‟: 
1. Low participation rates (Buckner et al., 2007; EOC, 2007a). 
2. Unemployment (EOC, 2007a). 
3. Progression at senior levels (EOC, 2006b). 
4. The pay gap (Platt 2007a). 
5. Occupational segregation (Platt, 2007a; Buckner et al., 2007; EOC, 2007a). 
However, caution needs to be exercised against too ready an acceptance of discrimination 
as responsible for the differences identified. First, the EOC‟s enquiry rests heavily on 
perceptions, rather than evidence, of discrimination. And such instances of „discrimination‟ 
as are provided are at least partially explicable in terms of individual characteristics and 
employment histories – both of which are related to ethnicity and religion.  
This highlights a second major difficulty with the investigation, which is the researchers‟ 
determination to „move away‟ from cultural, ethnic or religious influences to focus on 
labour market discrimination. For whilst it is right to examine work-based barriers to 
access and progression, a partial and distorted picture is presented if ethno-religious 
influences are not also considered. These include: large families; extended caring 
responsibilities; definitions of women‟s roles as home centred; the limitation of higher 
education to local universities (see Bolliver, 2005, who highlights late and fewer 
applications by minority ethnic students and their intention to live at home while studying); 
constraints on participation in CV enhancing activities, and the inability or unwillingness 
to travel for work. 
5.3 Violence Against Women 
Whilst some of the evidence of women‟s inequality in various arenas is striking (see 
Chapter 6), nowhere is it more graphically illustrated than in the sphere of violence – 
which takes place across the world:61  
Violence against women continues unabated in every continent, country and culture. 
It takes a devastating toll on women‟s lives, on their families and on society as a 
whole. Most societies prohibit such violence – yet the reality is that too often, it is 
covered up or tacitly condoned. (Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary, 2008) 
The extent and severity of violence against women on a global scale should not be 
underestimated: the World Bank found that domestic violence against women of 
reproductive age caused as many deaths as cancer and more deaths than road traffic 
accidents and malaria combined (World Bank, 1993. See also Pickup, et al., 2001; 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2008). In the UK, the vast majority of 
violence against women (other than trafficking for sexual purposes) is carried out by 
known perpetrators, such as partners or former partners. This includes rape, domestic 
abuse and murder. 
The British Crime Survey [BCS] reported that in 1999, 61,000 women in England and 
Wales were raped and that 754,000 women had been raped on at least one occasion 
                                                     
60
  Though there are some questionable elements to the investigation, not least the fact that discrimination 
(rather than disadvantage) was assumed from the outset when it should have been a research question. 
61
  See, for instance: Grewel and Kishore (2004) and Shuzhuo et al. (2004) on the abortion of female 
foetuses, now increasingly taking place in the UK, and linked to ethno-religious boy preference; 
Waldby (2003), Heisse et al. (1999) and Ki-moon (2008) on domestic violence; UNFPA (2000) and 
Thapar-Björkert (2007) on „honour‟ killings; UNFPA (2000) on trafficking; UNICEF (2006) on FGM, 
and IPAS (2008) on unsafe abortion. 
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since the age of sixteen. It is estimated that only 20% of rapes (and 18% of incidents of 
sexual victimisation) are reported to the police. Of those rapes that are recorded, 45% 
were carried out by current partners with only 8% constituting stranger rape (Myhill and 
Allen, 2002). Rape convictions have been decreasing over time and currently stand at 
only 5% of the number of offences recorded (Walker et al., 2006; EOC, 2007c). This, 
together with the way that they are treated in court (Clare, 2008) is unlikely to 
encourage women to report rape. 
Domestic violence is the largest single category of violence against women in the UK 
and has the highest repeat rate of any crime, at over 25% of all reported crime in the 
BCS in 2000 (Walby and Allen, 2004; HO, 2007a). As with other forms of violence 
against women, the available statistics are a significant under-estimation of the actuality 
of crime, since (a) it is estimated that only 1 in 10 incidents of domestic violence are 
reported to the police; (b) recorded statistics refer only to severe, recognisable, reported 
abuse (Mirlees-Black, 1999, cited in HO (2007b); (c) the BCS data exclude sexual 
violence; (d) domestic violence is not a legally defined offence, so it not identified 
separately in police statistics, and (e) domestic violence applies only to „adults‟, so that 
young people under the age of 18 are not included in statistics collected. 
Summers and Hoffman (2002) found that 1 in 4 women experience domestic violence in 
their lifetime by current or former partners.62 Stanko (2000) carried out a national 
reporting exercise on one day in the year which revealed that formal agencies received 
the equivalent of one report of domestic violence for every minute of the day. 16% of all 
violent incidents recorded by the police consist of domestic violence. 
The vast majority of violence against women is carried out by men, but Donovan and 
Hester (2007a) found that 40.1% of women in same-sex relationships had also 
experienced domestic abuse. Warrington‟s (2001) research shows that 50,000 abused 
women and their children are forced to flee their homes every year. The Women‟s Aid 
Federation carries out an annual survey of refuges to provide a snapshot of various 
aspects of their use on one day in the year. The 2004-05 statistics indicate that 19,836 
women and 24,347 children were in refuges across England, with an additional 19,060 
women and 23,445 children in emergency accommodation and 776 women and 902 
children in second stage properties (Williams, 2006). A particularly disturbing finding 
from this survey is that the number of disabled women using domestic violence safe 
housing is increasing yearly – between 2004-05, numbers increased by 140% (Williams, 
2006: 5). A particularly disturbing finding from this survey is that the number of 
disabled women using domestic violence safe housing is increasing yearly – between 
2004-05, numbers rose by 140% (Williams, 2006: 5). All these figures represent the „tip 
of the iceberg‟ of women who flee domestic violence, given the lack of refuge and other 
safe provision and the fact that most women are not eligible for refuge places. 
In the UK, the cost of violence against women in both individual and societal terms is 
massive, including its psychological and psychiatric effects – depression, anxiety, 
despair, post traumatic stress and suicide attempts (Pickup, 2001, cited in HO, 2007a). 
In purely economic terms, Walby (2004) estimated the overall cost of domestic violence 
in England and Wales as £25.3 billion annually [updated for 2005-06 to reflect 
population numbers and prices] (HO Select Committee, 2008). 
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  According to the BCS, 1 in 6 men also suffer domestic violence (Home Office, 2007); Hester and 
Westmarland (2007) found that GBT men accounted for 0.4% of domestic violence incidents recorded 
by the Northumberland police between 2007-07, and 35.2% of respondents in Donovan and Hester‟s 
(2007) national survey said that they had experienced domestic violence in same-sex relationships.  
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The scale of the problem is illustrated by the fact that one (London based) women‟s 
advice centre alone – Southall Black Sisters [SBS] – receives over 1,000 cases of 
violence against women every year, including not only domestic violence, assaults, 
forced marriage,63 the abduction of girls and women, female genital mutilation, acid 
attacks, violence related to dowry demands, and murder (cited in Centre for Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Law [CIMEL/INTERIGHTS], 2001). 
Around two women a week are killed by their partners and former partners, a figure that 
accounts for 1/3 of all female murder victims (Home Office, 2008; HoC Select 
Committee, 2008). 25% of all murders in the UK are of women (Refuge Women‟s 
Association [RWA], 2003) and 50% of all female murder victims are killed by their 
current or former partners (Flood-Page and Tayor, 2003). These statistics might give us 
pause for thought in assuming that „honour‟ killings are restricted to minority ethnicities 
and religions, though it is true that it is only within minorities that culture/ religion 
constitutes a justificatory ideology that is sometimes used as a defence in court (Okin, 
1999; Phillips, 2003; Raz, 2006; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). 
5.4 Discrimination against Women on the Basis of Religion or Belief?  
In addition to the difficulties already flagged up in terms of both defining and measuring 
discrimination, there is a further problematic issue. This concerns the question of 
whether actions are theologically or culturally defined, which could be relevant to 
individuals‟ rights under the law. We touched on this in Chapter 3 in discussing the 
demands made by religious groups for special provision and/or exemption from British 
law (e.g. the provision of halal meat in schools and the right not to wear motor cycle 
helmets). But of particular relevance to this chapter are religious/cultural requirements 
with respect to female dress, i.e. the wearing of items of clothing or other symbols 
signifying a particular religious identity. 
Though there have recently been cases of conflict between employees and employers 
about wearing crosses or crucifixes (see Chapter 6), it is in terms of Islamic dress that 
the majority of issues have arisen, notably the hijab (headscarf), niqab (face veil) and 
jilbab (full-length gown). The concern with Muslim women‟s dress has long been 
politicised in Muslim societies across the world, but it has only recently become an 
issue in Western Europe. The banning of the hijab in French schools brought 
accusations of Islamophobia from across the continent, despite the fact that Jewish 
yamoulka (skullcaps) and Christian crosses of any significant size are also banned. It is 
also despite the fact that this is illustrative of French society‟s commitment to laïcité 
(see Fekete, 2004; Lyon and Spini, 2004; Laborde, 2006; Thomas, 2006; Choudhury, 
2007). 
In Britain, too, there have been a number of cases regarding Islamic dress, some of 
which have merely „hit the headlines‟, whilst others have involved legal challenges. An 
example of the former is the furore that greeted the former Home and Foreign 
Secretary‟s announcement of his intention to ask women to remove niqabs when they 
came to consult him because these interfered with communication and relationships 
(Straw, 2006). Another example is the Bishop of Rochester‟s call to ban the veil in 
public on security grounds. The Bishop, who is the most senior Asian Anglican and 
expert on the Qur‟an, added that he saw nothing in the Qur‟an that required the wearing 
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  Throughout this report, we use the term „forced‟ to indicate any marriage that is undertaken without 
the full consent of both parties (see the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal [MAT] for a detailed definition of 
five categories of marriage, 2008: 6-9). 
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of face veils. Subsequently, senior Muslim peer, Lord Ahmed, also spoke out against 
the niqab as „a barrier to integration in the West‟ (Herbert, 2007), and the MCB said 
that religious scholars were divided over veiling as being Islamically required (Abdulla, 
cited in BBC, 200). 
All the cases relating to religious dress that went to tribunal and/or court involved 
schools (Gies, 2006). In 2005, a fourteen year old girl was refused permission to wear 
the jilbab in school. The Appeal court ruled in her favour, but the House of Lords 
overturned this on the grounds that the school‟s uniform policy did not breach the girl‟s 
right to manifest her religious beliefs under article 9 of the ECHR because it allowed the 
hijab and shalwar kameez [trousers and long-sleeved knee-length overshirt] (House of 
Lords, 2006). Another case in 2006 involved a school refusing permission to wear the 
niqab, a decision that was subsequently supported by the High Court on the grounds of 
(a) security, and (b) teachers‟ need to „read‟ students‟ faces as part of the 
teaching:learning process.64 
A high profile case which reached the House of Lords was that of a Muslim primary 
school teaching assistant who was suspended and later dismissed for insisting on 
wearing the niqab in class on the grounds that this interfered with her ability to do her 
job (of helping children to learn English). The courts ruled against her on the basis of 
the requirements of the teaching:learning process. These cases raise different issues for 
the equalities legislation, including questions relating to definitions of religious 
requirement and the age at which an individual is deemed able to make decisions on 
these. 
SECTION TWO: THE ROLE OF RELIGION – GENDER 
5.5 Religion, Ideology and Gender Oppression 
Religion is implicated in women‟s inequality and oppression, as well as violence against 
them in a number of ways, though it may be worth reiterating the point made in sections 
5.1 to 5.3 above, that in this it does not differ from secular society. It is also worth 
noting Phillips‟ (2007) concern that secular feminism can be used to attack religion and 
religious women. Dobash and Dobash suggest that the seeds of the subordination of 
women and their subjection to male authority and control are institutionalised in the 
patriarchal family and supported by economic, political and religious belief systems that 
make this seem „natural, morally just and sacred‟. (1980: 33) Jasinski and Williams 
(1998) observe that in many cultures, religion is used to support the contention that it is 
men‟s duty to discipline their families. Both Young (1993) and Corrin (1996) implicate 
religious values (particularly on sexual purity) in violence against women, and Pickup 
(2001) refers to the Christian concept of forgiveness, and prayer for change, as 
influencing attitudes to violent abusers. Muslims link marriage with the maintenance of 
izzat (honour) and its breakdown with sharam (shame), both of which are the 
responsibility of women, who are thus under immense pressure to remain in abusive 
relationships (Beckett and Macey, 2001; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007). 
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  The security argument is in line with the limitations on religious rights specified in Article 9 (2) of 
Human Rights legislation. Additionally, covering heads and faces in ways that prevent recognition is 
prohibited by British law and the police can require removal of such covering. We know of no 
instances of this happening to Muslim women, but do know of young men being asked to remove 
„hoodies‟. 
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5.6 Religion and Patriarchy; Men and Masculinities 
Turner (1991) states that all the Abrahamic traditions [Christianity, Islam and Judaism] are 
patriarchal and that this permeates their theologies and practices. De Ferrari points to the 
„persistence of an anthropology that assigns a „special nature‟ to women‟ (2000: 25/6) and 
Lerner observes that a basic gender assumption of patriarchal society is that: 
Men and women are essentially different creatures, not only in their biological 
equipment, but in their needs, capacities and functions. Men and women also differ 
in the way they were created and in the social function assigned to them by God. 
(1993: 4) 
This is not the place to analyse the theological justifications for treating women as 
subordinate to men, though it is worth noting both their existence and their influence on 
women as well as men. This also raises the difficulty of separating culture and religion 
since, by definition, religion is created and sustained within a cultural context. 
The links between religion and masculine identities have been highlighted by Archer 
(2001), Macey (2005) and Hopkins (2006) to show how young men use a religious 
identity to construct a particular form of masculinity in relation to Muslim women and 
„the West‟. In all cases, „Muslim‟ identity was categorically male („the brothers‟); Islam 
was seen to enhance male bonding and strength („Muslims are all one‟; „you got 
brothers all over the world‟), and a „religious‟ identity was related to politics, power 
and the domination of both women and non-Muslim groups. These studies indicate the 
primacy of an Islamic identity, but raise questions about the meaning of this, since the 
young men concerned were not necessarily religious. 
5.7 A Special Role for Women? 
Brown observes that the concept of „complementarity‟ is central to an Islamic 
understanding of the relations between the sexes as operating in harmony with the skills 
and natural attributes of men and women. „Complementarity‟ asserts that biological 
differences determine how to be a good Muslim, and that society should be ordered for the 
fulfilment of men‟s „regency on earth‟ (2006: 424). Brown notes that this leads to 
women‟s roles always being defined in relation to men – as daughters, sisters, wives and 
mothers. Nevertheless, she suggests that global Islam could provide a platform from which 
British women might attain their rights, citing Dwyer‟s (1999) finding that educated 
women can use the Qur‟an to invoke religious rights. This view proposes that Islam can 
provide a framework to open pathways towards feminism (Afshar, 2007: 419). A 
fundamental challenge to this approach is articulated by Moghissi (2000), Manji (2005) 
and Hirsi Ali (2006) who state that it is the Qur‟an itself – not cultural misinterpretations 
of it – that discriminates against women:  
No amount of twisting and bending can reconcile the Qur‟anic injunctions and 
instructions about women‟s rights and obligations with the idea of gender equality. 
Regardless of the interpretation of the Qur‟an and the Shari‟a, if the Qur‟anic 
instructions are taken literally, Islamic individuals or societies cannot favour equal 
rights for women in the family or in certain areas of social life … If the principles of 
the Shar‟ia are to be maintained … women cannot enjoy equality before the law and 
in law. The Shar‟ia is not compatible with the principles of equality of human beings 
(Moghissi, 2000: 140-41) 
A „middle‟ way between these views of Islam as promoting versus preventing the 
attainment of women‟s rights came from a roundtable on „honour‟ crimes (CIMEL/ 
INTERIGHTS, 2001). This suggests working through both religious and secular channels 
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(religious leaders and UN committees). Woodhead, too, adopts a pragmatic perspective in 
suggesting that Muslim women are more likely to achieve equality by working within their 
own religious culture than by rejecting it (2008: 56). 
Whatever the theological rights and wrongs of these views,65 it is probably wise to evaluate 
their pragmatic utility against the backdrop of the fact that all religions hold clear 
conceptions of gender roles that result in prescriptions for behaviour. These are commonly 
articulated as „equal but different‟66 – a phrase that tends to ring warning bells for Western 
feminists who are only too aware that this is normally an acronym for male power. So it is 
with women and religion. 
One reason for religions having a particular focus on women is their intimate involvement 
in biological, cultural and religious reproduction as the bearers and principal socialisers of 
children. Women‟s reproductive capacity and social location mean that men exhibit 
concerns around women‟s sexual purity. At a personal/individual level, this relates to 
paternity, but in cultures that emphasise „purity‟, it determines structured relationships and 
status (see Bhatty, 1988; Moghissi, 2005). All this underpins attitudes to sexuality, 
definitions of what is considered „normal‟ and „appropriate‟, and how to control this –
which, in religious terms, is through marriage.  
This can lead to extreme attempts to control women, described by Afshar (1989; 1994) as 
„policing‟ and involving not only parents, but other male relatives and the wider 
community (Scott, 2003). It is linked to both family honour and masculinities (Jacobsen, 
1998; Macey, 199b; Dwyer, 1999, 2000; Beckett and Macey, 2001; Archer, 2003) and is 
justified in the name of religion. 
Efforts to control sexuality are not, however, restricted to Islam. Aune and Sharma‟s 
(2008) research into a conservative Evangelical Christian community illustrates how 
discourses of purity impact on young women‟s dress and behaviour – as well as instilling a 
deep sense of guilt in those who transgress religious norms. It also shows how a 
heteronormative definition of sexuality is maintained through dominant discourses of 
masculinity and femininity. 
Confirmation of Aune and Sharma‟s finding of the emphasis on purity within Christianity 
comes from research on an African Pentecostal church (Hunt and Lightly, 2001; Hunt, 
2002). Two aspects of this church are relevant to other parts of this review: first, its rapid 
expansion, and second its emphasis on the maintenance of boundaries between itself and 
wider society. The latter illustrates the part played by religion in enabling migrant 
communities to maintain the cultural and religious traditions of the homeland. But this 
raises the question of whether Government funding of minority religious communities 
could exacerbate tendencies towards separatism, rather than social cohesion. Mukta (2000) 
and Searle-Chatterjee (2000) highlight a different, but related issue through their finding 
that some Government funded Hindu projects are politically, rather than religiously 
motivated and are promoting Hindu nationalism. And Samaroo‟s (2005) research found 
examples of Muslim domestic violence refuges being run by imams‟ wives who tried to 
persuade women to return to violent partners. On a different level, the growth of 
Pentecostal Christianity in Britain needs to be examined in the context of the shift towards 
Evangelical Christianity among Anglican ordinands (Gilliat-Ray, 2001).  Both carry 
potential implications for the equalities agenda in the field of religion/belief because of 
their tendency towards conservativism, particularly in relation to gender and sexuality. 
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  Although it is worth noting that there is a difference between the Qur‟an and the Hadith in terms of the „space‟ 
that they afford for interpretation. 
66
  The „different but equal‟ argument underpins not only gender, but racial discrimination. 
  
 
83 
We will return to these questions later. Meanwhile, it is worth referring briefly to some 
diverse examples of gender discrimination that are rooted in religion and its construction of 
gender roles. For example, the Catholic Church prohibits women from becoming priests 
and treats women religious [nuns] in a deeply unequal way (Utti, 2006). The Anglican 
Church admits women to the priesthood, but has only just agreed (2008) that they may 
become bishops and the issue of women priests remains a source of conflict within the 
wider Anglican Communion, particularly outside the UK. Sani and Reicher talk of the 
danger of schism (2000: 95); Crockett and Voas (2003) and Yip and Keenan (2004) make 
similar points with reference to homosexuality. There could be far-reaching implications 
here in relation to Christianity‟s response to the religion and belief legislation. 
Another area in which gender inequality is clear is that of women‟s position in FBOs, 
where, despite being over-represented in voluntary work, they are rarely found in positions 
of leadership or decision-making. In addition to this „glass ceiling‟ a number of 
illustrations of gender inequality are provided by Farnell et al‟s research, summarised by 
the senior national community development professional who said: „The activity that is 
faith based is also in our view misogynist‟. In a different way, the operation of „benevolent 
sexism‟ (Glick and Fiske, 2001) is illustrated by the committee member of a Hindu temple 
who responded to a question about the part played by women in the running of the temple: 
„Every day women look after the kitchen very well, and wherever there is need, they are 
there. General maintenance, cleaning and hovering…‟ (cited in Farnell et al., 2003: 34). 
5.8 Marriage and Family Life 
Most, if not all, religions see heterosexual marriage as the only appropriate relationship 
within which to engage in sex and to produce and rear children, though they vary in their 
emphasis on these. Yet it is within the private sphere of marriage and the home that many 
women experience their greatest inequality and oppression, and in which the law is most 
difficult to enforce. In this sphere there are a number of areas in which religious docrines 
are in tension, if not conflict, with contemporary civil law (and wider social attitudes). 
These are thrown into sharp relief by the existence of religious courts or tribunals, such as 
the Jewish Beth Din which have operated in Britain for over a hundred years, and the 
Muslim Shar‟ia Councils which have been operational for around thirty years. Both are 
restricted to religious adherents who voluntarily agree to accept the ruling of the courts, 
which are thus binding on them, though not implemented by secular authorities. However, 
three important caveats need to be considered: first, that the voluntary nature of acceptance 
of religious rather than secular law can sometimes be more apparent than real, particularly 
in patriarchal communities; second, that voluntary acceptance of religious law does not 
mitigate its negative effects on women; and thirdly, since 1997, the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal has – in their words – „exploited a loophole‟ in the 1996 Arbitration Act to 
significantly increase their powers in a way never seen in Britain before (Taher, 2008). Of 
particular concern is the fact that the rulings of tribunals are open to implementation 
through secular law, which could thus be used to enforce decisions that are actually illegal. 
An example here is a disputed inheritance case between three women and two men in 
which the tribunal awarded twice as much to the sons as to the daughters. 
Other examples of the tensions that exist between religious doctrine and secular thinking 
include: 
 It is taken for granted that individuals can choose to marry, or not marry, and that 
they have full freedom of choice of marriage partner. Yet some religions stress that 
(heterosexual) marriage is the only „natural‟ way of living [Judaism] and others that 
it is virtually a religious requirement [Islam], where marriages are sometimes 
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arranged at birth, (MAT, 2008). 
 The age of marriage is restricted by law to adulthood, but in Islam marriage is 
expected to take place early and is permissible from puberty. Some religions refuse 
to accept the validity of marriages outside the faith (Judaism). Islam regards 
marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims as highly transgressive, though it 
allows men (but not women) to marry Christians and Jews (Al-Yousuf, 2006); 
British law requires that marriage be monogamous, yet an exception is made for 
Muslim men whose polygamous marriages are recognised if they are contracted 
outside the UK.  
 A woman‟s right to refuse sex within marriage is protected by the law on rape, but 
Muslim women are expected to be available on demand: „A wife may not deny 
herself to her husband.‟ (Kidwai and Huda, 2007: 35).67 Some research in the USA 
with religious leaders is illuminating on this issue. Asked „What happens if a woman 
doesn‟t want sex?‟ an imam suggested that it would be unwise for her to refuse sex 
to her husband, since he might then decide to re-marry (Levitt and Ware, 2006: 
1184). This issue is particularly relevant to forced marriage and has been termed 
„statutory rape‟ by Idrus and Bennett (2003).  
 Whether or not to have children, and how many, is generally assumed to be an 
individual decision, but this is not entirely the case in Judaism or Catholicism 
because of their strict rules on contraception. 
 Women (and men) are protected by law from violence within marriage, but the 
Qur‟an permits the „limited physical chastisement‟ of women (Mather, 1998).  
 The right to divorce is institutionalised, but not accepted by Catholicism, only 
allowed through men in Judaism, and is generally the prerogative of men in Islam, 
though women can sometimes instigate divorce. Decisions on the custody of children 
following divorce rest with the courts, but is generally awarded to the mother. This is 
not the case in Islam, and is a factor that keeps many women in unhappy, and 
sometimes violent relationships. In addition, Jewish and Catholic rules on divorce 
can put women in positions of extreme financial difficulty since secular law expects 
child maintenance to be paid on divorce, not separation (Chantler, 2004). 
5.9 Consultations with Muslim Women 
The „war against terror‟ is generally held to have had a negative impact on Muslim 
communities and the relationship between them, the Government, and non-Muslims in 
general. However, as part of the attempt to understand and prevent young men‟s 
radicalisation, a range of fora, networks, advisory groups and consultations with Muslim 
women have been funded by the Government. These have enabled women to articulate 
their own concerns, many of which are relevant to this chapter, and, indeed, the review as a 
whole. The outcomes of three examples of these are attached as Appendix 4, but we would 
draw attention here to some issues raised by the women that have clear implications in the 
field of equalities: 
 Lack of knowledge/understanding by many Muslim women of their human rights, 
particularly in relation to forced marriage, child abuse and „honour‟-related violence. 
 Lack of knowledge/understanding by professionals and service providers of such 
cultural factors as „honour‟ affects their ability to protect vulnerable members of 
society. 
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  It should be noted that the „conjugal exemption‟ which basically permitted rape within marriage was 
not repealed in a number of European countries until the 1990s (Romito, 2008). 
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 Lack of knowledge/understanding by policy-makers and practitioners of the 
distinction between religion and culture and the link between this and: „the current 
stigma that favours „political correctness‟ instead of the pursuance of justice in the 
name of human rights.‟ (Mahoney and Taj, 2006: 18). 
Pressure of space prevents detailed discussion of many of the issues raised by Muslim 
women during consultations or of others that arise from research into violence against 
women. We feel, however, that attention needs to be drawn – however briefly – not only to 
forced marriage, but to domestic violence and so-called „honour‟ killings. 
Forced Marriage: There are three important points to keep in mind in relation to forced 
marriage. The first is that forced marriage is not restricted to Muslim groups, though the 
vast majority of such marriages of which we are aware do take place in Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi Muslim communities – 65% and 15% respectively (HoC Home Affairs 
Committee, 2008). Secondly, forced marriage is specifically forbidden in the Qur‟an, 
though not in UK criminal law, as noted below. Thirdly, there is a crucial distinction 
between arranged and forced marriage (for a clear exposition of the varieties of arranged 
marriages, see Shaw, 2001, particularly in relation to consanguineous marriages and the 
reasons for these and MAT, 2008, on the distinction between religious versus cultural 
approaches to marriage). Basically, however, arranged marriages involve the full consent 
of both parties, whilst forced marriages involve some form(s) of coercion or force, which 
can involve: 
physical and sexual violence, threatening behaviour, imprisonment, abduction, 
mental and social pressures, including emotional blackmail, restrictions on lifestyle 
such as limitations in movement, association, dress, education and career choices, 
oppressive financial controls, and other demeaning, humiliating and controlling 
actions. (SBS, 2001: 4) 
As with so many areas discussed in this report, lack of reliable statistics makes certainty 
about the extent of forced marriage impossible (Samad and Eide, 2002). The Home Office 
investigation (2000) concluded that they are rare, but the picture that emerges from 
individuals and agencies dealing with forced marriage and from the two consultations with 
Muslim women reported in Appendix 3 does not support this conclusion (see Keighley 
Domestic Violence Forum [KDVF], 1998; Gores, 1999; Macey, 1999b; Rehman-Sabba, 
1999; SBS, 2001; Mahoney and Taj, 2006; Raz, 2006; West Yorkshire Police, cited in 
Bhatti, 2007).  
Bhatti‟s (2000) research, though restricted to one city and her own experience of a forced 
marriage, leads her to conclude that all intercontinental marriages are forced. The logic of 
this is supported by Beckett and Macey (2001) on the basis of experience with distressed 
students being forced into marriage with a cousin from a remote village in Mirpur with 
whom they have nothing in common – attitudes, values, education, skills, and not even a 
shared language. Relevant here is Idrus and Bennett‟s (2003) reference to „statutory rape‟ 
and the clear association between forced marriage and mental breakdown, self-harm and 
suicide (Newham Asian Women‟s Project [NAWP], 1988a and b). 
A recent publication by MAT states that nationally over 70% of intercontinental marriages 
are coerced or forced, referring to this as: „the crisis that has loomed within the Muslim 
community … for the past two decades‟ (2008: 9). Despite this statistic – and the reality 
that 47,000 spouses entered Britain last year alone – (UK Border and Immigration Agency, 
2007), MAT‟s „solutions‟ to the problem do not including anything that would affect 
immigration legislation.  
It is worth noting at this point that though in 2006 the Government decided not to 
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criminalise forced marriage (Forced Marriage Unit [FMU], 2006), it introduced the Forced 
Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 which takes the form of a new part 4A of the Family 
Law Act, thereby also placing this legislation in the wider context of domestic violence 
and family proceedings (HoC Home Affairs Committee (2008). It is also the case that 
existing law could be brought to bear in at least some of the more extreme cases, such as 
those involving physical and sexual violence and abduction. And the law in what at first 
sight appear to be unrelated areas, such as immigration, can have a considerable impact on 
forced marriage. An example here is the „primary purpose rule‟, introduced by the previous 
Conservative Government to curb abuses of immigration, and repealed when Labour 
gained power. Under strict immigration legislation, many parents had begun to arrange 
marriages for their offspring within Britain, but as soon as the primary purpose rule was 
waived, parents returned to favouring close kin marriages with partners from the Indian 
sub-continent, as is illustrated by the rise in applications for visas for marriage purposes 
from 255 in 1997 to 1,132 in 1998 (Home Office statistics cited by Alibhai-Brown, 1998). 
Domestic Abuse: Though domestic violence cuts across ethnicity, social class and religion, 
it is linked to inter-continental marriage (Samaroo, 2005) and to migration more generally 
(Akpinar, 2003). And here the law and service support impact on women‟s ability to 
escape violent partners. For example: gendered risk is not recognised as grounds for 
asylum (Crawley, 2001; RWA, 2003); the „two year rule‟ renders immigrant women 
subject to deportation unless they can provide legal evidence of violence (Meeto and 
Mirza, 2007), and eligibility for service support, including refuge places, is denied to many 
women because of their immigration status (Burman and Chantler, 2004a; HoC Home 
Affairs Committee, 2008). There is also the suggestion that service providers are afraid of 
being seen as racist if they intervene in „community affairs‟ (Burman, et al., 2004; Johal, 
2003; Meeto and Mirza, 2007). 
‘Honour’ Killings: There is growing awareness of „honour‟ killings in Britain and wider 
Europe, and though accurate statistics are limited,68 in global terms, the UN (2002) 
estimates that around 5,000 women every year are murdered by family members (including 
mothers) in the name of „honour‟. As with forced marriages, the role of the CJS is 
important, particularly in terms of sentencing, because this sends out messages about what 
is, and is not, acceptable. There have been cases of judges imposing light sentences for 
murder because, they have said, „family honour‟ was involved. Such cases feed the 
impression that „cultural sensitivity‟/„political correctness‟ is more important than 
women‟s lives, as suggested by Mahoney and Taj (2006). Of relevance to both domestic 
violence and „honour‟ killings is Kelly‟s (2005) reminder that the 1995 Beijing Platform 
for Action declared that culture, tradition and religion cannot be used by states to avoid 
their obligation to protect women. 
SECTION 3: DISADVANTAGE AND DISCRIMINATION – SEXUALITY  
5.10 Sexuality, Inequality, Disadvantage or Discrimination: The Wider Context 
As with section 1 on disadvantage and discrimination on the basis of gender, we feel that it 
is necessary to locate our discussion of the role of religion in homophobia in the context of 
wider society. However, here it has to be noted that if the statistics on various aspects of 
discrimination against women are complex, and in places confusing, this applies even more 
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  Marilyn Mornington, a district judge who chairs the Northern Circuit Domestic Violence Group, says 
that the basic problem for the legal system is that: „people will not give evidence against perpetrators, 
sometimes because they support what they're doing … and, even if they don't support it, they feel it 
would be against the honour of their community to stand out against it‟ (cited in Malik, 2005).  
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to data on sexual orientation. This is partly because in the UK, non-heterosexuality 
[LGBT] is a latecomer to legality, let alone the equalities agenda. And even today, the 
collection of factual information in this sphere is only due to come into operation in 2008-
09 (HO, 2007c). The lack of statistics is also partly because many LGBT people feel 
unable to declare their sexuality in the face of widespread social disapproval. This means 
that such statistics as are available on the disadvantage, discrimination and violence 
suffered by LGBT people almost certainly underestimates its extent. 
Notwithstanding this, there is a considerable amount of information available on the 
repercussions of being LGBT in today‟s world. These range across a number of arenas, 
including education, health, the workplace and the experience of being the victim of hate 
incidents, crime and violence – up to and including murder.  
 
Children and Young People: Childline estimates that around 2,700 young people access 
their services every year to talk about sexual orientation, homophobia and homophobic 
bullying, together with fear of telling parents about their sexual identity (Childline, 2006).   
Schools: The HoC Education and Skills Committee (2007) says that homophobic bullying 
is a growing problem in schools and exceeds general bullying [10-20% of children are said 
to experience general bullying, compared to 30-50% who experience homophobic 
bullying] (see also Stonewall/DfCSF, 2005). A survey of 1,145 secondary school students 
carried out by Hunt and Jensen (2006) found that 65% of young people experienced 
homophobic bullying in schools. In faith schools, however, this rose to 75%, and students 
were less likely to report it. Teachers are also implicated, as one student indicated: „It‟s a 
Catholic school … and we are told „gay people will go to hell because the Bible condemns 
it‟ … It‟s horrid, you just want to go and cry at some of the remarks made by teachers. It‟s 
just not fair‟. (cited in Hunt and Jensen, 2006: 10) 
The types of bullying experienced in schools include: verbal abuse: 92%; malicious gossip: 
76%; ignored and isolated: 58%; physical abuse: 41%; vandalism and theft of property: 
30%; death threats: 17%; threats with a weapon: 13%, and sexual assault: 12%. Hunt and 
Jensen note that 58% of young people do not report bullying, and of those who do, 62% 
say that no action was taken. 50% of teachers do not respond when they hear homophobic 
language. 
Commenting on this research, Hartnell (2007) – who experienced extreme homophobic 
bullying at a faith school run by Benedictine monks – says that this means that 143,000 
secondary school pupils suffer name-calling; 64,000 are physically attacked and 26,000 
experience death threats. He notes that teachers often join in the „joke‟, or ignore incidents: 
„Ears all too often turn deaf; eyes turn blind. There is so much avoidance of this problem. 
That‟s a breach of the duty of care.‟ (Hartnell, 2007). 
Ellis and High (2004) found that young LGB people were at risk of violence and 
victimisation – verbal abuse, isolation and physical assault – on the streets as well as on 
school premises. Mason and Palmer (1995) found that 78% of LGB young people under 18 
had experienced verbal abuse and 23% had been physically attacked by other pupils. 
Health: Fish (2007) reports that as few as 13% of young LGB people have disclosed their 
sexuality to their doctors (see also, Allen et al., 1998) and that when they have, a number 
of GPs have informed their parents without consent. Fish observes that many children 
know they are LGB by the age of 11 or 12, but do not „come out‟ until they are 14 or 16, 
leaving them to face several years of isolation.  
In the realm of physical health, lesbian and bisexual girls are more likely to smoke (Austin 
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et al., 2004; D‟Augelli, 2004); they are also seriously over-represented in relation to 
alcohol consumption and binge drinking (Austin et al., 2007). Gay and bisexual young men 
are more at risk of illicit drug taking (Austin et al., 2007). Marshall et al.‟s (2008) review 
of the research found that the odds of substance abuse among LGB youth is on average 
190% higher than for heterosexual youth; 340% higher for bisexual youth, and 400% 
higher for females. In terms of mental health, Fergusson et al. (1999) say that LGB young 
people are at increased risk of mental health problems; McNamee (2006) found depression 
to be the most common, and Remafedi et al. (1998) found a greater likelihood of attempted 
suicide among LGB young people. 
The Workplace: Until recently some occupations have been officially closed to non-
heterosexuals, including all the armed services (which revoked the ban in 2000). The 
childcare sector, too, held the view that LGBT people were not suitable to work with 
children, and the Christian Churches either ban gay men from the priesthood or tolerate 
them to a limited degree. Presumably, a number of non-Christian religions hold similar 
attitudes. This is not to say that LGBT people did not hold posts in all these sectors, but 
they did so at the cost of concealing their sexual orientation.  
Nor should it be assumed that LGBT people are now fully accepted in the workforce, 
despite the implementation of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003. Savage (2007) reports that 470 cases of alleged discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation were brought to ACAS between January, 2004 and August, 2006. These 
were predominantly related to bullying and harassment – most commonly verbal abuse and 
threats, though physical assault and sexual harassment were also involved. Patterns of 
homophobic discrimination raise similar questions to those of religious discrimination 
about management attitudes and workplace cultures. 
Despite the use of ACAS, Cowan (2007) found that many employees found it difficult to 
report bullying and harassment, due to the workplace culture, fear of lack of 
confidentiality, career development concerns, peer pressure, and seeing anti-gay bullying 
as less serious as other forms of bullying or harassment. This is despite its negative effects 
on physical and mental health. Cowan cites estimates by UMIST that more than 2 million 
people in the UK experience bullying at work and DoH indications that stress-related 
sickness costs more than £5 billion a year. 
Homophobic Violence: There is no statutory definition of a homophobic incident, though 
the CPS applies the same definition as that used for racist incidents: „Any incident which is 
perceived to be homophobic or transphobic by the victim or by any other person‟ (CPS, 
2007: 5). Homophobic crime falls under section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
which does not create new offences, but „imposes a duty on the courts to increase the 
sentence for any offence aggravated by hostility based on a number of factors including 
the victim‟s sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation). (CPS, 2007: 8) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CJA was implemented in 2005, the Home Office 
acknowledges that „we have very little national data to draw on with respect to 
homophobic hate crime.‟ (2006: 1) It notes, however, that young LGBT people are likely 
to suffer proportionately higher rates of homophobic incidents ranging from bullying to 
physical assaults; that those living in rural areas experience higher rates than urban 
dwellers, and that the LGBT community is likely to experience repeat victimisation and an 
acceleration in seriousness (HO, 2006: 2). It also observes that under-reporting is a 
significant issue. 
Stonewall‟s (1995) research into violence against lesbians and gay men in Britain found 
that 1 in 3 gay men and 1 in 4 lesbians had experienced at least one violent attack between 
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1990-1995 (Mason and Palmer, 1995).  A survey by their National Advisory Group (1999) 
found that of a sample of 2,656 LGBT people, 2/3 had been the victims of at least one 
homophobic incident, including threats and intimidation, verbal abuse and physical assault. 
Only 18% of the sample reported the incident to the police, partly out of fear that the police 
would respond in a homophobic manner. In the 12 months to January, 2006, the 
Metropolitan Police alone recorded 1,359 incidents of homophobic hate crime, estimating 
that as much as 90% of such crime goes unreported (Home Office, 2006). In a report on 
the murder of a young barman, The Independent stated that he was the 141st victim of a 
homophobic assault in one borough in London, and the 31st in 2 1/2 months (Milmo, 
2005). 
SECTION 4: THE ROLE OF RELIGION – SEXUALITY  
5.11 Religious Doctrine and Ideology: Heteronormativity and Homophobia 
Much of what we have written about religion and gender is relevant to sexuality. The fact 
that all religions have strong views on what constitute „normal‟ and „acceptable‟ means of 
expressing sexuality – indeed, of being „male‟ or „female‟,  „man‟ or „woman‟ – indicates 
that religion is involved in the promotion of heteronormativity. The central role accorded 
to marriage and procreation by most religions69 is indicative of their strength of 
commitment to heterosexuality and the reproduction and transmission of religion to future 
generations. Thus, it is not surprising that religions appear to be having most difficulty 
with the sexual orientation aspect of the equalities legislation. 
Crockett and Voas (2003) suggest that the Church reflects wider social attitudes in its 
difficulty with homosexuality, though there are conflicting opinions on the extent of 
prejudice against LGBT people and the role of religion in this. The survey commissioned 
by Stonewall in 2006 (N=2,009 adults) found that the majority of religious people support 
laws to protect the rights of lesbians and gay men; 84% disagree that homosexuality is 
morally wrong under all circumstances; 88% support legislation making it illegal to incite 
hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, and 91% believe that homophobic bullying in 
schools must be stopped. However, religion was seen by many respondents to be a major 
cause of anti-gay prejudice (Cowan, 2007). 
Religious and social attitudes to homosexuality are illustrated by the fact that whilst civil 
partnerships between same-sex couples are now legal, Britain is not yet willing to call 
them marriages. However, some Christian denominations confer church blessings on civil 
partnerships, though the law does not allow them to marry same-sex couples.70 Other 
denominations and non-Christian religions are more antagonistic to anything outside the 
heterosexual norm (whether gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, transgender or transsexual) and in 
almost – if not all – cases they can produce fundamentalist71 readings of the Bible, Qur‟an 
or Torah to justify their stance. The Anglican Church is probably the most liberal in terms 
of sexuality and now accepts that some of its priests are gay – though it has not felt able to 
condone the act of homosexuality.  
Despite its relative liberality, Crockett and Voas (2003) suggest that the Anglican Church 
is suffering from a crisis around homosexuality72 which they link to (a) lack of consensus 
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  In reserving a special place for celibacy, the Catholic Church is the exception to this. 
70
  There is currently a furore surrounding the discovery that an Anglican priest recently blessed the civil 
partnership entered into by a bishop in the USA. 
71
 We use the term to indicate the literal reading of the Holy Books. 
72
  This suggestion is supported by the facts that (a) a number of (mainly African) Bishops are refusing to 
attend the forthcoming Lambeth Conference because of their disagreement with the Church‟s stance 
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in British society on sexual morality and (b) because they see religion as inherently 
resistant to change, due to its role as a defender of inherited values and repository of 
tradition.73 They also suggest that the general trend towards acceptance of gay sex masks a 
growing gulf between liberal and conservative views in the population as a whole, but 
especially among Christians where there are ideological, gender and generational divisions. 
They conclude that the statistics for Britain and other advanced industrial societies: „should 
disabuse us of the liberal temptation to suppose that homosexuality is now condemned by 
only a small minority.‟ (Crockett and Voas, 2003:3.2) 
Yip and Keenan (2004) agree that the Anglican Church is suffering a crisis around 
homosexuality. They locate this in an international context, noting the potential influence 
of non-European members of the Anglican Communion. 17.5 million Anglicans are 
Nigerian, a country not known for holding liberal attitudes towards homosexuality. Similar 
considerations apply to the Catholic Church in which liberal priests and religious have 
concerns about the traditional attitudes of the Nigerian Church hierarchy (Utti, 2007). 
A counterbalance to this, however, comes from the South African Archbishop [Emeritus] 
Desmond Tutu. In a Radio 4 interview in 2007, Tutu commented on the worldwide furore 
that greeted the election of Gene Robinson, the first openly gay man to serve as an 
Episcopal [Anglican] Bishop in the USA. Tutu accused the Church of having an 
„obsession‟ with gay priests, and said that the Gospel message is being undermined by 
„extreme homophobia‟. Calling on the Archbishop of Canterbury to make the Church a 
welcoming place for lesbian and gay people, he commented: 
God must be weeping looking at some of the atrocities that we commit against one 
another. In the face of all of that, our Church, especially the Anglican Church, at this 
time is almost obsessed with questions of human sexuality. (Tutu, 2007) 
Notwithstanding pressures on the Anglican Church‟s guarded acceptance of 
homosexuality, Yip‟s 1998 survey (published 2002) of lesbian, gay and bisexual Christians 
in Britain points to their growing confidence to challenge the Church on both its theology 
and practice. In the wider social context of equality and human rights legislation, then, it 
may be that any attempt by the Church to retreat, rather than progress, its stance on sexual 
orientation will be vigorously challenged.74 Nevertheless, Crockett and Voas‟ warning not 
to assume widespread liberality in relation to sexual orientation needs to be read in light of 
the class, ethnic and religious demography of the UK. 
 
5.12 Religion, Social Policy and Discrimination 
Cowan (2007) notes the view that LGB people are not suitable to work in the childcare 
sector. This view is perhaps related to the myth that gay men are more likely to abuse 
                                                                                                                                                                           
on homosexuality, and (b) the Church‟s refusal to invite the first openly gay Anglican Bishop to the 
Conference (BBC, 2008). 
73
  At one level, it is difficult to disagree with Crockett and Voas‟ view of organised religion as inherently 
conservative and resistant to change. However, this neglects the fact that – internationally and 
historically – religion has been centrally involved in revolutionary social change in, for example, 
North and South America and India. In the UK, too, both the Church of England and the Catholic 
Church have radically challenged Government policy in the socio-economic and immigration arenas, 
and some Anglican social welfare projects are highly innovatory.  
74
  Two of Yip‟s findings are relevant to this report: (a) 97% of respondents strongly agreed that religion 
encourages heterosexism in society, and, (b) 96% said that it contributes to homophobia in society 
(Yip and Keenan, 2004). 
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children than heterosexual ones, when, in fact, the opposite is the case (Patterson, 1992). It 
is a view that may have influenced attitudes to non-heterosexual people and children more 
generally. 
An industrial tribunal recently found the Church of England guilty of employment 
discrimination against a gay youth worker (BBC, 2008). Notwithstanding the tribunal‟s 
decision, the Bishop of Hertford continues to claim that the man was not discriminated 
against on the basis of sexuality, but because the Church only approves of sex within 
marriage.75  
Similar discrimination has been found among Evangelical FBOs in the voluntary sector 
(Farnell et al, 2003). This has implications for equalities legislation, particularly in the 
context of the growth of this branch of Christianity and its popularity within Anglicanism 
(Gilliat-Ray, 2001). 
Hicks (2003) analyses Christian writings on lesbian and gay parenting and refers to a 
„Christian homophobic discourse‟ that constructs homosexuality as diseased and 
dangerous. He analyses the Christian Institute‟s publication of material in support of 
Morgan‟s (2002) book Children as Trophies? which claims to produce evidence that „same 
sex parenting is bad for kids‟ (Christian Institute, 2002). This was part of a highly 
organised and well-funded campaign to oppose all forms of lesbian and gay parenting, 
timed to coincide with a Parliamentary debate on a change to the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 to allow applications from unmarried couples, including lesbians and gay men. 
Hicks locates this incident within a broader anti-gay agenda being promoted by some 
Christian organisations in the UK and USA (2003: 1.1; 1.2). At the time of the House of 
Commons‟ debate, the Christian Institute sent copies of Morgan‟s book to every Member 
of Parliament, together with the results of a survey (funded by them) which claimed that 
71% of respondents were against adoption rights for gay men, a poster and a briefing 
paper. 
Hicks‟ paper raises a number of broader issues. First is the fact that some right wing 
Christian organisations, both in the UK and the USA, appear to be extremely well-
resourced (see also Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2005 on this issue). This 
gives them the power (particularly in an age of instant global communications) to peddle a 
gospel of hate, rather than the one of love that most believers see as the very basis of 
Christianity. Secondly, it raises the question of potential influence, not only on „ordinary‟ 
people‟s attitudes, but also on decision-making in the legal and policy realms. Was it 
merely a coincidence, we wonder, that some of Morgan‟s homophobic discourse was 
repeated in the Parliamentary debates on amendments to the Adoption and Children Act 
2002? The Anglican Lord Bishop of Chelmsford, for example, not only reiterated 
traditional Judaeo-Christian teaching on the family, but used Morgan‟s actual words, 
highlighted below: 
The Judaeo-Christian ethic clearly emphasises that it is within the context of the 
committed heterosexual relationship of marriage that the paramount interests of the 
child are best served. All of us emphasise that it is the children who must be our 
paramount concern … Children are not pawns or trophies. They need and deserve 
to be cared for and nurtured ideally within a home environment in which the 
                                                     
75
  We are not in a position to evaluate the sincerity of the Bishop‟s claim, but it throws into sharp relief 
such issues as exemptions from aspects of the religion and belief legislation. And insofar as such 
claims are rooted in strongly held (transcendental) beliefs, it highlights the tensions, contradictions and 
genuine dilemmas inherent in the legislation. 
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complementarity of the sexes is expressed by a male and female parent. (Bishop of 
Chelmsford, 2002, cited in Hicks, 2003) 
5.13 Negotiating Religious Prohibitions 
It is clear from this chapter that many, if not all, the world faiths have clear conceptions of 
what constitutes appropriate sexuality and its expression through heterosexual marriage. It 
is also clear, however, that all religions have adherents whose sexual orientation and 
practise is LGBT. These believers have clearly found ways of negotiating their identities in 
relation to religious doctrine, the public and the private, and – in some cases – the 
intersection between culture and religion.  
An extreme case of this concerns Muslims because, relative to other world faiths, the 
Islamic prohibition on same-sex relationships is so clearly stated in its religious texts (the 
Qur‟an, Shari‟ia and Hadith) that it has a far-reaching impact on cultural as well as 
religious definitions of what constitutes acceptable sexuality. This extends across the 
individual, micro, mezzo and macro levels of social structure and organisation to constitute 
one of the clearest examples of the power of belief. 
Yet even in this context, Yip‟s (2002; 2004) research with lesbian and gay Muslims of 
South Asian heritage, illustrates how individuals can negotiate and manage identities and 
social relations at the individual, interpersonal and intergroup levels. The participants in 
Yip‟s research had developed widely varying strategies for coping with the dissonance 
between their sexuality and Islamic teaching, and the demands of family, community and 
mosque. These sometimes varied by context and often involved drawing on both their own 
and Western cultural traditions (see Bose, 2000, and Roald, 2001). Thus, despite the power 
of religious doctrine and cultural ideology to structure both attitudes and actions, 
individuals retain the ability to resist these and to negotiate, instead, their own definitions 
of reality.  
5.14 Key Points 
 There are high levels of gender inequality in the UK and other societies, with women 
being disadvantaged relative to men in most arenas. 
 Religion is implicated in the production and reproduction of gender inequality and 
oppression in both the ideological and theological domains. 
 The concern with gender and sexuality is linked to religious reproduction and leads 
to a focus on „purity‟, the specification of „appropriate‟ male and female roles, and 
an emphasis on heterosexual marriage as the only legitimate expression of human 
sexuality. This promotes and sustains heteronormativity. 
 While social attitudes to LGBT people have generally improved over time, most 
religions (or denominations) remain negative and antagonistic. This can promote –
and certainly attempts to justify – homophobia. 
 It is in relation to the sexuality legislation that religions, FBOs and religious 
individuals are having the most difficulty and there is evidence of discrimination 
against LGBT people in access to employment.  
 There is evidence of harassment and bullying of lesbians and gay men in the 
workplace. There is also some evidence of conflict between Christians and LGBT 
people in the workplace. 
 There is some evidence of growing mobilisation by „far-right‟ Christian groups (see 
Appendix 4). 
 There is a widespread perception that Muslim women are discriminated against in 
access to the labour market and service provision. However, though the evidence for 
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disadvantage is clear, that for discrimination is considerably less so.  
 In the spheres of gender and sexuality – as elsewhere – inadequate and potentially 
inaccurate (or even non-existent) statistics remains a problem, as does the failure to 
differentiate between ethnicity and religion.  
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CHAPTER 6  
RELIGION AND EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE  
AND PUBLIC SERVICES 
6.1 Religion in the Workplace 
Variations in access to employment by religion and ethnicity are discussed elsewhere in 
this report (see Chapters 4 and 5), but different questions arise in relation to potential 
disadvantage or discrimination on the basis of religion in the workplace itself. These range 
over a number of dimensions, from pay and promotion, to institutionalised procedures –
both formal and informal – that impact on people‟s ability to practise their religion. 
As with many parts of this report, some information refers to ethnicity, rather than religion, 
so that interpretation of the data in this section must bear in mind the general points made 
in Chapters 2 and 4 above.  
One indication of the reasons for the lack of specific information about religion in the 
workplace is the finding of one survey that only 20% of employers monitored religion 
(Adams and Carter, 2007).  This may be symptomatic of a more general neglect, since the 
National Employment Panel found a surprising lack of awareness about ethnicity and race, 
let alone religion or belief, among „over a thousand businesses‟ surveyed. 42% of the 
employers could not explain why race equality might be a business objective, and no less 
than 83% of employers did not believe they would face formal investigation or legal action 
from employees over race equality issues (Pell, 2007:13). Since this is thirty years after the 
original legislation in the field, it is to be hoped that the same situation will not be found in 
thirty years time in relation to the legislation on religion or belief. There is also the point 
that the focus on the public sector in this Chapter mainly reflects the relative availability of 
information, and should not be taken to indicate the existence of a more favourable climate 
regarding religion or belief within the private sector. 
Differential Pay (Men): Berthoud found that when education, age and other factors are 
controlled for, there remains an ethnic „deficit‟ or „penalty‟ in average male weekly 
earnings compared to white male earnings (2000, Table 14: 408):  
Ethnicity       Average Weekly Pay Deficit (%) 
White    £332          - 
Indian    £309          7% 
Caribbean    £251       24% 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi  £203        39% 
African    £200       40% 
 
Differential Pay (Women): Platt‟s (2007a) investigation for the EOC of full-time pay gaps 
between men and women by ethnic group found: 
 Hourly Pay: A substantial full-time hourly pay gap for women from all ethnic 
groups relative to white men, and for all minority group men, other than Indians. 
 The average hourly pay gap for minority women (13%) is almost three times as high 
as that for minority men (5%).  
 Pakistani women have the highest pay gap among women at 28%, compared with the 
pay gap among white British women of 17%. Bangladeshi men have the highest full-
time pay gap among men (39%).  
 Indian, Pakistani, Black African and white women are paid less per hour in full-time 
  
 
95 
work than men from the same ethnic group, except for black Caribbean women who 
are paid marginally more per hour than Black Caribbean men. Indian –women: 
£10.28; men: £12.45; Pakistani – women: £8.31; men: £9.32; Black African – 
women: £9.38; men: £10.38; Black Caribbean – women: £10.50; men: £10.34. 
 Higher qualifications make little difference to the pay gaps suffered by women from 
all ethnic groups, relative to white men qualified at the same level. However, being 
higher qualified decreases the pay gap for most groups of men compared to their 
white counterparts, though for Black African men the pay gap actually increases (to 
15%). 
 Weekly Pay: There are very substantial full-time weekly pay gaps for women from 
all ethnic groups relative to white men, and for all minority group men except for 
Indians. The average weekly pay gap for minority women (20%) is over three times 
as high as the average weekly pay gap for minority men (6%).  
 The estimated pay gaps for Black Caribbean women double from 9% (full-time 
hourly pay) to 18% (full-time weekly pay).  
 The weekly pay gaps also show an increase on hourly pay gaps for Pakistani women 
(35%) and Bangladeshi women (33%), compared with a weekly pay gap of 24% 
among white women. Among men, Bangladeshis again have the highest weekly pay 
gaps at 46%.  Indian – women: £397; men: £515; Pakistani – women: £316; men: 
£380; Black African – women: £368; men: £430; Black Caribbean –women: £397; 
men: £429; white – women: £369; men: £485. 
It should be noted, however, that statistics on women‟s pay relative to men‟s need to be 
interpreted with some caution, particularly in relation to ethnic differences. For example, 
the proportions of women in paid employment vary by ethnic group (see the next 
paragraph), as does the tendency to work part-time. Age profiles also vary and changes 
occur over the life cycle. Thus, as Platt notes, women with very different characteristics are 
being compared.  
Economic Participation Rates: The Report of the National Employment Panel (Pell, 2007) 
is entitled „60/76‟ in order to highlight the discrepancy between the employment rate of all 
minority ethnic groups (60%) and the white population (76%) according to recent Labour 
Force Surveys. But this difference involves considerable variation between ethnic groups, 
and between the genders. Indian men have almost the same level of participation as white 
men (78% to 80%); Indian women have the highest minority participation (62% compared 
with 73% for white women). On the other hand, Bangladeshi men have the lowest rate 
among men (57%), and Pakistani and Bangladeshi women share the lowest rate among 
women (24%) (Pell, 2007: 56). This is a good illustration of the point that overall figures 
on ethnic inequality often conceal almost as much as they reveal.  
Progression: The ACAS research reported below (Savage, 2007) includes allegations of 
discrimination on the grounds of religion in relation to both recruitment and promotion. 
Interestingly, these came particularly from non-Catholics working in Catholic schools.  
Workplace Policy, Practice and Provision: On a different level, the religion or belief 
legislation raises a number of issues around workplace policies, practices and provision 
with respect to minority faiths. For example:  
The Christian Calendar: The fact that work is organised around the Christian calendar can 
disadvantage other religions whose festivals and holy days do not include Christmas, 
Easter or Sunday (see Sharp, 2002). 
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Working Hours: Similar problems apply to the issue of conventional working hours in the 
UK which may interfere with religious practice on, or in preparation for, holy days. It is 
noteworthy that the dominant theme of calls received by the ACAS helpline – from both 
employers and employees – related to problems around working hours, time off or leave to 
meet religious obligations (Savage, 2007). 
Facilities for Religious Practice: The ability to fulfil faith requirements varies not only by 
religion, but also by denomination, tradition (e.g. Orthodox v. Reformed Judaism), gender, 
and individual interpretation, all of which could lead to problems in interpreting the 
legislation. For instance, some Muslims may demand the provision of a private prayer 
room and its use at specified times; others state that it is acceptable to combine the 
requirement for daily prayer outside working hours. Some Muslims may demand separate 
prayer spaces for men and women; others will accept mixed facilities. Lack of provision of 
kosher or halal food on works‟ premises is seen as an issue for some, but not all believers. 
Sharp‟s (2002) research on Muslim police officers raised this (together with lack of prayer 
facilities). There appears to be little allowance made for the effects of fasting during 
Ramadan. 
Dress Codes and Religious Symbols: EOC research (2006a) suggests that though women 
perceive discrimination to be related more strongly to racism than to any other dimension 
of identity – age, class, gender or religion – negative attitudes to Muslim women wearing 
the hijab are seen to be associated with post 9/11 reactions. However, whilst we have 
reported elsewhere on a number cases of conflict over Muslim women‟s dress in the 
education sector (see Chapter 5), we are not aware that this has been an issue in the 
workplace. Sikhs being exempted from the legal requirement to wear safety helmets on 
building sites was touched on in Chapter 3. Many employers, including the police and 
armed forces, as well as a range of retailers have opted to change their uniform policies to 
accommodate religious requirement for both men and women. 
However, in 2006, British Airways [BA] suspended an employee for wearing a Christian 
cross, despite allowing Muslims to wear hijabs and taweez (lockets) and Sikhs to wear 
turbans and karas (bangles). BA subsequently changed its policy to allow the wearing of 
religious symbols.  
Exclusion: The issue of exclusion from informal networks is also raised by some Muslims 
who cite the consumption of alcohol as exclusionary (Sharp, 2002). We are aware, too, that 
this has caused conflict in some Universities where the proposal that alcohol should not be 
served at social functions has caused considerable resentment among non-Muslim students. 
This highlights the issue of potentially conflicting rights, as well as questions of self v. 
social exclusion, and the extent to which the majority can – or indeed should – be expected 
to change their traditions to fit the religious or cultural sensibilities of minorities. This is 
not the place to discuss such matters, but their possible impact on attitudes to the effects of 
equalities legislation is worth considering.  
Formal Challenges under the Religion and Belief Legislation: Savage (2007) reports that 
ACAS research shows that between January 2004 and August 2006, 461 cases were 
brought where religion or belief discrimination was the main jurisdiction. Two-thirds of 
these had race discrimination as a secondary jurisdiction (which again illustrates the 
difficulty of distinguishing between discrimination based on ethnicity and that based on 
religion). Muslims brought half of the cases; the rest included claims by Christians, Jews, 
Hindus, Sikhs and non-Catholic claimants bringing cases against Catholic schools. Seven 
in ten of the cases related to the private sector; within the public sector, claims were most 
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likely to be brought against local authorities and educational organisations. 
Workplace Bullying and Harassment: In addition to alleged discrimination in relation to 
workplace provision for religious practice, the ACAS figures also included many 
allegations of bullying and harassment based on religion. Verbal abuse was the most 
common form, consisting of name-calling and threats; however, physical attacks, incidents 
of sexual harassment and unfair treatment by managers were also alleged. 
The alleged bullying or harassment may have been perpetrated by one or two individuals 
or alternatively have been part of a wider culture of discrimination within the organisation. 
The bullying or harassment may have gone on for a considerable period of time, lasting up 
to two years in some cases, and some claimants asserted that they had developed mental 
health problems (including anxiety or depression) as a consequence of this. It was also 
alleged that managers sometimes joined in with the bullying or harassment, whilst in other 
cases they failed to stop it when it was reported to them. 
Potential Problems with the Religion and Belief Legislation: In other parts of this report, 
we have referred to the potential for conflict between various elements of the equalities 
legislation, particularly that between religion and sexual orientation. And some of the 
material reported above throws a number of issues into sharp relief – not least the evidence 
of concern by both employers and employees about rights under this legislation. 
In fact, it seems to us that the legislation is relatively balanced and does not involve 
excessive demands on employers (see ACAS, 2005). However, the number of enquires 
received by ACAS on the workplace rights aspect of the legislation, from both employers 
and employees (Savage, 2007) suggests some need for education in the arena.  
As in all the other areas discussed in this report, it may be that the effectiveness of the 
religion and belief legislation as it applies to the workplace will depend to a large extent on 
knowledge and understanding, but ultimately, perhaps, goodwill and reasonableness – on 
the part of both employers and employees. In this context, it is worth taking as a case study 
a recent incident in the police service which raises issues of wider relevance to workplace 
equalities (ACPO, 2005). This is attached as Appendix 4. 
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6.2.  Inequality, Disadvantage and Discrimination in Health and Social Care 
 
Figure 6.1 Age Standardised limiting long-term illness or 
disability rates: by religion and sex. GB. 
Source: Census 2001. ONS, 2003.
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The above table refers to long-term illness or disability which restricts daily activities and 
illustrates clear differences by religion (and gender) in health status, showing similarities 
between the Christian, Buddhist and No Religion populations, with women‟s health in each 
category being slightly better than men‟s. However, the health of Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and 
Other Religion women is worse than their co-religious, and – with the exception of Hindus 
– worse for both genders than that of the general population. Jewish men and women have 
the best health of any group. 
Disparities in health status, lifestyle and access to services on the basis of ethnicity/religion 
have been established by the HEA (2000). And a number of other publications suggest 
differential treatment on the dimensions of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender and 
sexuality (Roberts, 2000; Roberts et al., 2002; CRE, 2004; Social Exclusion Unit, 2005, 
2006; Age Concern, 2005; Bromley et al., 2005; Lee, 2007). However, the biennial 
Citizenship Surveys show that BME confidence in the provision of equal treatment by the 
health service is high, with only 4% expecting to receive differential treatment, a lower 
percentage than for education (6%); the courts (11%); prisons (14%) and the police (22%)  
(DCLG, 2008a).  
Despite this confidence in the health service, the evidence of inequality/disadvantage has 
caused the Government to introduce a range of measures across a number of areas, aimed 
at reducing disparities. These include: raising standards; setting targets; addressing 
discrimination; introducing NSFs; improving interpreting and translation services and 
creating culturally appropriate services (DoH, 2001; DoH, 2007; National Institute for 
Mental Health Education [NIMHE], 2003; Chahal and Ullah, 2004; King‟s Fund, 2006). 
Whether or not such measures are likely to succeed depends on the reasons for the 
inequalities in both health status and differential access to health care. And this raises the 
question of whether discrimination by service providers is at the root of disadvantages, or 
whether there are ethnic/religious reasons for it – or some combination of the two. 
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6.3 Religion and Health  
As with many areas of welfare provision, historically religion provided care for the sick in 
Britain and even today many religious orders remain heavily involved in health provision. 
There are a number of dimensions to the link between religion and health, only a few of 
which can be explored in this review. It is worth noting, however, that religion could 
potentially have both direct and indirect positive effects on individual and community 
lifestyles and health outcomes. To cite just two examples: most, if not all, religions expect 
their adherents to demonstrate religious commitment via charitable acts/social works 
(Farnell et al., 2003). And on an individual level, adherence to the religious restriction of 
sex to marriage could help to reduce the spread of STDs and HIV/AIDs. The research that 
we discuss below, however, highlights a range of both negative and positive effects of 
religion on health – as well as illustrating the fact that self-identification by religion is no 
guarantor of doctrinal observance! 
The overall finding for the Judaeo-Christian tradition is that higher levels of religious 
involvement are modestly associated with better health (McCullough and Larson, 1999; 
Koenig, 1998; Koenig et al., 2001). There is a generally positive relationship between 
religiosity and psychological well being. Maltby et al. (1999) highlighted a number of 
significant correlations, but found that the dominant factor was frequency of personal 
prayer, and Francis et al. (2008) reached similar conclusions. 
Research into the effects of religion on lifestyles – and hence health – reaches rather varied 
conclusions. For example, a study by Douds et al. (2003) into Alcohol, Drugs and 
Smoking shows that South Asian men using liver services in Birmingham were 
differentiated by religion, with Sikhs comprising 63% of patients, Hindus 32%, but 
Muslims only 5%. In this instance, it would appear that the Sikh prohibition on alcohol is 
ineffective, whilst the Muslim one is effective. A study by Heim et al. (2004) of 174 
Indian, Chinese and Pakistani men in Glasgow aged 16-25 found that individuals with 
strong religious beliefs generally drank less. However, Muslims who did drink had higher 
levels of alcohol consumption than non-religious respondents, and a survey by Mirza et al. 
(2007) of young Muslims found that 21% of respondents had drunk alcohol. Thus, it would 
appear that whilst there is a general tendency for the Islamic prohibition on alcohol 
consumption to be effective, this is not universally the case. Interestingly, Heim et al. 
(2004) found that some young Pakistanis criticised their community for denying 
problematic levels of alcohol consumption as a „white problem‟, which is similar to the 
situation found by Khan (1997) in relation to drug use.  
Bradby and Williams (2006) reported that substance abuse was lower among young 
respondents from minority religions, though the survey by Mirza et al. (2007) found that 
9% of young Muslim respondents admitted to taking drugs. Ross et al. (2004) found that 
drug use was correlated with lack of religious identification, as well as gender and peer 
pressure.  
Research by Bush et al. (2003) into smoking among Pakistani and Bangladeshi men 
suggests both cultural and religious influences. In both groups, there was a taboo on 
women smoking, but, despite Islamic disapproval, Bangladeshi men had high rates of 
smoking. This confirms the suggestion above that religious individuals do not always obey 
doctrinal imperatives, despite their potentially positive effects on health and wellbeing! 
HIV/AIDS: In 2005, an estimated 63,000 adults were living with HIV in the UK, with 
7,450 new diagnoses that year – double the number in 2000 (ONS, 2006c). Here again, 
religion can be seen to play both positive and negative roles: positive in that restricting sex 
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to monogamous marriage should help to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS; negative in a 
number of other ways. Adogame (2007) suggests that African Pentecostal churches do not 
discuss the issue of HIV/AIDS and fail to support sufferers. Anderson and Doyal (2003) 
suggest that religions can inculcate such a sense of guilt or shame in sufferers that they feel 
unable to disclose their condition to friends or family – including partners – with clear 
consequences for the spread of the disease (61% of their sample were African Christians; 
1% were Muslims).  
An additional way in which religion is implicated in the spread of HIV/AIDS is via their 
formal teachings or traditions. Catholic teaching on birth control falls into this category, as 
does the Islamic acceptance of polygamy. Gatrad and Sheikh (2004) suggest that the 
Muslim practice of circumcision helps to prevent the spread of AIDS (which also applies 
to Judaism), but that a range of other Muslim traditions put believers at risk of contacting 
AIDS, such as sharing razor blades on completion of hajj and the preparation of bodies for 
burial. They also refer to the dangers of Muslim attitudes to childbirth and breastfeeding 
increasing the risk of HIV positive mothers transmitting the disease to babies. Caesarean 
sections are recommended to reduce this risk, but these also limit the number of children a 
woman can bear which goes against Muslim preferences for large families. Likewise, 
Qur‟anic teaching that a child has the right to be breastfed for two years runs counter to 
medical advice on risk reduction.  
The relationship between religion, ethnicity and mental health has been a focus of 
attention for some time, particularly because of the over-representation of some BME 
groups in the mental health system (Nazroo, 1997; Sproston and Nazroo, 2002; Sproston 
and Mindell, 2006; Healthcare Commission, 2007). Until recently, this over-representation 
was blamed on racism in psychiatry, though alternative/additional reasons are now being 
considered (Singh and Burns, 2008). A survey by King et al. (2006) of 4,000 BME adults 
found no difference in the prevalence of common mental disorders (CMDs) between 
religious and non-religious people. However, they also found that people who had a 
spiritual life view, but did not translate this into religious practise did have a higher 
prevalence of CMDs. 
A long-term study by Coleman et al. (2004) of the religious experiences of 342 mainly 
Christian elders also found that religion could have both negative and positive effects on 
mental health. Those for whom religion meant more than it used to displayed higher levels 
of self-esteem, but those for whom religion meant less were found to be more depressed.  
Pote and Orrell (2002) found that some ethnic groups viewed schizophrenia through a 
religious lens as spirit possession or witchcraft. And a series of studies show that help is 
not sought for a range of mental illnesses because of the ethno-religious shame/stigma 
attached to them (see Dogra et al., 2005, on South Asians and mental illness; MacKenzie, 
2006, on Eastern Europeans and Muslims in relation to dementia, and Leavey, 2007, on 
Muslim and Christian Pentecostal attitudes to mental illness). Leavey also found that 
clergy – priests, rabbis or imams – may not be adequately equipped to support the mentally 
ill people who request their help. Hussain and Cochrane‟s (2003) research with a small 
group of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs on depression found that whilst religion could be a 
source of comfort and support, it could also serve to make people fatalistic in the face of 
illness and this impacted negatively on their ability, or willingness, to seek help. 
6.4 Religion and Disability 
Both negative and positive attitudes towards disability can be associated with religion and 
ethnicity; for example, the Hindu belief in reincarnation can result in disability being 
viewed as a punishment for transgressions in previous incarnations. In other religions, too, 
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it is sometimes the case that parents and extended families regard the birth of a disabled 
child as punishment for sin or a „curse‟ or a „test‟ (GLAD, 1986; CIO, 1987; Shah, 1997; 
Atkin et al., 2002). However, the reverse also applies in that people of faith can be more 
ready and/or able than those without religious belief to accept disabled children (Ali et al., 
2001; McGrother et al., 2002; O‟Hara, 2003; Rosario, 2005). Begum (1992) suggests that 
whilst there are negative attitudes towards disability in Asian communities, these may be 
partially explicable in terms of lack of knowledge and understanding, a finding supported 
by Shah (1999) who notes language barriers. Smith (1994) and Chambra et al. (1998) also 
found that knowledge of, and access to, services is low among minority ethnic disabled 
people and carers. 
Atkin et al. (2000) found in their study (in England and Scotland) that religious values 
could negatively influence the take-up of service provision. This research involved 70 
Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh deaf young people and their parents/carers and found a 
disjunction between the two groups in relation to using service provision. The young 
people valued the respect and affirmation that they gained through deaf culture and mixing 
with other deaf people, but some parents‟ concerns centred around the threat that this could 
pose to ethno-religious values. The study also pointed to lack of provision for young deaf 
people in mosques and temples. Shah (1999) also found that parents were reluctant to use 
day centres or respite care due to fears that cultural and religious issues would not be 
addressed – such as male staff caring for girl children, mixing between the genders and 
lack of provision of halal food. However, Ahmed et al.‟s (2000) research with young deaf 
people from minority communities contradicts this, saying that parents and families 
encouraged their children to engage in activities that they thought were beneficial. They 
did, however, acknowledge parents‟ fears that deaf children would lose their ethnic and 
religious identities, expressed by one Bangladeshi mother: „I send my child to school and 
he comes back an Englishman‟ (cited in Ahmed et al., 2000: 69/70). The situation is, 
perhaps, summed up by Begum who suggests that the only firm conclusion that can be 
drawn from apparently conflicting research is that „extreme caution needs to be exercised 
when trying to interpret the evidence‟. (1992: 2)  
Hussain‟s (2005) study explored the views of 29 Muslim and Sikh disabled young people, 
parents and siblings and concluded that strong religio-cultural expectations of marriage 
conflict with negative attitudes towards disability which reduce the chances of marriage for 
disabled people. Hussain also found that barriers exist to mosque and temple attendance. 
The incidence of learning disabilities in some South Asian communities is three times 
higher than in the majority communities, and 19% of these families have more than one 
member with a learning disability (Mir et al., 2001). Emerson et al. (1997) found that in the 
North of England, the prevalence of severe intellectual disability is 3 times higher among 
the Asian community between the ages of 5 and 34, than in the majority population. 
Katbamna et al. (2002) and McGrother et al. (2002) found that though GP consultation 
rates are significantly higher in minority ethnic communities than majority ones, South 
Asian patients are far less aware of the existence of specialist services and make 
significantly lower use of psychiatric, respite and residential care services. All these factors 
are linked to material and social deprivation which, in turn, are linked to inequalities in 
access to, or use of, maternal health care and environmental and genetic risk factors 
(Baxter, 1998).  
On the other hand, Nadirshaw (1997) points to language barriers and lack of understanding 
of learning disabilities and O‟Hara (2003) observes that a common misconception among 
South Asian parents about learning disabilities is that they are curable – particularly 
through marriage. This supports earlier research by Channabasavanna et al. (1985) who 
found that neither the severity of the disability, nor the socio-economic status of the 
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family had any effect on this belief. O‟Hara and Martin (2003) refer to Bengali parents‟ 
belief that the marriage of their children with learning disabilities is at the heart of their 
parental responsibility and notes the struggle of service providers with the ethical issues 
that this raises for them. Currently, an early day motion on „forced marriages of people 
with disabilities‟ is proposed, based on a report by the Director of UK Visas in Pakistan 
that of the 250 „reluctant sponsors‟ for visas dealt with by the consul in 2007, 86 involved 
adults with severe disabilities (www.parliament.uk, 2008). 
Linked to disability is the issue of Genetic Disorders which are significantly higher in 
South Asian – particularly Pakistani Muslim communities – than the general population 
(Overall et al., 2002; Christianson and Modell, 2004). These are sometimes connected to 
consanguineous marriages, which are estimated to account for 35% to 60% of all marriages 
among Pakistanis (Shaw, 2001; Hussain and Bittles, 2004).76 The problem of genetic 
disorders is particularly important because of the Muslim emphasis on large families and 
women‟s role as child bearers.  Phillipson et al. (2003) say that the average family size in 
the Bangladeshi population in Tower Hamlets is 5.2 and Rozario observes: „Above all, the 
primary role of a Bangladeshi woman is to produce children‟. She notes the influence of 
community attitudes on this, but suggests that it might also be linked to recent religious 
revivalism in which contraception, prenatal testing, termination and sterilisation may be 
seen as un-Islamic (2005: 190; 192). Rozario discussed the issue of genetic disorders with 
four Imams and found that none of them had any knowledge of the subject, one 
commenting: „Islam says not to go near people with contagious diseases‟, (2005: 193). 
Secrecy surrounds genetic disorders because family marriage prospects could be threatened 
and this influences the use of service provision, including interpreters who are not trusted 
to maintain confidentiality. However, Walji (2008) states that the introduction of a 
screening programme at his local mosque in Birmingham, which includes advising against 
marriage between carriers, has led to a marked reduction in the incidence of birth defects. 
Gilliat-Ray (2007) also explored the role of religion in relation to Bangladeshi and health 
professionals‟ views on genetic screening and the management of genetic disorders. Her 
findings are almost identical to Rozario‟s, i.e. families might prefer to risk having a child 
born with a genetic disorder rather than damage the marriage prospects of other siblings; 
imams have little knowledge of the subject and are not consulted by families, and few 
families took up day or respite care because they feared neglect of such religious 
requirements as halal food.  
6.5 Unequal Treatment/Oppression 
There are two spheres of religion and health in which we find suggestions (or evidence) of 
unequal treatment. The first concerns Hospital Chaplaincies where a national survey of 
multi-faith chaplaincy arrangements in England and Wales showed that the majority of 
chaplains were Christian (93.3% and 91.4% respectively). 6.7% of full-time chaplains 
were Muslim, and of the remaining part-time chaplains few were from non-Christian faith 
groups (Sheikh et al., 2004).77 A similar situation applies in Scotland, where most 
chaplains have been appointed and employed historically by the Church of Scotland‟s 
Board of National Mission (Levison, 2005). Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the 
Muslim share of hospital chaplains is higher than their overall share of the population, so 
that too ready an acceptance of discrimination needs to be treated with caution. 
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 The link between consanguineous marriage and the prevalence of genetic disorders is both complex 
and contested – the latter particularly by non-medical researchers such as Ahmad, 1995; Darr, 1997 
and Stacey, 1997.  
77
  The NHS has issued guidance on meeting the religious and spiritual needs of patients and staff in 
hospitals which require the provision of suitable „spaces‟, accessible 24 hours a day (DoH, 2003: 17). 
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The second sphere in which there is some evidence of unequal treatment is in the broad 
area of women and health care. Ahmad and Jones (1998) suggest that the quality of care 
received by South Asian [Muslim] women from GPs and midwives is affected by negative 
stereotypes and „culture blaming‟ assumptions about a range of conditions, particularly 
their association with consanguineous marriages.  
Puri (2005) carried out research in both the United States and the United Kingdom and 
found that in both countries, the emphasis on „cultural sensitivity‟ dictated by multicultural 
was essentialised in practice and resulted in South Asian women receiving unequal 
treatment from GPs. Though the research focused on domestic violence, Puri‟s findings 
and conclusions have implications that extend far beyond how doctors respond to battered 
women. Rather, it raises questions about the theoretical, policy and practice aspects of the 
multicultural project itself and – given the influence of this on current equalities thinking –
it is a highly significant piece of research. Lack of space prevents our reporting this 
research in the detail that it deserves, but of particular relevance to this review are the 
findings that GPs acknowledged that they treated minority ethnic religious women 
differently to others and that this was influenced by the policy emphasis on cultural 
awareness/competence/sensitivity and also their fear of being accused of racism. Among 
more specific findings were that: GPs sometimes allowed husbands to be present during 
consultations with women; that they sometimes felt the need to breach patient 
confidentiality by reporting back to families; that their treatment of South Asian women 
was based on assumptions and stereotypes, particularly if the women wore traditional 
dress, and that among the most commonly used phrases by GPs in the UK about South 
Asian women were „religious‟, „troubled‟ and „family oriented‟ (Puri, 2005: 421). 
Among more general issues raised by Puri that have relevance for the wider equalities 
agenda are such questions as: who determines a community and its needs? What is the role 
of religious leaders in suppressing women‟s issues? What are the effects on vulnerable 
individuals (such as women and children) of privileging male voices in consultations on 
service provision? What are the consequences of reducing patients to their religious, ethnic 
or cultural backgrounds? 
Puri observes that despite major differences between the USA and the UK: „the outcomes 
of [multicultural] approaches to health care provision are eerily similar: that is, for 
different reasons, South Asian women seem only rarely to find the support and intervention 
they need from their physicians‟ (2005: 429/30). Puri‟s key conclusion is the question of 
how far „difference‟, whether cultural, racial, religious or ethnic, should influence health 
care provision, particularly when questions of women‟s health and safety are at stake. The 
relevance of this to other services – and, indeed, equalities thinking in general – is, we 
believe, self-evident, but see the Newham Asian Women‟s Project (1998) on medical 
breaches of confidentiality; Okin (1998; 1999) on multiculturalism as being „bad for 
women‟, and Mahoney and Taj‟s (2006) report on the consultation with Welsh Muslim 
women that echoes a number of Puri‟s findings on the negative effects of multiculturalism 
and the fear of being seen as racist.  
Female Genital Mutilation [FGM]: We raise the issue of FGM partly because research 
shows that it is most common in religious, especially Muslim, communities (UNICEF, 
2005; El-Zanaty and Way, 2006), though there is no Islamic justification for the practice –
and because migration has resulted in demographic changes by ethnicity and religion that 
have led to the practice becoming an issue in the UK. Despite the fact that FGM is illegal, 
as recently as the 1990s there were demands that it be carried out on the NHS (Stewart, 
1998). Dorkenoo et al. (2006) produce statistics to show that the practice is ongoing in 
England, though no prosecutions have taken place here. Hilsdon and Rozario (2006) 
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suggest that the law has also been largely ineffective in France and other Western 
European countries and Ahlberg et al. (2004) extend this to Sweden. All these studies 
indicate the importance of attitudes and values, a view confirmed by research in London by 
Morison et al. (2004), which additionally highlighted the role of integration in changing 
attitudes. None of the researchers dismiss the importance or utility of the law, but they 
suggest that it needs to be combined with educational/awareness raising programmes.  
6.6 Religion, Parenting, Social Work and Social Care 
The literature on parenting characteristically notes the preferences of some BME people 
for early parenthood (Higginbottom et al., 2006), multi-generational households and 
„traditional‟ parenting models (Beishon et al., 1998; Barn et al., 2006). However, the extent 
to which cultural, rather than religious values are responsible for differences is unclear. 
Research by Beishon et al. (1998) suggests some tendency for BME respondents to feel 
that white children lack discipline and respect for their parents and elders. Grant (1997) 
found that African and African-Caribbean respondents were not keen to use statutory 
services because they felt that teachers and social workers diminished parental authority.  
With respect to substitute parenting, including adoption, the Children Act 1989 requires 
that religion be considered alongside racial, cultural and linguistic factors. Patel et al. 
(2004) surveyed 1,200 people in England and Wales to ascertain their views on the 
importance of matching children‟s and adoptive parents‟ religious and cultural identities. 
They found that whilst the majority felt that this was important, they also felt that it should 
not override a child‟s chances of adoption. The exception to this was a small group of 
Muslims who felt that religion should take precedence over all other factors. Golda Smith 
(2000) has similarly argued that the needs of Jewish children can only be met within 
Jewish families, matched according to type of Judaism.  
Religion and spirituality are neglected areas in social work (Furness, 2003; Furman et al., 
2005; Gilligan and Furness, 2005), despite its origins in religious voluntary action (Payne, 
2005), and it is only recently that educators have begun to introduce students to these 
dimension of their clients‟ lives (Furness, 2003). This is despite the fact that it is over ten 
years since Patel et al. (1998) advocated the need for greater attention to be paid to religion 
in social work education, and despite the fact that it is a major area of study in the USA 
(Furman et al., 2005).  
As we noted above, however, religion can have negative as well as positive effects, 
perhaps especially with regard to such beliefs as spirit possession which can lead to child 
abuse and even death. Lord Laming‟s (2003) inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié 
stressed the importance of making connections between some religious beliefs/practices 
and child abuse. Gilligan (2008) has emphasised that places of worship must be open and 
held to account in this area. The consultations with Muslim women in England and Wales 
raised the issue of child abuse in homes and mosques and criticised social workers‟ failure 
to act in such cases (Appendix 3).  
Grewel et al. (2004) examined the influence of ethnicity (and religion) on elder care and 
the quality of life. This study covers a range of factors – extended family living (Evandrou, 
2000), volunteering activities, and the effects of poverty on fulfilling family obligations. 
Muslim elders stressed religion as a means of transmitting cultural and ethnic values to the 
younger generation. They also saw poor health as negatively affecting their ability to 
practise their faith. For both Hindus and Muslims, poor health was Allah‟s will or karma, 
which helped them to accept a poorer quality of life. 
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6.7  Religion and Education 
The relationship between education and religion raises issues that are among the most 
difficult and contentious addressed in this report. On the one hand, education and 
socialisation into the faith remains a vital interest for all organised religions because the 
long-term survival of any faith depends on its transmission across generations. For the 
same reason, religious socialisation is a focus of concern for those opposed to the claims of 
organised religion. On the other hand, publicly-funded education has been subject to the 
process of secularisation, despite the fact that educational institutions in Great Britain at all 
levels can often trace their origins to religious foundations, and in some respects the 
educational system remains marked by these.
 
An obvious example of the latter is the UK 
academic calendar, which is still organised around the major Christian festivals (with some 
strain in some cases) which is not unlike the situation for religion and social work. 
The new equalities framework creates additional sources of tension within this (already 
complex) situation, especially by the way in which it extends the framework of 
religion/belief beyond Christianity, and, indeed, beyond religion, and adopts an attitude of 
equality of formal consideration towards all religions and belief systems. But this new 
legal framework is not entirely unequivocal in its implications for education, because it 
also attempts to balance the demands of diversity – and therefore religious difference –
against the demands of equality (see Chapter 2.8). It is also relevant to note that schools 
now have a duty to promote cohesion and that this could be a source of potential conflict 
with the inherently exclusive nature of religious affiliation (Zolberg and Long, 1999).  
We will not attempt to address the issues raised by these developments, still less to resolve 
them, but will concentrate on those emerging from recent research. 
Religion and Educational Achievement: Butler and Hamnett (2007) note the strong 
correlation between social class, race, ethnicity, household structure and gender, and we 
have commented elsewhere on the links between these factors and religion. All of these 
have undoubtedly played a role in educational under-achievement by Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani Muslims (CRE, 2007), though there are indications of improvement over time, 
particularly by girls/women (Abbas, 2002; 2003; EOC, 2007a; Philips, 2006).  
Faith based schools – Anglican, Catholic and Jewish – are generally very successful 
academically, though the part played by religion in this is unclear (Judge, 2001) relative to, 
for example, social selection (Allen and West, 2007) or class (Butler and Hamnett, 2007). 
It may be that the high levels of discipline and good standards of behaviour for which faith 
schools are known create a context that is more conducive to the teaching:learning process. 
Certainly, this is a factor that influences many parents of minority faiths to send their 
children to Christian schools (Flint, 2007). 
Educational Separation and Social Cohesion: The catchment area system of allocating 
school places means that there is a considerable degree of ethnic separation in schools in 
England – that is, a statistical tendency for children of different ethnic backgrounds to 
attend different schools (Burgess et al., 2003; Miller 2004; Burgess et al., 2005; Johnston 
et al., 2006a & b; Osler, 2007).78 It is notable that some of the LEAs with the highest levels 
of separation are the sites of the „Northern riots‟ of 2001 (Ouseley, 2001; Cantle 2001). 
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  The facts of ethnic and religious segregation have led to a number of initiatives designed to ameliorate 
its possible effects, such as Bradford‟s Linking Schools project, which was evaluated very positively 
by Raw (2006), and was included as an example of good practice in What Works in Community 
Cohesion? (DCLG, 2007a: 116-119). 
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Faith Based Schools: If ethnic and religious separation is an issue for all schools, it is one 
that comes to a head over the question of „faith schools‟. The term „faith‟ schools is 
generally used to refer to „schools with a religious character‟ that are maintained wholly or 
partly by state funding. „Voluntary controlled‟ schools receive all of their funding from the 
Local Authority in return for allowing some control over the religious education element 
and their governing body. The religious organisation concerned contributes about 10% of 
the budget in the case of „voluntary–aided‟ schools (Cush, 2005). It is worth noting here 
that concerns about the potentially divisive nature of faith based education in Europe are 
far from new, but date back to the Reformation (MacCulloch, 2003) and centre around 
citizens‟ allegiance to the nation state as well as divisions between citizens (Flint, 2008).  
There are 5,000 (including independent) Church of England [CoE] and Church of Wales 
schools, providing education to 25% of primary and 6% of secondary school pupils (Flint, 
2008). The Catholic school system serves around 10% of the school population in England 
and Wales (Grace, 2001), and state-funded Jewish schools educate around 12,000 pupils 
(Valins, 2003). There are also an estimated 160 fee-paying Catholic schools; 101 
independent Jewish schools; 115 independent Muslim schools and at least 70 independent 
Evangelical Christian schools (Grace, 2001; Walford, 2001; Valins, 2003; Meer, 2007). In 
addition, significant numbers of Christian, Jewish and Muslim children receive 
supplementary religious education in evening or weekend schools.  
In 1990, the CRE published a report that questioned the purpose of education and parental 
rights to choose the form of education for their child. In 2001, the Church of England 
indicated its intention – with the support of the Government (DfES, 2001) – to expand the 
number of church schools (Archbishops‟ Council, 2001). In 2007, the Government 
reiterated its commitment to faith schools, citing historic reasons for a dual system of 
education and arguing the right of parents to choose schools in accordance with their 
religious beliefs (DCSF, 2007a). Nevertheless, agreement has been reached with the 
Anglican and Catholic Churches to allocate 25% of future school places to non-Christians 
(as recommended in the Cantle report). 
Judge (2001; 2002) criticises the state‟s funding of „faith‟ schools, questioning their 
desirability in a society divided on ethnic and religious lines. However, evidence indicates 
that Christian faith schools tend to be more ethnically diverse than non-denominational 
ones because they draw from wider residential catchment areas (Phillips, 2006) and also 
because some minority religious parents choose to send their children to Christian schools.  
Others question the admissions policies of faith schools, given that Muslim and Jewish 
schools operate a more religiously stringent intake policy than do Christian schools, and 
one Hindu school has fallen foul of the regulations governing admissions (Frean, 2007).79 
Pennell et al. (2007) examined the religious composition and admission policies of 33 
Catholic, 11 CoE, 3 Jewish and 2 other Christian secondary schools in London and found 
differences in inclusivity by religion. However, it was noted that even religiously inclusive 
schools sometimes operated social selection with respect to socio-economic status or 
special needs. Pennell et al.‟s conclusion is that all schools need to be inclusive of all 
religions and none if community cohesion is to be achieved.80 
There are potentially conflicting demands between educational attainment, religious 
socialisation and community cohesion. Weekes-Bernard‟s (2007) research into school 
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 The DCSF has introduced new regulations to counter unfair policies (DSCF, 2007b, 2008). 
80
 But Pennell et al.‟s conclusion raises the question: at what point do secular demands for 
„inclusiveness‟ render the concept of „faith‟ schools meaningless? This is a question that could be 
asked of many other areas discussed in this review, and links to Woodhead‟s criticism of the lack of 
logic in, and implications of, the call to restrict religion to the private realm (2008: 54/55). 
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choice by BME parents highlighted tension between parental choice and policies designed 
to raise BME achievement and promote community cohesion.  
Valins (2003) suggests that some Orthodox Jewish schools aim to preserve a distinctive 
way of life by „fixing‟ children‟s religious, cultural and social identities. He found that 
though academic standards were of key importance to parents, so, too, was a Jewish ethos. 
Interviews conducted by Grace (2002) with Catholic head teachers identified tension 
between market values and Catholic values. The requirement that schools demonstrate 
academic success to preserve their educational standing is at odds with the Christian value 
of the dignity of the individual regardless of achievement. The pressure to admit more able 
pupils also affects the inclusivity of schools. 
Smith‟s (2005) study of 100 older children in two Church primary schools focused on 
children‟s understandings of religion and its role in their lives. He suggested that:  
 School is one of the few places where children can meet and socialise with others 
outside their ethno-religious group. 
 The majority of children were not aware of any religious ethos in their schools and 
were largely indifferent to faith based schooling. 
 Lunch times and assemblies were events that marked out differences, with the more 
devout children having less time to socialise. 
 Some children found mixing positive, whilst others experienced a degree of tension 
and conflict.  
Overall, it is apparent that the debate on faith schools and social cohesion is informed more 
by personal opinion than by empirical research. Grace (2003) observes that the evidence 
base is weak in relation to the potentially adverse effects of faith based schools on 
community cohesion. He suggests that it is not clear to what extent faith based and secular 
schools differ in their interpretation of the curriculum, given national curriculum 
guidelines. And though Valins (2003) and Meer (2007) suggest that some Muslim, Jewish 
and Evangelical Christian schools fail to teach tolerance, others argue the opposite. 
Research by Miller (2001), Grace (2003), Association of Muslim Social Scientists [AMSS] 
(2004) and Billings and Holden (2007) suggests that most faith based schools promote 
tolerance of diversity and respect for other religious traditions. It is possible, as McGlynn 
et al. (2004) argue, that it is lack of inter-faith social interaction, rather than the particular 
teaching ethos or practices of faith schools, which might inhibit positive attitudes to other 
religious and non-religious groups (Flint, 2008). Similar comments can be made about the 
impact of the new legal framework of equalities on publicly-funded faith schools, which is 
potentially very significant, but not at all clear.81  
‘Supplementary’ Education: This is a very general term that can apply to a wide range of 
religious (and non-religious) institutions, from Christian Sunday Schools to Islamic 
madrasas. However, since 9/11 and 7/7, the Government has focused particularly on Islam 
and has questioned the role of mosques in the political radicalisation of young men. Others 
have considered ways of engaging with Muslim youth and the role of Imams in tackling 
disaffection and promoting social cohesion. But the suggestion that religion is over-
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  The effects arise from the provisions of the ECHR, which involve the rights of the individual (and 
therefore the pupil) to freedom of conscience, coupled with the right to exercise this freedom „in 
community with others‟ (Article 9.1); the rights of the parents to an education for their child „in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions‟ (First Protocol, Article 2), and the 
rights of the state to limit the exercise of the other rights under Article 9.2. (DCA, 2006: 43-44). It is 
not all clear how the courts will reconcile all these potentially conflicting rights in relation to faith 
schools.   
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estimated as the key influence in people‟s lives (see Appendix 3) might also apply to 
mosques. Certainly, empirical research suggests much lower mosque attendance than is 
generally assumed, particularly by young men (Macey, 2005; Channel 4 Dispatches, 2006; 
Billings and Holden, 2007; Mirza et al., 2007). It is also increasingly clear that many 
imams are unable to equip young people with a theological grounding that could help them 
to deal with the profound challenges with which they are faced in a globalised world 
(Lewis, 2002, 2006, 2007; Siddique, 2007).  
According to the Islamic Cultural Centre, around 10% of Muslim children attend a Muslim 
supplementary school („Islamiyat‟). They are designed to teach the fundamental pillars of 
Islam, but it has been found that some classes have been run by the militant al-Muhajiroun 
group which pours scorn on western ideals and aims to „capture the hearts and minds of 
the young to win the propaganda war‟. On a different level, Waziz (2002) reflects on his 
own experiences of attending a Muslim supplementary school (Islamiyat) and the 
uncompromising discipline and harsh punishments that were metered out for minor 
infringements (Waziz, 2002). The issue of physical violence in mosques was also referred 
to by the Bradford rioters (Macey, 2005) and raised by mothers with the Labour MP for 
Keighley.82  
Farooq (2000) suggests that the long hours spent in mosques and mosque schools can 
negatively affect boys‟ educational attainment due to tiredness and the effects of learning 
to read the Qur‟an in Arabic (making English their third language). And the Open Society 
Institute suggests that this places an additional burden on Muslim children in terms of both 
time and intellectual effort (2005b: 105). A study by Bolognani (2007) shows that young 
Muslim people are critical of parents delegating responsibility for moral education to 
others – including mosques and schools. This raises the question of where, if anywhere, 
young Muslims are receiving moral guidance – a question that has implications for their 
vulnerability to extremist ideologies that they might encounter on, for instance, the web. 
Religion and Education in Scotland: There are 375,946 pupils in 2,168 primary schools 
and 309,560 pupils in 378 secondary schools in Scotland. 91.4% are white; 1.4% are 
„Pakistani Asian‟ and 0.8% are „mixed‟ (Scottish Government, 2008). Despite the low 
numbers of minority ethnic (and in some cases religious) people, the Scottish Executive 
reviewed religious observance in schools to provide a framework to accommodate diverse 
beliefs and practices and to comply with the Equalities Act 2006 (Scottish Executive, 
2004). 
The Scottish education system is different to that of England and Wales as is the historical 
and contemporary situation with respect to religion, including minority v. majority 
religions. The main issue confronting Scotland is the question of Christian sectarianism 
which is rooted in history and in educational terms has resulted in a binary divide between 
Catholic and state schools. There are 418 Catholic Schools providing education to 16% of 
the school age population, but no Church of Scotland or other Protestant denominational 
schools because these were incorporated into the state sector by the 1872 Education 
(Scotland) Act (Flint, 2008). Catholic schools remained outside this settlement until the 
1918 Education (Scotland) Act, which resulted in 226 Catholic schools transferring to the 
state sector. This binary division between non-denominational and Catholic schools has 
contributed to the frequent challenges to the legitimacy of Catholic schooling since the 
1920s (Conway, 2001; Flint, 2007).  
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  Personal communication from Ann Cryer, MP. 
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Religion and Educational Attainment in Scotland: Historically, Catholic children had 
lower educational attainment levels than Protestants, though these have now evened out 
(Paterson and Iannelli, 2006). Indeed, as with faith based schools in England, Catholic 
schools in Scotland have a reputation for high educational and disciplinary standards 
(Flint, 2008). However, comparison of Catholic and non-denominational schools in 2005 
show no significant differences in attainment levels at key stage 4 (Scottish Government, 
2007). 
There are a higher number of non-Christians than Christians in post-compulsory education 
(See Figure 6.2). Hindus have the highest number of degree level qualifications (58%), 
followed by Buddhists (40%), whilst the qualification levels between Church of Scotland 
and Catholic groups are very similar. Sikhs are the most likely to have no qualifications 
(42%) (Arshad et al., 2004). However, Netto et al. (2001) note that there is a lack of 
adequate statistics on minority ethnic learners in Scotland. 
Figure 6.2 Adults with No Listed Qualification: by Age 
and Religious Group.  Scotland. 
Source:  Census 2001.  SE, 2005.  
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As can be seen from Figure 6.2, there has been a very dramatic improvement in the 
qualification levels of the Scottish population over time: almost two-thirds of the oldest 
cohort has no qualifications, and only about 12% of the youngest cohort. But there is still a 
considerable variation in this pattern by religious affiliation. The Church of Scotland, 
Catholic and No Religion groups have converged on a very similar profile; yet they are 
less well qualified than either the Jewish or Hindu populations. Although all the minority 
religions have shared in the educational improvement, almost twice as many young 
Muslims lack qualifications than the average for the population as a whole, with Sikhs and 
Buddhists in intermediate positions. 
Religion, Education and Social Cohesion: In 2002, the Church of Scotland reported its 
study of the adverse effects of sectarianism on Scottish society. The findings on Christian 
sectarianism were seen as applying to other forms of bigotry and intolerance and 
emphasised the need to promote an inclusive society (Scottish Government, 2002).  
Ross and Hill (2006) examined young people‟s views and experiences of inter-ethnic 
relations on moving from primary to secondary school. Most of the young people were 
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from white backgrounds and thought that both their own and others‟ cultures and religions 
were respected.  
Cassidy et al. (2006) explored how 134 young people in Glasgow experienced the 
transition to adulthood. The sample comprised: white – 49%, Pakistani – 25%, Indian – 
12%, Chinese – 7% and other – 7% students. All had aspirations to go to university and, 
with the exception of Indians, preferred to study locally. White students chose a greater 
variety of university courses, while those of ethnic minorities were shaped by family and 
community expectations, though lack of knowledge may be a factor. Religion and ethnicity 
was more important for minority ethnic students than their white peers. Indian students 
reported fewer experiences of prejudice and discrimination than their Pakistani peers 
which may suggest religious rather than racial discrimination.  
6.8 The Criminal Justice System  
The Ethnic Composition of the CJS 
Following publication of the Macpherson Report (1999) on the handling of the 
investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, the Government placed a duty on 
the police, prison, probation and fire services to promote race equality. This included 
targets for recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic employees in the 
police and prison services (Home Office, 1999). Jones and Singer (2008) observe that 
BME employment has, indeed, increased across the CJS in recent years, though there is 
variation between areas. The lowest BME representation is among members of the 
Judiciary (3%) the majority of whom are employed at the levels of District Judge and 
Recorder. There are no BME Lord Justices. 
Perpetrators and Victims 
Table 6.1. Proportion (%) of Ethnic Groups at Different Stages of the Criminal Justice 
Process England and Wales, 2005/6.  
(Jones and Singer, 2008) 
     White          Black       Asian    Other    Unknown  
General population  
(2001 Census) 91.3    2.8    4.7  1.2  0.0  
Stops and searches 72.2  15.4    7.9  1.6  2.9  
Arrests 83.8    9.1    5.1  1.3  0.6  
Cautions 83.5    6.3    4.5  1.4  4.4  
Youth offences 87.6    6.0    3.2  0.3  2.8  
Tried at Crown Court 76.3  12.6    7.3  3.9    *  
Prison population 75.5  15.6    6.8  1.3  0.9  
 
The above information, like much cited in this chapter, clearly indicates minority ethnic 
over-representation in the CJS, but does not, in itself, explain it. It is likely that a number 
of interacting variables are implicated, including social class.  
The reverse side of the coin is the fact that black and Asian people are more likely than 
their white counterparts to be the victims of violent crime, including homicide. There were 
139,000 racially motivated incidents in 2005/06 and of 2,327 homicides in the three-year 
period ending 2005/06, 23 were classed as racially motivated: 10% were of black people, 
7% of Asian and 4% of „other‟ minority people (Jones and Singer, 2008). According to the 
IRR, 33 racist murders took place between February 2003 and December 2007, 40% of 
which were of Muslims and 15% were of men working in isolated jobs, such as cab driving 
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(IRR, 2008).  
Hate Crime: A number of cautionary notes need to be applied to the statistics on hate 
crime.  
First, following Macpherson (1999) the definition of hate crimes depends – like those of 
racist incidents – on the perceptions of the victim (and sometimes the police). They are 
extremely broad, which has resulted in statistics that give an impression of huge increases 
over time (Mirza et al., 2007). This can be used to paint a misleading picture of widespread 
Islamophobia and to support accusations of racially based discrimination by the police in, 
for example, their use of „stop and search‟ (Malik, 2005).83 It is worth noting here that the 
methods of data collection employed by, for example, the IHRC are questionable since 
their online questionnaire includes incidents „heard of‟ by respondents, and defines „dirty 
looks‟ as comprising religious harassment. The findings reported in Chapters 2 and 4 are 
also relevant here, since they suggest that the perception of widespread injustice, prejudice 
and/or hostility directed against Muslims exceeds the levels actually experienced by them 
in a variety of different fields. It should be added, however, that the self-reports of 
discrimination suffered by Muslim respondents was highest for the police service among 
all other agencies, at 6%, according to the 2005 Citizenship Survey (Kitchen et al., 2006: 
59, Table 34). 
Secondly, racially and religiously motivated/aggravated offences and hate crime are 
reported together which adds to the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between their 
religious and racial/ethnic elements. This applies even to evidence that has been carefully 
collected and rigorously analysed, such as the annual monitoring of anti-semitic incidents 
carried out by the CST, the authors of which point out that there is no way of 
distinguishing between violence that is motivated by hatred of Judaism, Zionism and 
ethnicity. This does not, of course, alter the fact that Jewish people and property are the 
targets of violence! Nor does it alter the fact that – contrary to popular belief – Jews are 
more likely to be the targets of hate crime than Muslims (Mirza et al., 2007). This finding 
may support Wistrich‟s suggestion that antisemitism is „the longest hatred‟ (1992) [see 
also, Taguieff and Camiller, 2004; Chesler, 2005; Bunzi, 2007 on the rise of antisemitism 
and Kotek, 2004; Gerstenfeld, 2006, and Cook, 2007 on specifically Muslim antisemitism]. 
In 2006-07, the police reported 5,619 hate crimes involving injury; 4,350 without injury; 
28,485 cases of racially or religiously motivated harassment and 3,565 cases of criminal 
damage (Nicholas et al., 2007). Hate crime is the most extreme and obvious indicator of 
religious hatred and the one that impacts most directly, and devastatingly, on religious 
people. From 2009, the police will be recording „religiously motivated‟ crime, but, of 
course, similar caveats will apply to the accuracy of this data as we have noted with respect 
to the category of „racially motivated‟ crime. 
                                                     
83
  Organisations such as the IHRC and MCB claimed that the police were persecuting Muslims under the 
anti-terrorism laws. But Home Office statistics for London show that of the 21,577 people stopped and 
searched under the terror laws, 14,429 were white and only 1,500 were Muslim. The proportion of 
Muslims among those who were stopped and searched (just less than 7%) is thus slightly lower than 
the proportion of Muslims in the population of London (just over 8%). This is in stark contrast to the 
claim by the MCB of 95-98% and yet they refused to change their published figures, despite Malik 
(2005) providing them with clear alternative evidence. Notwithstanding this, there have long been 
accusations of racism in the police in general (MacPherson, 1999; Bland et al., 2000; Miller et al, 
2000; BBC, 2003; Whitfield, 2004), and particularly regarding the disproportionate targeting of Asian 
and black people for stop and search (see Home Office, 2004; Metropolitan Police Authority Scrutiny 
Panel, 2004). 
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Violence against religious people and property appears to be related to both international 
and national incidents and, perhaps, the way these are reported in the media. The CST 
shows that the number of anti-semitic incidents varies according to incidents in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and EUMC recorded similar changes in anti-Islamic incidents following 
7/7 (Allen and Nielsen, 2002). The latter increased dramatically in the immediate aftermath 
of 7/7, but decreased equally quickly and a few weeks later fell below those for the 
previous year (EUMC, 2006: 86). And as we have noted previously, following 9/11, a 
number of Sikh people and properties were attacked, presumably in the belief that they 
were Muslim: „The problem is‟, said a Sikh interviewee, „We look more like the Taliban 
than the Muslim does‟ (cited in Farnell et al., 2003: 38). 
Ameli et al. (2004) report Muslim women being punched, shouted at, spat on and having 
hijabs pulled off. They refer to a 2001 survey – post 9/11 – which reported 80% of 
respondents being subject to Islamophobia; 68% being perceived and treated differently, 
and 32% being subjected to discrimination at airports (FAIR, 2004). These findings are 
supported by the MWN consultation. 
Reports of Muslim women having their hijabs ripped off appear in a number of places, 
though the extent of such incidents is unclear and „what everybody knows‟ does not always 
yield concrete examples. However, the Muslim Women‟s Network [MWN] consultation 
found safety to be the issue of greatest concern, with the majority of participants 
recounting personal experiences ranging from harassment and verbal abuse to serious 
threats and assaults (Raz, 2006).  
Franks‟ (2000) research is relevant here, because it looked particularly at white women 
who wear the hijab, so that, in theory, instances of harassment and violence relate to 
religion, rather than ethnicity. This research raises the question of how racism and 
religious discrimination intersect and the differential impact of this on women relative to 
men.  
Notwithstanding our cautions about the motivations of the perpetrators of hate crime, it is 
probably prudent to note that this is likely to be of little interest to victims such as the 114 
Jews who were subjected to violent physical assault in 2007 (CST, 2008. See also EUMC, 
2004a and b on anti-semitism in Europe). In this respect, one incident of „faith hate‟ is one 
too many.  
The Police Service 
Sharp (2002) observes that the British police force is based on a model of „policing by 
consent‟, rooted in its early development as a relationship between the police and the 
community. He suggests that today this relationship is more fragile than previously and 
that whole sections of the public have lost faith in the ability of the police to protect them. 
This may be due to changes in the ethnic and racial composition of society over the last 
fifty years or so, tensions between cultural attitudes to, and expectations of, law 
enforcement, the lack of representativeness of the police force and racism by individual 
officers and/or the institution.  
Following the accusation of institutional racism by the Macpherson Inquiry (1999), efforts 
were made to change the public perception of the force and to make it more ethnically 
representative of British society. This included the setting of employment targets, the 
introduction of new recruitment and selection techniques and the implementation of 
compulsory race and diversity training. Notwithstanding this, any illusions that the police 
service had eliminated racism were shattered in 2003 when the BBC‟s „Secret Policeman‟ 
showed shocking examples of racism among police recruits. 
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This was followed by a CRE formal investigation into the police service in England and 
Wales, focusing particularly on selection and race/diversity training (CRE, 2005b). 
Criticisms were made of the lack of race and diversity training strategies in some forces, 
the content of others, and the trainers themselves. However, the investigation also found 
that recruitment practices prioritised BME applicants over whites – which constituted 
unlawful direct discrimination. It was also found that more black and Asian candidates 
failed the „respect for diversity‟ competency than whites, and more Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani candidates failed this than Indians. Another finding was that women and whites 
performed better overall than men and VMEs in all exercises and competency areas (CRE, 
2005b).  
The CRE investigation raises questions about approaches to furthering the equalities 
agenda, including the dangers of setting unrealistic employment targets. This highlights the 
issue of positive discrimination versus positive action, on which there are strong, and 
divergent, feelings and arguments that we do not have the space to enter into here (see, for 
instance, Khan, 2006, who argues for „preferential treatment‟). O‟Neill and Holdaway 
(2007) argue that the focus on recruiting BME police officers is crucial to improving police 
culture and on this and the related issue of diversity training they cite the support of black 
police associations.  However, the chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales 
argues against positive discrimination on any grounds – gender, ethnicity, sexuality –
saying that the way to increase the trust and confidence of all communities is by sustained 
non-discriminatory action (Berry, 2004).  
There are around 138,000 police officers in England and Wales, 3% of who are BME 
individuals, relative to 7% of the general population (Sutton et al., 2006). But in trying to 
recruit BME officers, the police are faced with the reluctance of minority ethnic and 
religious groups to join the service. Weller et al. (2000) found that two thirds or more of 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh organisations reported unfairness in the attitudes, behaviour and 
practices of the police service and officers. Stone and Tuffin (2000) found that many BME 
people saw police „culture‟ as encouraging racism, and Rowe (2004) found that BME 
police officers were viewed as having betrayed their communities. 
Inequality, Disadvantage and Discrimination Within the Police  
Holdaway (1996) and Holdaway and Barron (1997) found that the high attrition rates of 
BME officers was related to racism within the force. Cooper and Ingram (2004) reported 
that around 50% of the officers surveyed gave discrimination as the reason for 
transfer/leaving. Bland et al. (1999) showed slower rates of promotion for BME officers 
and Foster et al. (2005) found that BME officers believed that promotion was blocked and 
that if they were promoted they were subject to greater scrutiny.  
Sharp‟s (2002) research into the experiences of 14 Muslim police officers found that 
common themes emerged which highlighted: the central importance of religion; the 
importance of belonging; the pressures of policing, and the experience of racism. Issues 
raised included lack of provision of prayer rooms and halal food; holidays being based on 
the Christian calendar; exclusion from informal networks developed around alcohol 
consumption and racist and anti-Islamic language and „jokes‟.  
Of particular relevance to this review is that the Muslim officers felt that it was their 
presence, rather than official policies or training that had brought about improvements. 
Another piece of research that raises questions about the effectiveness of approaches to the 
elimination of racism and religious discrimination is that by Foster et al. (2005). This 
suggests that though the use of racist language and bantering has declined since the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, many police officers attributed this to the „stifling‟ atmosphere 
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of enforced political correctness. This raises questions about apparent versus real change.  
A striking voice on racism/discrimination within the police is that of Gurpal Singh Virdi 
who has been a serving officer with the Metropolitan Police for twenty-four years, despite 
at one stage being unfairly dismissed by them. His case went to industrial tribunal, which 
found in his favour. Singh refers to being given inappropriate postings, the worst jobs to 
do, being set up to fail, and regularly being overlooked for promotion. Although he 
acknowledges the role of the CRE in bringing about positive change, he is also critical of it 
for not „flexing its muscles‟ sufficiently in enforcement (Singh, 2006: 84). 
 Discrimination By the Police  
There have been many accusations of racism and institutional racism against the police 
(see Bland et al., 2000, on stop and searches; Phillips and Brown, 1998, on arrests; 
Macpherson, 1999, on institutional racism). Of the 878,153 stop and searches in 2005/06, 
15% were of black; 8% of Asian and 2% of „other‟ ethnic groups. Of the 1,429,785 arrests 
in 2005/06, 9% were of black, 5% of Asian and 1% of „other‟ ethnic groups. Of the 
256,116 official cautions issued that year, 6% were to black, 4% to Asian and 1% to 
„other‟ ethnic groups (Jones and Singer, 2008).  
Like crime, these statistics are likely to be affected by a range of demographic factors, 
including residential patterns, gender, age, socio-economic and social class factors (Macey, 
1999, 2005; Spalek, 2002). For obvious reasons, there is heavier policing of deprived 
urban areas than of privileged rural ones, and since the former are more multi-ethnic than 
the latter, there is a greater likelihood of BME people, particularly young men, having 
negative encounters with the police. Thus, whether or not the accusation of „over‟ policing 
constitutes racism is a moot point, as is the counter-accusation of „under‟ policing,84 but it 
seems highly likely that the prejudiced attitudes found within police cultures will impact 
on policing in wider society (see Whitfield, 2004; Sutton et al., 2006). 
Complaints Against the Police 
Of the 26,880 complaints against the police in 2005/6, 7% came from black, 5% from 
Asian and 1% from „other‟ minority ethnic people. However, of the 1,116 claims of 
discriminatory behaviour, only 13 were upheld (Jones and Singer, 2008).  
                                                     
84
  The perpetrators of the Bradford riot expressed opposing view on this issue, some accusing the police 
of targeting Muslim areas, other accusing them of deliberately ignoring such crime as drug dealing in 
Muslim areas. Both articulated a „conspiracy‟ approach to the question (Macey, 2005). 
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Deaths and Near Misses During/Following Police Contact 
Table 6.2. Type of Death by Ethnicity, 2006/07. Docking and Menin (2008) 
Ethnicity     Road Traffic        Fatal            Deaths In or            Deaths During or      Total 
       Fatalities     Shootings       Following Police     Following Other   
                                                      Custody                   Police Contact 
       No.     %           No.     %         No.    %                 No.     %                   No.     % 
White  31    86    1 100   21 78   12   67  65 79 
British  25 69    1  100    20 74   11 61 57 70 
Other   6  17    0  -       1    4    1   6    8  10 
Asian   2    6    0  -      2    7    3 17    7   9 
Bangladeshi   1    3    0   -      0   -     0    -    1   1 
Indian    1    3    0  -     0    -      1   6    2   2 
Other    0    -      0   -     2   7     2 11    4   5 
Black     3    8    0   -     3 11   3 17    9 11 
Caribbean    1    3    0   -     0   -    1   6   2   2 
African     1    3    0   -     1   4    1   6    3   4 
Other     1    3    0   -     2    7     1    6    4   5 
Not Known    0     -    0   -      1    4    0    -     1    1 
Total  36   100   1 100     27 100    18 100     82  100 
Deaths following police contact are rare, none took place in police stations in 2006/07, and 
most were due to natural causes, alcohol or drug abuse. However, Bowling and Philips 
(2002) suggest that BME individuals are over-represented in terms of deaths in custody –
but that these are construed as „accidents‟ or the fault of the victim. There are also a 
number of incidents of self-harm, suicide and „near misses‟ (Best et al., 2004). Burke et al. 
(2008) surveyed 121 incidents over a 12-month period and concluded that there may be as 
many as 1,000 „near miss‟ incidents per year, the most common (46%) involving attempted 
suicide/self harm.85  
Prosecutions and Sentencing 
In 25% of cases involving white suspects, a decision not to proceed to prosecution is taken, 
compared to around 18-20% of black, mixed or „other‟ suspects (Chen and Lewis, 2007) 
[see also Barclay and Mhlanga, 2000, on differential decisions by the CPS]. In 
Magistrates‟ Courts, 60% of white, 50% of black and 42% of Asian defendants were 
convicted.86 In Crown Courts, 75% of white, 70% of black and 67% of Asian defendants 
were convicted with sentencing varying by ethnicity: 58% of white offenders relative to 
68% black, 60% Asian and 73% „other‟ received custodial sentences (see Hood, 1992, on 
race and sentencing). Similar racial/ethnic disparities are found in relation to statistics for 
youth offending, pre-court decisions and custodial sentences and to pre- or post-release 
supervision by the National Probation Service. 
 
 
                                                     
85
  It has recently been announced that every custody suite in England and Wales is to be scrutinised by 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (Jane‟s News Brief, 2008). 
86
  Ethnic recording was only available for 20% of Magistrates‟ court cases, relative to 80% in High 
courts. 
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The Prison Service 
 Race/Ethnicity: As of June 2006, the prison population comprised – per thousand 
population – black: 7.3; Asian: 1.7; white: 1.3; Chinese or other: 0.4. Those serving four or 
more years comprised – black: 59%; Chinese/other: 55%; Asian: 51%; white/mixed: 47% 
(Jones and Singer, 2007).  
 Religion: Data provided by Gressous et al. (2001) found a sophisticated breakdown of 
Christianity into 28 denominations relative to a simplified global approach to other 
religions, as „Hindu‟, „Muslim‟ and Sikh. They found that in 2000, 39% of prisoners 
defined themselves as Anglican; 32% declared „no religion‟; 17% said they were Catholic, 
and 7% Muslim. They noted that the number of prisoners who defined themselves as 
having „no religion‟ had doubled in size between 1993 and 2000). And Wilson (1999) 
pointed to the equally striking growth in the numbers of Muslims in prison. 
Inequality, Disadvantage or Discrimination in Prisons: The 2001 and 2005 Citizenship 
Surveys found negative perceptions of the prison service among black and Asian people 
who referred to lack of accountability, verbal and physical abuse of inmates, unequal 
access to parole, and deaths in custody (Gervais, 2008). 
Edgar and Martin (2004) carried out research in four prisons into how differential 
perceptions between officers and prisoners in relation to race/ethnicity might lead to 
conflict, particularly with respect to disciplinary situations. Interestingly, blatant racism 
was cited far less commonly than claims of differential treatment, stereotyping, officers‟ 
demeanour and lack of explanations for decisions. Almost 1/3 of the prisoners cited lack of 
access to facilities to practise their religion as racially biased treatment; 3 prisoners saw 
this as their main area of concern, and a further 16 raised it among other issues. 
Spalek and Wilson (2002) looked at religious provision in prison with respect to access to 
imams. Because the penal system is basically oriented towards Christianity, particularly 
the CoE, imams are placed in a relationship of dependency with Anglican chaplains and 
are marginalised from decision-making mechanisms. They also reported harassment, direct 
racism and anti-Muslim sentiment. 
 In 2001, the CRE began a formal investigation into the prison service of England and 
Wales, the findings of which were published in two parts. The first referred to the murder 
of Zahid Zubarek, a young Asian man who had been placed in a cell with a known violent 
racist. The findings of this investigation were that the Young Offender Institution [YOI] 
concerned exhibited 16 areas of failure under the RRA and a further 4 „underlying‟ areas 
of failure (CRE, 2003). It is notable that one of the recommendations of the investigation 
was that the concept of institutional racism should be extended to institutional religious 
intolerance. 
Part 2 of the CRE investigation consisted of a broader enquiry into the prison service, the 
findings of which listed 14 areas of failure under the RRA, some of which involved racial 
discrimination against staff as well as inmates, and a number of which related to Islam, but 
were classed as „racial.87 Among other criticisms, it was noted that Muslims were not 
allowed adequate access to imams, dedicated prayer rooms/places of worship or facilities 
for pre-prayer washing. It was also stated that prisons made inadequate arrangements for 
Muslims to fulfil the modesty requirements of their religion (CRE, 2005). 
 
                                                     
87
  The CRE‟s ability to raise issues relating to Muslims is interesting, given that one of the reasons for 
introducing legislation on religion was the claim that Muslims (unlike Jews and Sikhs) were not 
protected under the RRA.  
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Deaths in Prisons: There were a total of 74 self-inflicted deaths in prison in 2005/06, 9 of 
which were of black, 5 of Asian and 2 of mixed race prisoners (Jones & Singer, 2007). The 
main cause of death was hanging (86%). There were a further 90 deaths, 6 of black, 2 of 
Asian and 1 of mixed race prisoners. 94% of deaths were due to natural causes, though 
there were 2 homicides, both of white prisoners. 
6.9 Key Points 
 Health, Social Work, Social Care and Disability 
 There is clear evidence of inequality and disadvantage in the health status of ethno-
religious groups, but we have found no evidence of discrimination in the provision of 
health services. 
 Failure to access health and social services is due in some cases to: 
(a) Conflict between the value base of service providers and users;  
(b) Ethno-religious values that associate certain illnesses with stigma and shame, 
and,  
(c) Reluctance on the part of some religious minorities to risk exposure to secular 
environments. 
 Lack of religious literacy can cause miscommunication and misunderstanding 
between service providers and users. 
 Monitoring of service use by religion is inadequately developed. 
 Both negative and positive attitudes to disability are associated with religion. 
 Some ethno-religious groups view schizophrenia as spirit possession or witchcraft. 
Education 
 Secular belief systems suffer disadvantage relative to religious ones within the 
education system. 
 The provision of separate faith based schools raises questions across a wide range of 
areas and elicits strong feelings among proponents and opponents. The debate is 
currently strongly influenced by emotion and ideology and there is a need for 
research to provide an adequate evidence base. 
 The emphasis on mosques and madrasas as key influences on young people may be 
misplaced, since evidence suggests that mosque attendance in general is 
overestimated, particularly for young men. 
The Criminal Justice System 
 There is evidence of racial and ethnic inequality, disadvantage and discrimination in 
relation to police and prison service staff. 
 Police recruitment and selection techniques and anti-discrimination training has been 
found to be discriminatory.  
 Religious literacy is not currently on the diversity menu of police training, nor are 
adequate statistics kept on this dimension in relation to either officers or arrests. 
Prison statistics are inadequate in relation to minority religions, although we 
understand that a more sophisticated method of recording religion in the prison 
service has recently come into operation.  
 Accusations of racism/ethnic discrimination by the police force against lay people are 
assumed, rather than proven, and care needs to be taken in the interpretation of 
statistics showing over-representation of minority ethnic and religious people across 
the CJS.  
 The definitions of „racially motivated‟ and „hate‟ crimes invite inaccurate, 
  
 
118 
exaggerated and dangerous interpretations and statistics. 
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CHAPTER 7 
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1  Overview of Research and Recommendations for Future Research 
In Chapter 1, we noted Denvir et al.‟s comment about the lack of a strong research base in 
relation to religion or belief in the workplace, separate from race, ethnicity and culture 
(2007: 26).  
Our review supports this comment in some respects as a general statement of the research 
on religion/belief, and challenges or qualifies it in other respects, leading to a more 
nuanced view overall. 
First, the literature on the social dimensions of religion or belief has undoubtedly expanded 
rapidly in recent years. This „turn to religion‟ in the scholarly treatment of equality is 
reflected in the number of references cited in this report – over 700 – and the thousands of 
other publications disclosed by the search process, which for various reasons did not fulfil 
the criteria for inclusion. 
Second, this substantial research base is dispersed among a wide variety of different types 
of source, as indicated by the inventory given in Chapter 1. It may be that this dispersion of 
the research base leads observers to underestimate its extent, and one purpose of the 
current report is to make this research base more accessible in a single publication.   
Third, and despite the volume of recent publication relevant to religion or belief, the 
coverage nevertheless remains uneven on most of the dimensions of interest, as follows. 
In terms of topic areas, the most striking finding is that, despite the existence of large-scale 
enquiries such as the Census, surprisingly little is known about two issues of fundamental 
importance to the field:  
 The overall distribution of religion or belief in the British population, taking account 
of the distinct dimensions of identity, belief and practice. 
 „patterns of discrimination relating to religion or belief in isolation from race, 
ethnicity and culture.‟ (Denvir et al., 2007: 26) 
We regard investigation into these two questions as the top priority for future research in 
the field of religion/belief.  
In very broad terms, roughly 15% of the population is clearly identified (from the 2001 
Census) as having „No Religion‟, and it is probable that no more than 15% to 25% (at 
most) practise one of the major faiths (according to the evidence available to us, coupled 
with conventional views of what it means to practise a faith, such as churchgoing for 
Christians). But this leaves the majority of the population out of account, in terms of their 
religion or belief. Research into this huge grouping might focus profitably on issues such 
as ethnic (as opposed to religious) identification with religion, and the relative distributions 
of spiritual (as opposed to religious) belief among those who do not practise in 
conventionally recognised ways. We think that there is a very strong case for amending the 
question on religion in the 2011 Census (both in Scotland and especially in England and 
Wales) to address these issues. 
On the question of discrimination by religion or belief, we have found that there is a good 
deal of research about (and well-circulated beliefs concerning) the perceived extent of 
religious discrimination. There is much less research on the actual experience of such 
discrimination, as it affects individuals in the workplace, civil society or the public 
services. And virtually all of the latter research relies on self-reports of discrimination, 
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which are subject to methodological shortcomings. There is a correspondingly clear need 
to establish the incidence and extent of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
by direct methods of discrimination testing. Prejudice of religion or belief also requires 
investigation (as distinct from unfavourable attitudes).  
Some topic areas, such as the labour market and residential separation, are beginning to be 
covered by „pioneer studies‟ which use sophisticated numerical techniques to isolate the 
religious dimensions of inequality.  
There is also established coverage in some areas of qualitative research involving group 
representation and community cohesion, in which JRF has taken a particular interest. This 
literature also refers to the evolution, meanings and uses of religious identity, especially 
among young men, but the empirical research in this area has not kept pace with the 
theoretical debates, which have, moreover, concentrated on the situation of Muslim young 
people, with less consideration of Hindus and Sikhs, where the „politicisation‟ of religious 
identity also occurs.  
There is very little published work in such areas as housing, transport or rural affairs. 
Likewise, there is very little research that explores the link between religion and social 
class, despite the fact that social class is heavily implicated in many of the issues 
considered above, including poverty, employment, access to services, residence, education 
and political representation. There is a good deal of published work on the representation 
of religion in the media, especially the issue of „Islamophobia‟, but some of this work is 
uncritical, and does not conform to the full requirements of social science methodology.  
Research in all these areas stands in need of further development, as does the philosophical 
work on the vision of justice underlying the new equalities framework (see Chapter 2.8). 
Clarity over concepts such as „equality‟ or „toleration‟ have important practical 
consequences (Jewson and Mason, 1986) and there is a strong case for investigating the 
human rights‟ foundations of some current legislation, with a view to recommendations for 
change. The issues here include forced marriage (which is not currently illegal); divorce 
and child custody; the impact of asylum and immigration status on access to places of 
safety and public support, and the currently-discontinued primary purpose rule for 
immigration. 
The research coverage of the workplace and public services is uneven in two respects. 
First, there is more information on religion/belief in the public sector generally than in the 
private sector. Second, although there are relatively large number of studies related to the 
public sector, these are typically small-scale, and are often devoted to highly specific 
topics (such as a particular medical condition or aspect of service provision) with small 
samples, in single geographical locations and/or institutional contexts, and sometimes 
addressed to the situations of highly specific ethno-religious groups. 
These studies are often very valuable in their own right, and an overall picture begins to 
emerge by assembling the findings from a range of such research (as in Chapter 6 
especially), but a number of omissions will inevitably remain. An example is the lack of 
research on the educational and social effects of faith schooling, and it is likely that more 
heat than light will be generated in the debates on this contentious issue until that omission 
is rectified.  
Part of this overall picture for the public services presented in Chapter 6 is that the health 
services tend to emerge well from the research, so that the main issues in this sector are 
religious literacy, cultural sensitivity and health education rather than injustice or unfair 
treatment. This relates to research evidence that a failure of some ethno-religious user 
groups to take up services in some spheres can be due to cultural or religious attitudes 
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towards, for example, HIV/AIDs, mental health or genetic disorders, rather than hostility 
or discrimination on the part of providers. Concerns about unfair treatment tend to be 
concentrated on the Criminal Justice System among the public services, with Education 
and the Social Services located between these cases in the overall distribution of concerns. 
The geographical coverage of research reveals that there are both shared and distinctive 
features of the experience of religion/belief in the three countries of England, Scotland and 
Wales. Subject to the uncertainties outlined above, there appears to be a similar balance 
within the populations of each country between religious and secular orientations, and an 
issue common to all three countries is the continuing decline of Christian observance.  
In terms of national variations: 
 (Intra-Christian) sectarianism remains a live issue in Scotland, but not in either 
Wales or England, although the evidence suggests that even in Scotland, the issue 
may be more concerned with cultural perception than social or economic experience 
(Bruce et al., 2005). This situation in Scotland resembles that with minority religious 
discrimination in England and Wales. 
 The distinctive issues in England revolve around the minority (non-Christian) 
religions, but the concentration of the relevant populations mean that these are 
(numerically speaking) issues for London and a small number of other urban centres 
rather than England as a whole. 
 As a broad generalisation, Wales has neither Christian sectarianism nor a numerous 
minority religious population, so it does not tend to encounter either of the distinctive 
concerns faced in Scotland or England.  
Although the relative extent of the research coverage reflects these national situations, this 
does not mean that those interested in religion or belief in, say, England have nothing to 
learn from colleagues concerned with Scotland or Wales. On the contrary, the decline of 
sectarianism in Scotland may provide one of the best (and closest) models for the 
development of good relationships of religion or belief in England. And one of the most 
illuminating consultations on minority religions we have found was carried out in Wales 
with Muslim women (Mahoney and Taj, 2006).      
If the coverage of research by religion or belief followed the (probable) distribution of 
allegiances within the population, most publications would be concerned with the secular 
spectrum of belief, followed by Christianity, and then Islam, with slightly smaller 
representations of Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism and Buddhism, followed finally by NRMs. 
In fact, we have found very little empirical research into the secular spectrum of belief (as 
opposed to literature concerned with arguments about the existence of God), and almost no 
studies concerned with NRMs that are relevant to this review. 
There is a good deal of research on Christianity, including, for example, the ramifying 
debate inspired by Davie‟s (1994) hypothesis of „believing without belonging‟, which is 
central to the question of religious v. secular orientations. There is some specific research 
focussed on Judaism, with fewer contributions on Hinduism, followed by Buddhism and 
Sikhism (as indicated in Chapter 1). Research on the minority religions is nevertheless 
mostly by, or about, Muslims, and this coverage is reflected in its prominence within this 
report.  
Some of the reasons for this research emphasis on Islam are indicated briefly in Chapter 1. 
But it is well to remember, in case the concerns of the Muslim minority (or the issue of 
„Islam and the West‟) crowd out the legitimate interests and concerns of other groups, that 
those who identify as Muslims form just 2.9% – that is, less than one in thirty – of the 
British population.       
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We recommend in this light that the research effort into religion or belief should be 
distributed with greater attention to the full diversity of allegiances within the field. 
The next two sections list the more detailed recommendations that have emerged from the 
previous chapters of the report. 
7.2  Recommendations for Stakeholders and Practitioners 
It was part of our brief from the XXXX to draw out the implications of research for 
stakeholders and practitioners. These implications are hopefully made clear in the relevant 
sections above, but some general themes are drawn together here for ease of reference.  
In our view, there are requirements for stakeholders and practitioners with interests in this 
field to:  
 Inform members of the public, especially women from ethno-religious groups, about 
their rights under the equalities legislation. 
 Inform and educate employers about the new requirements of the law. 
 Monitor religious hate crime, of which the three main areas of concern are crimes 
directed against i) Muslims, where the evidence is strongest of crimes directed 
against women wearing the hijab; ii) converts from Islam, who are vulnerable to 
attack by Muslims, and iii) Jewish people, who, (as noted in Chapter 6) are more at 
risk of attack than Muslims (Mirza et al., 2007), a finding that may support 
Wistrich‟s (1992) suggestion that anti-semitism is „the longest hatred‟ (on which, see 
more recently  Taguieff and Camiller, 2004; Chesler, 2005; Bunzi, 2007). 
 Be aware of the possibility of discrimination (and other forms of unfair treatment) on 
the grounds of religion or belief. 
 Committed against members of religious or belief groups in the workplace, civil 
society or the public services. 
 Committed by FBOs on this or other protected grounds against members of 
other religious or belief groups, particularly on the grounds of gender or sexual 
orientation. 
 Develop cultural literacy alongside „literacy of religion or belief‟, in order to make 
information more widely known about the diversity of religious faiths and secular 
belief systems, and also to bring home the crucial distinctions between: 
 Culture and religion. 
 Unfavourable attitudes and prejudice. 
 The perception and the experience of injustice. 
 The experience of inequality and the experience of injustice. 
 Work to ensure that misapprehensions about such issues do not exacerbate inter-
ethnic tensions and feelings of religious marginalisation, exclusion and victimhood.  
 Develop training programmes in cultural and religious literacy and the equalities law 
for the benefit of service providers such as the police, teachers and social workers, as 
well as the advice sector.  
 Recognise that minority communities (whether cultural or religious) are not 
homogeneous and be aware of divisions within such communities. 
 Be wary of „gatekeeping‟, and pay particular attention to the question of whether 
those who claim to speak on behalf of religious groups are truly representative of 
those groups, and whether they have non-religious political agendas. This is the issue 
of „political literacy‟ (Mukta, 2000; Searle-Chatterjee, 2000; Bright, 2006).  
 Be alive more generally to the possibility that assertions of religious identity may be 
better understood in „ethnic‟, „cultural‟ or „political‟ terms. 
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 Establish special communication channels, networks or fora to encourage discussion 
of issues that might not otherwise be raised – among women‟s, young people‟s or 
LGBT constituencies within religious groups, for example; 
 Orient action where appropriate to the specific circumstances of „hyphen-groups‟ 
defined by combinations of race, ethnicity and religion (for example, „black African 
Christians‟), rather than ethnic or religious groups considered as a whole;  
 Look at ways of increasing levels of awareness among religious and community 
leaders of the health risks and other factors that contribute to the long-term 
disadvantage of their communities, including genetic disorders linked to first cousin 
marriages, attitudes to mental illness and disability, and attitudes to HIV/AIDS and 
STDs.  
 Follow the advice of the Muslim women consulted in Wales, and do not allow 
„political correctness‟ (which is in reality incorrectness) to outweigh the claims of 
human rights, especially those of vulnerable individuals (including women and 
children) within ethno-religious communities (Mahoney and Taj, 2006: 18). This 
issue can arise in different forms in connection with all the major faith traditions, 
including Judaism and Catholicism, as well as within Islam. 
7.3  Disadvantage of Religion or Belief in Service Provision and the Law 
The term „disadvantage of religion/belief‟ has been used throughout this report to indicate 
an unequal formal recognition of groups of religion or belief, compared with other such 
groups, in some official or organisational context. The following cases are drawn from the 
chapters above, and represent anomalies in current service provision or the law. As such, 
they present cases for review, including a prima facie case for change:  
 Secularists (Agnostics, Atheists, Humanists and others) do not have their views 
reflected in the school curriculum, since the teaching of non-Christian beliefs tends 
to comprise „world faiths‟ (i.e. religions), rather than secular belief systems 
(changing this situation would require an amendment to the Education Act 1996). 
 Secularists tend not to be represented on such decision-making bodies as School 
Boards of Governors, and in some publicly-funded initiatives such as the Inter-faith 
Network (which should perhaps become a „Network of Faith or Belief‟).    
 Humanist weddings are not recognised in England and Wales.  
 Provision is less frequently made for non-Christian denominations (and non-religious 
belief systems) than for their Christian counterparts in connection with hospital and 
prison chaplaincies and facilities for the practice of faith (or belief) within these 
institutions. 
 The law on religious hatred does not apply to Scotland, and there seems little reason 
not to extend it there. 
 The law of succession privileges Anglicans over other Christian and non-Christian 
religions. 
 The House of Lords includes Anglican representatives of religion or belief alone by 
right. 
 The Charities Act 2006 (which applies only to England and Wales) defines a charity 
in part by reference to purposes that include the advancement of religion if it is for 
the public benefit (Jahangir, 2008), but excludes the similar advancement of secular 
belief systems. 
 Unlike other Western European countries, the UK has not ratified Protocol 12 of the 
ECHR (Ansari, 2002; Bamforth, 2004: 695, n.14). 
 
  
 
124 
 
7.4  General Recommendations of the Review 
There are two broad recommendations that emerge from many of the detailed instances 
above. These are that activities in the field of religion or belief should be adjusted 
throughout to correspond more closely with: 
 The rough distribution of religion or belief in the population as a whole, including 
especially the (probable) existence of a spiritual, agnostic or secular majority. 
 The („actual‟) experience of unequal, hostile or unfair treatment, rather than the 
perception or the presumption of such treatment. 
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Appendix 1 
METHODS 
The process described below was not linear, but interactive, with each element feeding into 
others and the literature search being constantly modified in light of reading and bibliographical 
references.  
1. Electronic Searches:88 The review was heavily dependent on electronic database searches, 
for which we employed a professional research consultant with extensive experience of 
literature reviews. 
 (a)  Three searches of the academic databases [ASSIA – Applied Social Sciences Index 
and Abstracts; British Humanities Index – BHI, and Sociological Abstracts – SA] 
were conducted by the research consultant (see below). Each search was modified by 
reference to the previous one/s with the final search picking targeting areas that had 
yielded low returns. The final search was by individual religions in relation to 
specified equalities areas.  
Additional searches were carried out towards the end of the project by members of the 
research team and Iain Macey, using amended search parameters and sources to ensure 
that material had not been overlooked. 
 (b) The search parameters used:89 
 Keyword Search (KW) – automatically searches the Abstract (AB), Descriptor 
(DE), and Title (TI) fields together. If a database has the Identifier (ID) field, that 
field is also searched; 
 English Language articles only; 
 Journals & published works only (i.e. not theses or dissertations); 
 Year 2000-2008 inclusive. 
 (c) Boolean Operators used: 
 „And‟ – to narrow the search to retrieve records that contain all of the words that 
it separates; 
 * Truncate – to expand a search term to include all forms of a root word, e.g. 
patent* retrieves: patents, patented, patentable, etc. 
(d) All abstracts were read and additional references obtained. 
(e) Relevant articles were downloaded, printed and analysed to form the basis of the 
review.  
2. Web Searches: The research team carried out a comprehensive search of the web for 
relevant material from a range of sources, some indication of which is given in the 
„Abbreviations‟ section of this report. 
(a) Examples include: a range of Government Departments (English, Scottish and Welsh), 
including the Office for National Statistics; University Research Centres; Religions 
and Denominations; Equalities Organisations (e.g. Commission for Racial Equality, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission, 
                                                     
88
 The scale of the search exercise is illustrated by the fact that the initial search alone yielded 11,420 
abstracts, 1,321 of which were deemed potentially relevant, and from which the research team selected 
463 to read in full.  
89
  Unfortunately, it is not possible to set parameters that restrict searches by country, which led to the 
generation of a large number of abstracts from outside the UK. 
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Runnymede Trust, Institute for Race Relations, Islamic Human Rights Commission); 
Research Funding Bodies (Arts & Humanities Research Council, Economic and Social 
Science Research Council, Joseph Rowntree Foundation; Policy Organisations (e.g. 
Policy Studies Institute, Institute for Public Policy Research, Institute for Jewish 
Policy Research); Faith or Belief Based Organisations (e.g. Association of Muslim 
Social Scientists, British Humanist Association, Christian Research, William Temple 
Foundation). 
 (b) Relevant materials from the web search were downloaded, printed, read and sorted for 
further references. 
 (c) Web materials were analysed to form the basis of the review. 
3. Consultation: The research team sought the advice (via e-mail/telephone) of experts in the 
field, as indicated in the „Acknowledgements‟ section of this report. Advice received was 
followed up and further articles and reports obtained. 
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Appendix 2 
ACADEMIC OR PROFESSIONAL SURVEYS AND POLLS90 
 
1. ABRAMS, D and HOUSTON, D.M. (2007) Equality, Diversity and Prejudice in Britain: 
Results from the 2006 National Survey, London: CO. 
Sample size: representative sample of 2895 over sixteen year olds across Britain, with smaller 
subsets of various categories, e.g. 128 Muslims. Methods: Personal interview survey. 
Description: social psychological survey to assess a range of aspects of prejudice towards 
age, disability, ethnicity, gender, religion and sexuality relative to each other.  
Key Findings (authors‟ headings): 
Equality and Human Rights 
 The vast majority of people value the principles of equality and social justice. Security is 
also important value. 
 There is a strong endorsement of individualism and the idea that groups should be free to 
differ and be treated equally. But there is also support for the view that it is better if people 
share the same values and ways of life. 
 The need to promote equal employment opportunities is seen as greatest for over seventy 
year olds, disabled people and women, then black people, gays and lesbians with Muslims 
at the bottom. 
 
Expressions/Experiences of Prejudice 
 Prejudice is expressed differently towards different groups, with the majority of overt 
prejudice being against illegal immigrants and asylum seekers and a minority towards 
Muslims, gays and lesbians. Overwhelming, the majority express positive feelings towards 
women (though this varies by ethnicity), older people and the disabled. 
 49% reported personal experience of prejudice over the previous twelve months.  
 The most pervasive experience of prejudice was ageism followed by sexism.  
 Over 50% of the members of relevant groups reported racism and religious prejudice. 
 
Conditions for Prejudice 
 People think that media portrayals of Muslims, gays and lesbians are the most negative. 
 Arabs and Muslims are less likely than others to be viewed as being accepted as British. 
Acceptance as British is linked to being white, native English speakers and either Judaeo-
Christian or non-religious. 
 1/3 of respondents said they were not concerned about being prejudiced. 
 Political correctness applies more in relation to some groups than others. People are least 
constrained about admitting prejudice against gays and lesbians, Muslims and women. 
 Different groups direct their prejudices against particular out-groups, i.e. prejudice is not a 
psychological aspect of individual personality but a function of inter-group relations. 
 
                                                     
90
 Note: lack of space prevents the material in this section being reported in full and readers are advised 
to consult the originals which not only give more details but are more nuanced than might appear to be 
the case from a condensed version. 
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Social Stereotypes Underpinning Prejudice 
 Prejudice can be „patronising‟ – e.g. towards older and disabled people and women. 
Prejudice can also be „hostile‟ – e.g. towards Muslims, gays and lesbians. 
 The emotions associated with different groups reflect types of prejudice – e.g. older people 
and disabled people evoke pity; Muslims evoke fear and anger; gays and lesbians evoke 
disgust and anger. 
 
Together or Apart? 
 Difference does not imply hostility or have implications for distancing. 
 Economic competition is viewed with less concern than threats to culture, health or safety. 
Muslims, black people, gays and lesbians are seen as posing the strongest threats, both 
culturally and physically. 
 Socio-economic status is not strongly related to either negative or positive attitudes 
towards any particular groups. 
 
 
2. CHANNEL 4 DISPATCHES (2006) Muslim Attitudes to Living in Britain. 
Details: GfK telephone interviews of a random sample of 1,000 British Muslims aged 18+ 
using RDD in areas with 5% or more Muslims in population and with all households screened 
for ethnicity and religion at the outset. Final data were weighted by gender and age to match 
the profile of British Muslims. 
 
Key Findings (GfK headings): 
1.  Religiousness  
Importance of Religion 
 All important: 93%. 
 Very important: 73%. 
 Fairly important: 15%. 
 Not very important: 4%.  
 Not at all important: 3%. 
 
Mosque Attendance 
 7 times+: 10%. 
 4-6 times: 8%. 
 2-3 times: 8%. 
 Once: 19%. 
 Special occasions: 6%. 
 Never attend: 48%. 
 
2.  Britishness  
Britain: My Country or Their Country? 
 My country: 49%. 
 Their country: 24% 
 Both: 12%. 
 53% of men v 45% of women were more likely to say „my country‟. 
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 55% of those aged 45+ say „my country‟ compared to 44% of 18-24 year olds. 
 
Belonging to Britain v Belonging to Islam 
 2 in 5 Muslims in Britain (38%) feel they belong to both Britain and Islam „very 
strongly‟. However, 
 14% of those who say they belong to Islam „very strongly‟ do not feel a sense of 
belonging to Britain. 
 42% of men v 34% of women feel „very strongly‟ that they belong to Britain and 
Islam. 
 
3. Integration (School Preference) 
 Popular state school with good results: 44%. 
 Muslim school that follows the national curriculum: 43%. 
 Don‟t know: 13% 
 Muslims in lower social grades are more likely to opt for Islamic schools than their 
ABC1 counterparts (46% v 40%). 
 Islamic schools are most popular in the South of England. 
 
Living Apart 1? (To what extent do you agree with the idea that Muslims should keep 
themselves separate from non-Muslims?) 
 All agree: 4%. 
 All disagree: 94%. 
 
Living Apart 2? (I would prefer to have Muslim Neighbours) 
 All agree: 4%. 
 All disagree: 94%. 
 
4. Sha’ria Law  
Would you prefer to live under sha‟ria law? 
 Live under British law: 54%. 
 Live under sha‟ria law: 30%. 
 Muslims aged 18-24 and 25-44 are more likely to say that they would prefer to live 
under sha‟ria law than older people (34% and 32% compared to 23%). 
 
Britain as an Islamic State? 
 All agree: 28%. 
 All disagree: 52%. 
 
5.  Attitudes to Freedom of Speech  
 Punish the people who published the cartoons: Agree: 78%; Disagree: 15%. 
 British people who insult Islam should be arrested and prosecuted: Agree: 68%; 
Disagree: 23%. 
 Free speech even if it offends religious groups: Agree: 31%; Disagree: 62%. 
 
6. Conspiracies and Islamophobia 
Do you believe the Holocaust happened? 
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 Yes, but it‟s been exaggerated: 17%. 
 Yes, as History teaches: 29%. 
 It did not happen at all: 2%. 
 34% of ABC1 Muslims v 23% of C2DE Muslims believed the Holocaust happened as 
history teaches it.  
 
Do you believe that 9/11 was a conspiracy by America and Israel? 
 It was a conspiracy: 45%. 
 Don‟t know: 35%. 
 It was not a conspiracy: 20%. 
 Half of Muslims aged 18-24 (51%) feel that 9/11 was a conspiracy. This proportion 
drops to 43% among those aged 25-44 and 45+. 
 Second generation Muslims are more likely to say it was a conspiracy (50% v 42% of 
first generation Muslims). 
 
Do you believe that Diana was killed to stop her marrying a Muslim? 
 Yes: 38%. 
 No, her death was an accident: 31%. 
 41% of second generation v 33% of first generation Muslims feel that this was a 
conspiracy. 
 Two in five females feel that Diana‟s death was a conspiracy (40% v 32% of men). 
 
Has hostility towards Muslims increased since 7/7? 
 Increased significantly: 34%. 
 Increased slightly: 29%. 
 Decreased slightly: 4%. 
 Decreased significantly: 1%. 
 Situation has remained the same: 17%. 
 Despite the widespread perception of increased hostility, the majority of Muslims 
(77%) had not been subject to hostility since 7/7. 
 The minority who had, mentioned the following forms of hostility: 
 
 Verbal abuse: 18%. 
 Physical abuse: 3%. 
 Stop and search: 3%. 
 Police harassment: 2%. 
 
7. Terrorism 
To what extent to you agree that the July bombings were justified because of British support 
for the war on terror? 
 All agree: 22%. 
 All disagree: 61%. 
 31% of young Muslims compared to 14% of those aged 45+ agreed with this 
sentiment. 
 
Violence and suicide bombings as political tools?  
 „I can understand why young British Musims might want to carry out suicide 
operations‟. Disagree 80%; Agree: 14%. 
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 „It is acceptable for religious or political groups to use violence‟. Disagree: 85%; 
Agree: 9%. 
 
 
Were you surprised by the fact that the 7/7 bombers were British born Muslims? 
 Yes, I was surprised: 50%. 
 No, I was not surprised: 35%. 
 44% of 18-24 year old v 36% of 25-44 and 27% of 45+ Muslims say this did not 
surprise them.  
 45% of second v 30% of first generation Muslims were not surprised. 
 41% ABC1 v 30% C2DE Muslims were not surprised. 
 
8. Representation 
Organisations that represent Muslims in Britain? 
 30% were unsure how to answer and 57% were unable to answer this question.  
 4% mentioned the Muslim Council of Britain. 
 3% said the Mosque. 
 1% said the Muslim Association of Britain. 
 1% said the Islamic Society of Britain. 
 
9. Muslim Attitudes Towards Women 
How much truth is there in the idea that Islam treats women as 2nd class citizens? 
 A great deal of truth: 9%. 
 A fair amount of truth: 15%. 
 Not very much truth: 12%. 
 No truth at all: 56%. 
 22% of younger, 13% of 25-44 year old and 12% of 45+ Muslims feel that there is a 
„fair amount of truth‟ in this statement.  
 30% of women v 19% of men feel that there is a „great deal‟ or „fair amount‟ of truth 
in this statement. 
 
Do you agree that British society treats women with respect? 
 All Agree: 63%.  
 All Disagree: 28%. 
 68% of first v 56% of second generation Muslims agree with this view. 
 
Do you agree that wives should always obey husbands?  
 All Agree: 55%. 
 All Disagree: 34%. 
 59% of men v 51% of women agree with this statement. 
 59% of C2DE Muslims v 51% of ABC1 Muslims agree with this statement. 
 
Single sex schools?  
 All Muslim boys should go to boys only schools: All Agree: 39%; All Disagree: 53%. 
 All Muslim girls should go to girls only schools: All Agree: 40%; All disagree: 52%. 
 45% of men agree with single sex girls‟ schools and 42% with single sex boys‟ schools. 
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3. MIRZA, M., SENTHIKUMARAN, A. and JA'FAR, Z. (2007) Living Apart Together: 
British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism, London: Policy Exchange. 
Sample size: 1003 Muslims; 1,025 general population for points of comparison (answers 
weighted to represent the demographic of the Muslim population of the UK).  
Methods: Telephone and internet questionnaires; 40 semi-structured interviews with younger 
British-born Muslims of Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage, all either University students or 
recent graduates from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. 12 semi-structured interviews 
with non-Muslims to provide points of possible comparison.  
Description: exploration of the attitudes of Muslims in Britain and the reasons for the 
significant rise in Islamic fundamentalism among the younger generation.  
 
Key Findings: 
 „there has been a significant rise in Islamic fundamentalism amongst the younger generation 
[of Muslims in Britain]. …the growth of Islamism in the UK is not solely a foreign problem, 
but something that must be understood in relation to political and social trends that have 
emerged in British society over the past two decades. …there is a growing religiosity amongst 
the younger generation of Muslims. They feel that they have less in common with non-
Muslims than do their parents and they show a stronger preference for Islamic schools and 
sha‟ria law. …their interest in religion is more politicised. There is a greater stress on 
asserting one‟s identity in the public space, for example, by wearing the hijab‟. (p.5) 
 
 86% of Muslims feel that their religion is the most important thing in their lives. 
 62% of 16-24 year old feel that they have as much in common with non-Muslims as with 
Muslims, compared to 71% of 55+ year olds. 
 60% of Muslims would prefer to send their children to a mixed state school, compared to 
35% who would prefer to send their children to an Islamic school. However, there are clear 
age differences on this dimension, with 37% of 16-24 year olds preferring to send their 
children to Islamic state schools, compared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and 19% of 55+ year 
olds. 
 59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared to 28% who would 
prefer to live under sha‟ria law. However, there are clear age differences on this 
dimension, with 37% of 16-24 year olds preferring sha‟ria law compared to 17% of 55+ 
year olds. 
 36% of 16-24 year old believe that if a Muslim converts to another religion they should be 
punished by death, compared to 19% of 55+ year olds. 
 7% of Muslims admire organisations like Al-Quaeda that are prepared to fight the West. 
Again, there are age differentials in response to this question, with 13% of 16-24 year olds 
agreeing, compared to 3% of 55+ year olds. 
 74% of 16-24 year olds would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil, compared 
to only 28% of 55+ year olds.  
 
„There is clearly a conflict within British Islam between a moderate majority that accepts the 
norms of Western democracy and a growing minority that does not.‟ (p.5) 
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 21% of Muslims have consumed alcohol; 65% have paid interest on a normal mortgage. 
19% have gambled. 9% have admitted to taking drugs. 
 59% of Muslims feel that they have as much, if not more, in common with non-Muslims in 
the UK as with Muslims abroad. 
 
„the rise of Islamism is not only a security problem, but also a cultural problem. Islamism is 
strongly coloured by anti-Western ideas. …There has also been a weakening of older 
collective identities, notably the undermining of Britishness and the decline of working class 
politics, which has led to a feeling of disengagement amongst young people more generally. 
Some Muslims are therefore turning to religion as part of a search for meaning and 
community. They increasingly look to the abstract and global ummah.‟ (p.6) 
 
 41% named foreign policy as an important issue to Muslims but they are not necessarily 
more informed or engaged than the wider population. Only 18% of Muslims could name 
the president of the Palestinian National Authority and only 14% could name the Prime 
Minister of Israel. 
 58% believe that many of the problems in the world today are a result of arrogant western 
attitudes – 30% of the general population agrees. 
 37% believe that one of the benefits of modern society is the freedom to criticise other 
people‟s religious and political views, even when it causes offence. 29% of the general 
population believes the same. 
 
„The emergence of a strong Muslim identity in Britain is, in part, a result of multicultural 
policies implemented since the 1980s, which have emphasised difference at the expense of a 
shared national identity and divided people along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. Islamist 
groups have gained influence at local and national level by playing the politics of identity and 
demanding for Muslims the „right to be different‟. The authorities and some Muslim groups 
have exaggerated the problem of Islamophobia, which has fuelled a sense of victimhood 
among some Muslims‟. (p.6) 
 
 Despite widespread concerns about Islamophobia, 84% of Muslims believe they have been 
treated fairly in this society. 
 28% of Muslims believe that authorities in Britain go over the top in trying not to offend 
Muslims. In response to two scenarios presented, 75% believe it was wrong for a local 
council to have banned an advertisement for a Christmas carol service, and 64% believe it 
was wrong for a council to have banned all images of pigs from its offices. 
 
„Paradoxically, Government policies to improve engagement with Muslims makes things 
worse. By treating Muslims as a homogeneous group, the Government fails to see the 
diversity of opinions amongst Muslims, so that they feel more ignored and excluded‟. (p.6) 
 
 When asked to name an organisation that represented their views as Muslims, only 6% 
named the Muslim Council of Britain. 51% felt that no Muslim organisation represented 
their views. 
 75% believe there is more diversity and disagreement within the Muslim population than 
other people realise. 
 
„We argue that the Government has to change its policy approach towards Muslims. It should 
stop emphasizing difference and engage with Muslims as citizens, not through their religious 
identity. The „Muslim community‟ is not homogeneous, and attempts to give group rights or 
representation will only alienate sections of the population further. People should be entitled 
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to equal treatment as citizens in the public sphere, with the freedom to also enjoy and pursue 
their identities in the private sphere. The authorities should also try to present a more 
realistic and balanced picture of disadvantage and discrimination in the UK, as „victim 
politics‟ can contribute to a sense of alienation. We should also recognise that the negative 
effects of multiculturalism are particularly acute for Muslims, but are also experienced by 
other minority groups. 
More generally, we need to revive a sense of direction, shared purpose and confidence in 
British society. Islamism is only one expression of a wider cultural problem of self-loathing 
and confusion in the West. One way to tackle this is to bring to an end the institutional attacks 
on national identity – the counterproductive cancellation of Christian festivities, the neurotic 
bans on displays of national symbols, and the sometimes crude anti-Western bias of history 
lessons – which can create feelings of defensiveness and resentment. We should allow people 
to express their identity freely and in a climate of genuine tolerance. At the same time, we 
must also recognise that the Government and policy-makers cannot address this sense of 
disengagement alone. We need to work together, as a society, to develop a renewed sense of 
collectivity that asserts our shared British identity and Western values in a way that will 
inspire the younger generation‟. (p.7) 
 
 
4. THE PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT (2006) The Great Divide: How Westerners 
and Muslims View Each Other, Washington: Pew Associates.91  
 
Sample size: 15 nations, n = 16,710; Britain: representative national sample of 902, including 
a 412 Muslim oversample.  
Methods: Telephone and face-to-face interviews.  
Description: Survey aimed at exploring how Muslims and non-Muslims see each other, 
conducted in 13 countries: Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, Spain, India, Indonesia, Jordon, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, United States. Additional questions were asked in China 
and Japan. 
 
Key Findings: 
 After a year marked by riots over cartoon portrayals of Mohammed, a major terrorist attack 
in London, and continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most Muslims and Westerners are 
convinced that relations between them are generally bad. Many in the West see Muslims as 
fanatical, violent, and lacking tolerance. Muslims in the Middle East and Asia generally 
see Westerners as selfish, immoral and greedy – as well as violent and fanatical. 
 A rare point of agreement between Westerners and Muslims is that both believe that 
Muslim nations should be more economically prosperous than they are. But they gauge the 
problem quite differently. Muslim publics are much more likely than Americans or 
Western Europeans to blame Western policies for their own lack of prosperity. Western 
publics point to government corruption, lack of education and Islamic fundamentalism as 
the biggest obstacles to Muslim prosperity. 
 Nothing highlights the divide between Muslims and the West more clearly than their 
responses to the uproar this past winter over cartoon depictions of Mohammed. Most 
people in Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey blame the controversy on Western nations' 
disrespect for Islam; majorities of Americans and Western Europeans who have heard of 
the controversy say Muslims' intolerance to different points of view is to blame. 
                                                     
91
  See Borger (2006) and Roy (2007). 
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 The chasm between Muslims and the West is also seen in judgments about how the other 
civilization treats women. Western publics, by lopsided margins, do not think of Muslims 
as "respectful of women." But half or more in four of the five Muslim publics surveyed say 
the same thing about people in the West. 
 Despite the deep attitudinal divide between Western and Muslim publics, the survey also 
finds that the views of each toward the other are far from uniformly negative. For example, 
solid majorities in France, Great Britain and the US retain overall favourable opinions of 
Muslims. However, positive opinions of Muslims have declined sharply in Spain over the 
past year (from 46% to 29%), and more modestly in Great Britain (from 72% to 63%). 
 For the most part, Muslim publics feel more embittered toward the West and its people 
than vice versa. Muslim opinions about the West and its people have worsened over the 
past year, and by overwhelming margins Muslims blame Westerners for the strained 
relationship between the two sides. But there are some positive indicators as well, 
including the fact that in most Muslim countries surveyed there has been a decline in 
support for terrorism. 
 In many ways, the views of Europe's Muslims represent a middle ground between the way 
Western publics and Muslims in the Middle East and Asia view each other. 
 While Europe's Muslim minorities are about as likely as Muslims elsewhere to see 
relations between Westerners and Muslims as generally bad, they more often attribute 
positive characteristics to Westerners – including tolerance, generosity, and respect for 
women. And in a number of respects Muslims in Europe are less inclined to see a clash of 
civilizations than are some of the general publics surveyed in Europe. Notably, they are 
less likely than non-Muslims in Europe to believe that there is a conflict between 
modernity and being a devout Muslim. 
 The belief that terrorism is justifiable in the defence of Islam, while less extensive than in 
previous surveys, still has a sizable number of adherents. Among Nigeria's Muslim 
population, for instance, nearly half (46%) feel that suicide bombings can be justified often 
or sometimes in the defence of Islam. Even among Europe's Muslim minorities, roughly 
one-in-seven in France, Spain, and Great Britain feel that suicide bombings against civilian 
targets can at least sometimes be justified to defend Islam against its enemies. 
 56% of British Muslims say they do not believe Arabs carried out the terror attacks against 
the US, compared with just 17% who do. 
 There are mixed views on whether democracy can or cannot work with Muslim publics. 
Majorities in Germany and Spain say democracy is a Western way of doing things, but 
most of the French and British, and about half of Americans, say democracy can work in 
Muslim countries. 
 Overall, the Germans and Spanish express much more negative views of both Muslims and 
Arabs than do the French, British or Americans. Just 36% in Germany, and 29% in Spain, 
express favourable opinions of Muslims; comparable numbers in the two countries have 
positive impressions of Arabs (39% and 33%, respectively). In France, Great Britain and 
the US, solid majorities say they have favourable opinions of Muslims, and about the same 
numbers have positive views of Arabs. 
 These differences are reflected as well in opinions about negative traits associated with 
Muslims. Roughly eight-in-ten Spanish (83%) and Germans (78%) say they associate 
Muslims with being fanatical. But that view is less prevalent in France (50%), Great 
Britain (48%) and the US (43%). 
 In many ways, the views of Europe's Muslims are distinct from those of both Western 
publics and Muslims in the Middle East and Asia. Most European Muslims express 
favourable opinions of Christians, and while their views of Jews are less positive than 
those of Western publics, they are far more positive than those of Muslim publics. And in 
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France, a large majority of Muslims (71%) say they have favourable opinions of Jews. 
 Moreover, while publics in largely Muslim countries generally view Westerners as violent 
and immoral, this view is not nearly as prevalent among Muslims in France, Spain and 
Germany. British Muslims however, are the most critical of the four minority publics 
studied – and they come closer to the views of Muslims around the world in their opinions 
of Westerners. 
 Concerns over Islamic extremism are widely shared in Western and Muslim publics alike. 
An exception is China, where 59% express little or no concern over Islamic extremism. 
 
 
5. THE PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT (2008) Unfavourable Views of Jews and 
Muslims on the Increase in Europe, Washington: Pew Associates  
Sample Size: 24 nations, n = 24,717; Britain: national probability sample of 753. 
Methods: Telephone interviews. 
Description: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Spain, South 
Africa, South Korea, Tanzania, Turkey, United States. 
 
Key Findings: 
 There has been an overall increase in Europe in negative attitudes towards both Jews and 
Muslims. Anti-Christian sentiment is also growing in various parts of the world, including 
parts of Europe. 
 Britain is the only exception to the European pattern with respect to Jews, with no change 
at 9% of those surveyed holding negative views. Comparable figures are: France, 20% 
(from 11% in 2004); Germany 25% (from 20% in 2004); Poland, 36% (from 27% in 
2005); Russia, 34% (from 25% in 2004); Spain, 46% (from 21% in 2005).  
 Anti Jewish sentiments are most pronounced in Muslim countries. 
 Opinions about Muslims in most countries are considerably more negative than they are 
for Jews and this has generally increased over time (though in France and Spain there has 
been a decrease since 2006). The percentages of those surveyed holding negative views of 
Muslims are: Brazil, 53%; Britain, 23% (from 14% in 2005); China, 55%; France, 38% 
(from 34% in 2005); Germany, 50%; India, 56%; Japan, 61%; Poland, 46% (from 30% in 
2005); Spain, 52%; South Korea, 50%.  
 Older, less educated people hold more negative attitudes to Muslims than do younger, 
better-educated people.  
 Notwithstanding the above trends, in Britain, France and the United States, the majority 
have favourable views of Muslims.  
 The expression of anti-Christian sentiment has increased in France 17% (from 9% in 2004) 
and Spain, 24% (from 15% in 2006). In Turkey, Pakistan and China, the majority 
expressed negative views of Christians –74%; 60% and 55% respectively. 
 Religiosity: in most countries surveyed, religion was considered to be a central feature of 
life.  
 There are consistent gender and age differences, with religion being more important to 
women than to men, and generally more important to older than to younger people (though 
this age gap does not apply to Indonesia, Pakistan and the three African countries 
surveyed).  
 Apart from the United States there is a clear relationship between a country‟s wealth and 
the religiosity of its people, with poorer countries being more religious than rich ones. 
 In the majority of European countries, religion is not generally viewed as central to 
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individuals‟ lives and in Britain, France and Spain, the majority state that religion is not 
important in their lives.  
 In Australia, Britain, Japan, Spain and South Korea, at least 4 in 10 report never praying 
(in Britain, 46% state that they never pray and 26% say that they pray once a week or less). 
 France stands out as most secular country in Europe 
 Only 46% of Muslims in Pakistan fulfil the requirement to pray five times a day, and 
prayer and only 16% fast throughout Ramadan.  
 In Islamic countries, Muslim support for terrorism continues to decline. In Pakistan, 81% 
say that suicide violence is never justified. 
 Concern about extremism – in their own countries and elsewhere – is still of concern to 
many, as is concern about conflict within Islam, for example between Sunni and Shia. 
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Appendix 3 
HEARING THE VOICES OF MUSLIM WOMEN 
Consultations with Muslim Women in England and Wales92 
 
1. RAZ, A. (2006) SHE WHO DISPUTES: MUSLIM WOMEN SHAPE THE DEBATE, 
London: Muslim Women’s Network.  
[4 meetings in different locations; 201 women from various parts of England].93 
  
Forced Marriage, Domestic Violence and Honour Killings 
 When it comes to domestic violence there should be a zero tolerance policy and the 
Government shouldn‟t allow mitigating circumstances such as culture to play a part. 
 By minimising our problems on domestic violence and forced marriage it will not disappear. 
It has to be addressed. …we need confident women; we don‟t need shattered, battered 
women. 
 Men in all societies may control women, however they don‟t use religion as a justification, 
the way it is wrongly used by Muslim men within the community. 
 Issues like honour killings, domestic violence and sexually transmitted diseases – we need to 
talk about these – they are major issues. 
 
Sexual Orientation 
 I know girls taken abroad, or forced into marriage because of their sexuality. There is constant 
pressure. I had come out [as a lesbian] to my family years before and the relatives in Pakistan 
said – bring her here, we‟ll sort her out. I was forced into marriage. Although many people 
oppose forced marriage I find a lot of people say it‟s OK for lesbians.  
 You are told that to get married makes you a better Muslim. I thought if I got married, I could 
change my sexuality. I‟m a transsexual; I believe I was born in the wrong body. I‟ve tried 
everything to change, and I couldn‟t. … I have now lost my children; I am allowed to see 
them, but only on condition that I don‟t change [my sex].  
 Training for health professionals needs improvement. Homosexuality was de-listed as a 
medical condition years ago; If doctors come from abroad, they need to be taught that. And 
taught about confidentiality – they shouldn‟t be able to „out‟ you to your community, but they 
do. 
 
Community Consultation 
 We can‟t pussy foot around community leaders and not address issues because of fear of 
getting their backs up. By not addressing controversial issues our communities are destroying 
themselves. 
 You get policy makers talking to faith groups. They only come as far as the Muslim male 
leaders and say “Oh you can sort out the voices of your women, we‟ll just deal with you”. 
 
Written Comments on ‘Post-its’ by Women who did not Feel Able to Speak  
 Paedophilia from the community. 
 Sexual abuse in mosques. Domestic violence at home. Taboo subjects like homosexuality. 
                                                     
92
 Our understanding is that the „Muslim Women Speak‟ events included 8 for Scotland, but we have 
been unable to trace any reports of these. 
93
  Note: all the material cited above consists of direct quotations from the participants. 
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 Issues that cannot be discussed – sexual abuse; domestic violence. 
 Domestic violence to children/young people. Coercion to marry. 
 Sexual abuse. Incest. 
 Incest. Rape. 
 Child abuse in mosques. 
 Emotional blackmail. 
 It seems that it is almost impossible to get a divorce.  
 
2. MAHONEY, M. AND TAJ, S. (2006) MUSLIM WOMEN TALK WALES: SAHELI 
PROJECT REPORT, Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government.  
 [15 meetings; 600 women from various parts of Wales].94 
 
Culture v Religion 
 Women felt that their culture was a stronger influencing force on their social behaviour than 
their faith: „I can deal with Allah (pbuh) when I die – but I have to face my neighbours 
tomorrow‟.  
 
Safety/Anti-Islamic Feelings 
 Women felt threatened under the current climate of negative feeling toward the Muslim 
community as a result 9/11, 7/7, of ongoing news items in the media and coverage of the war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
 I was walking over the bridge, in the middle of the day, and a white man pulled my scarf off 
and threw it in the river. I didn‟t do anything to the man! Why do they hate me so? 
 
Discrimination by Service Providers 
 Women have experienced a demonstrated lack of/negative response from statutory service 
providers including and especially the police:  
 The sound of my voice turns them off. Even if I speak English – I still have an accent and they 
put me on to someone else. 
 If there is an accident between a white person and an Asian – the Asian is always at fault. The 
police favour the white person. 
 
The Concept of Honour 
 Women feel that the concept of honour within the community is not understood by service 
providers – nor do they feel that the individuals assigned to work with them have even the 
slightest interest in learning about their culture or how they are expected to behave: 
 I am always aware that I am here to keep everyone else‟s honour but no one takes the time to 
think about how I feel about my own [honour]. 
 
Lack of Knowledge – Child Protection 
 Women are unaware of child protection issues and the laws relating to treatment of children 
and young people: 
We accept our own pain without realising that we ourselves are contributing to the cycle of 
violence. 
 There is a great concern that the issue of child protection within the Asian and Muslim 
minority communities is not monitored appropriately. At present there are few if any practical 
ways of working with faith-based communities in monitoring and reporting cases of child and 
                                                     
94
  Note: all the material cited is from report; that in italics comprises direct quotations from the 
participants. 
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domestic abuse. Our research has demonstrated the need to remove the current stigma that 
favours „political correctness‟ instead of the pursuance of justice in the name of human rights.  
 
Lack of Knowledge – Rights and Representation 
 There is a demonstrated lack of awareness of rights, responsibilities and entitlements under 
the law, including the representative nature of the National Assembly for Wales in relation to 
Central Government. 
 
Communications/Consultation 
 Women felt that the greatest lack of communication takes place within the Asian and Muslim 
community itself and that there is a distinct lack of support for the wider community from 
those in a position of either faith or community standing. 
 Younger people being excluded and community „leaders‟ are not growing with the 
community. Government needs to reassess the way it reaches Muslim communities and 
consider non-traditional methods of engagement. 
 Culturally women haven‟t played a visible role in discussions regarding community because 
this is seen as unacceptable. Mixed groups of men and women are not viewed in a positive 
light by the community and women taking a stand are considered harridans. 
 
Forced Marriage and Honour Related Abuse 
 There are a high number of incidents involving Forced Marriage and Honour related abuse 
that is either unrecognised or widely ignored by the wider community. We have heard many 
anecdotes relating to the disappearance of vulnerable women as young as eleven and as old as 
sixty-five. Few if any investigations into these incidents are carried through to the courts and 
many are sidelined due to the incapacity of service providers to look beyond the face of an 
individual and into the inner workings of the family and community. 
 It is necessary to raise a question regarding the need to criminalise it and make the act of 
Forced Marriage an illegal offence. 
 In the Asian and Muslim community, „honour‟ is something that an individual is born with as 
part of their connection to the family nucleus. Honour is not the sole possession of the 
individual, rather that of the whole family and extended family as well. Any action taken by 
that individual has a direct impact on the immediate and extended family. Losing that sense of 
„honour‟ can put an individual in far greater danger than is perceived by the Western mind. 
 There is a need for awareness raising work with policy-makers and service provider of social 
behaviour (socialisation) and cultural attitudes towards domestic abuse and violence „in the 
name of honour.‟  
 Whilst we extol the virtues of living in a global village where the advancement and promotion 
of equality, justice and the advocacy of human rights is a social norm, there are still those 
men and women subjected to complex and archaic customs such as the practice of honour 
related conditioned/cultivated behaviour, violence and abuse, living here in Wales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. WOLLASTON, H. (2008) REALISING OUR POTENTIAL: PROMOTING THE 
TALENTS OF MUSLIM WOMEN, Wigan: North West Regional Assembly. [1 event held 
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in Bolton; 150 men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims].95 
  
Barriers for Muslim Woman96 
 The barriers faced by Muslim women vary between families and communities. 
 Structural barriers include the lack of visible role models, but also childcare, transport and 
poverty. 
 Lack of confidence is an issue. 
 Lack of information about opportunities is a major issue. 
 There is an issue of male  „community gatekeepers‟ who prevent development and block 
access to women and the articulation of their needs. But the danger of restricting consultation 
to a few key women runs the risk of creating female gatekeepers. 
 
Communicating with Muslim Woman 
 Organisations wising to engage Muslim women may need to employ specialist outreach 
workers from the local community and/or work in partnership with women‟s groups that have 
established contacts and trust. 
 Events need to be targeted specifically at Muslim women and are more successful if held in 
community venues. 
 The importance of working with and through family members, especially men was stressed as 
a way of allaying concerns. 
 
Access to Funding for Community-based Projects 
 The problems of short-term funding for services that target Muslim women were noted. 
 Changes in policy with respect to funding for the voluntary and community sector were noted, 
including LSPs to meet priorities set out in LAAs. 
 
Sharing Good Practice 
 The need for role models, Muslim women‟s networks and the sharing of information about 
effective projects was noted. 
                                                     
95
 Note: this is a very different kind of event to the two reported above, particularly in its focus on highly 
successful Muslim women. Notwithstanding this, a number of similar points were raised in relation to 
the barriers that confront Muslim women in their attempts bring about change and to fulfil their 
aspirations. Though only a few of these are mentioned here, they are relevant to the equalities agenda. 
96
  Many of the issues raised under all the headings apply to women in general, and/or to all community 
groups, e.g. the problem of short-term funding (see Farnell et al., 2003). A different question may 
concern the appropriateness of funding FBOs that exclude both men and non-Muslims! 
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Appendix 4 
 
CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUALITIES STRANDS IN THE WORKPLACE 
RELIGION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Case Study: The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland [ACPO] 
In November, 2007, ACPO implemented the guidance they had published in 2005 in a 40 
page document entitled Guiding Principles for the Police Service in Relation to the 
Articulation and Expression of Religious Beliefs and their Manifestation in the Workplace, 
the preface to which says that is designed to help readers [police personnel] to: 
 Understand the nature and extent of the protection conferred by the law upon 
individuals in relation to their religious and other duties; 
 Understand that the law does not confer an absolute and unfettered right upon 
individuals to express their religious or other beliefs, and that their rights must be 
balanced against the legal rights of other individuals to protection against 
discrimination; 
 Deal appropriately with situations in which the expression of religious or other 
beliefs by members of staff impinges upon the rights of others to protection against 
discrimination, whether internally or operationally, and 
 Ensure that the religious beliefs of individual members of staff are taken into 
account whilst at the same time complying with the Police Service‟s fundamental 
duty to deliver an efficient, effective and equitable service to all members of the 
community. (ACPO, 2005: 3) 
Appendix B of the Guidelines provides details of the reason for their publication, referring 
to a number of examples of the use made by some police officers of the religion and belief 
legislation. These include the refusal by a Muslim female officer to shake hands with the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, and the unwillingness of a Muslim male 
officer of Lebanese heritage to perform his duties at the Israeli Embassy [which was not a 
faith issue, but was perceived as such].  
However, what brought matters to a head was the placing of an advertisement in the 
Independent newspaper on 29 June 2006 by the Gay Police Association [GPA]. This 
featured a Bible beside a pool of blood under the heading „In the Name of the Father‟ and 
stated that the GPA had recorded a 74% increase in homophobic incidents where the sole 
or primary motivating factor was the religious belief of the perpetrator. This statistic comes 
from the GPA Action Line which received 250 calls in 2005 relating to homophobic 
incidents that were exclusively or primarily faith based. 
This incident is apparently the latest manifestation in a prolonged, open debate between 
leading members of the Christian Police Association [CPA] and the GPA (ACPO (2005: 
29). The GPA‟s position is that the expression of homophobic views on the basis of 
religion is accepted and that the growth of faith associations means that the GPA 
effectively has less of a voice, leaving gay and lesbian officers feeling marginalised. They 
describe: 
a „hierarchy of diversity‟, whereby ethnic minority, cultural and religious groups are 
at the top of the pecking order, making managers fearful of allegations being made 
against them if they challenge the homophobic behaviour of someone from one of 
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these groups. (ACPO, 2005: 30) 
The CPA‟s position is that it receives very few reports of either discrimination against its 
members or complaints about inappropriate expression of religious belief. However, the 
CPA feels that Christianity is being institutionally marginalised; that consultation is being 
replaced by validation; that Christians have to argue for the right to have their values 
considered whilst other groups are afforded more credence and influence. For example: 
 „Faith Issues in the Workplace‟ is considered to be predominantly about Islamic 
issues; 
 The CPA has the largest membership in the MPS, but no funding; 
 At Christmas, extreme care is taken not to offend other faiths; 
 Diversity training covers LGBT and Muslim issues but not Christian ones. 
(ACPO, 2005: 32) 
The CPA, the Black Police Association in Lancashire and the MPS Muslim Police 
Association state that while many faiths have strong beliefs/views on homosexuality, their 
members do not allow these to affect their professional behaviour, including that towards 
their LGBT colleagues. 
Following a review of a number of cases that highlight the issue of faith v. sexual 
orientation, the ACPO report summarises the tension/conflict as: 
(1) From the LGBT lobby: you cannot introduce anti-discrimination 
legislation that has an exemption that permits discrimination, and; 
(2) From the faith lobby: you cannot legislate against religious 
beliefs/conscience. (ACPO, 2005: 35). 
In addition, the ACPO guidelines raise a number of points that are applicable to other areas 
covered in this report, some of which are raised elsewhere; for example: 
 Managers are failing to exercise their duty of care under employment legislation by 
not making appropriate interventions; 
 There is inadequate monitoring of internal hate incidents in the Police Service; 
 Special treatment, however well intended, of an individual or group over and above 
any other can have a negative impact on others within the Police Service; 
 Faith groups cite the sexual orientation legislation as „the latest affront‟ to their 
freedom of religious belief and freedom of expression; 
 There is very real anger amongst religious groups who are forced to comply with 
legislation which is incompatible with doctrinal teachings and beliefs. Whereas in 
the past condemnation from religious groups has often been sporadic and piecemeal 
there is a sense of cohesion developing around this particular issue;97  
 This build up of anger and cohesion amongst the faith groups, together with the 
angst felt by LGBT groups, has led to considerable tension between the two; 
 The sexual orientation regulations are further evidence of the continuing 
development of a secular society in the UK. This is not going to change and as faith 
groups feel more and more marginalised over time, we are likely to see what would 
be considered more extreme views expressed more and more; 
 This is exemplified by the growth in evangelicalism within the Christian Church 
and research which suggests that young Muslims are developing more radical 
views than previous generations; 
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 This is based on an intelligence assessment carried out by the LGBT strand of the MPS Diversity and 
Citizen Focus Directorate of media articles and religious websites. 
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 The Police Service must be representative of the wider communities it serves and 
must value the diversity this brings, but friction between groups/factions within 
these communities will potentially manifest itself in the workplace; 
 The Police Service must therefore be mindful of the potential for „single issue-ism‟ 
to create a divisive atmosphere within the workplace; 
 The Police Service therefore needs to engage in ongoing debate, bringing the 
associations together, to encourage a move away from single-issuism, to focus 
instead on what can be achieved together. (ACPO, 2005: 37-40) 
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Appendix 5 
 
RELEVANT ONGOING RESEARCH98 
SECTION 1: FUNDED PROJECTS  
(By Funding Body) 
AHRC 
Gethin, R. University of Bristol (Centre for Buddhist Studies). Buddhist Death Rituals of South 
East Asia and China. 
Nesbitt, E., Arweck, E. and Jackson, R. University of Warwick (WRERU) The Religious 
Identity Formation of Young People in Mixed Faith Communities. 
Ram-Prasad, C. and Ganeri, J. Universities of Lancaster and Sussex. Hindu Senses of Self: A 
Response to Buddhist Critiques. 
 
AHRC DIASPORA, MIGRATION AND IDENTITIES PROGRAMME 
Gardner, K. and Mand, K. University of Sussex (Centre for Migration Research).  Home and 
Away: South Asian Children‟s Representations of Diaspora. 
 
AHRC/ESRC RELIGION AND SOCIETY PROGRAMME 
Bebbington, D.W. University of Stirling. Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in Britain. 
Conroy, J.C. University of Glasgow. Does Religious Education Work? An Analysis of the Aims, 
Practices and Models of Effectiveness in Religious Education across the UK. 
Gilliat-Ray, S. Cardiff University. (Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK). Leadership and 
Capacity Building in the British Muslim Community: the Case of 'Muslim Chaplains'. 
Gleave, R.M. University of Exeter. Network of British Researchers and Practitioners of Islamic 
Law. 
Graham, E.L. University of Manchester. Promoting Greater Human Wellbeing: Interacting the 
Happiness Hypothesis and Religion. 
Gregory, I. Lancaster University. Troubled Geographies: Two Centuries of Religious Division 
in Ireland. 
Haw, K.F. University of Nottingham. The Myth of British Identity and the Failure of 
Multiculturalism? From Hijab to Jilbab. 
Hoffman, R. University of Nottingham. Religion, Religiosity and Pro-Social Behaviour in 
Cross-Cultural Interactions. 
Johnsen, S. University of York. The Difference that 'Faith' Makes: Faith-based Organisations 
and the Provision of Services for Homeless People. 
Jones, P.N. University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Religion, Discrimination and Accommodation: 
The Role of the State in a Multi-faith Society. 
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 This appendix has been compiled on the basis of information supplied by some of the individuals we 
consulted and our own web searches. We apologise to any of our colleagues whose work has been 
unintentionally excluded as a result of this approach.  
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Knott, K. University of Leeds. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular-Sacred: A 
Longitudinal Study of British Newspaper and Television Representations and their Reception. 
Lehmann, A.D. University of Cambridge. Secularism: A Reappraisal of Institutional 
Arrangements for Religious Regulation. 
Olson, E.A. University of Edinburgh. Relational Religious Identities: Exploring Contemporary 
Meanings of Religion among Scottish Christian Youth. 
Pike, M.A. University of Leeds. Religious Reading in a Secular Society: Learning for Life in a 
Liberal Democracy? 
Purewal, T. University of Manchester. Gender, Caste and the Practices of Religious Identities. 
Scourfield, J. Cardiff University. Religious Nurture in Muslim Families. 
Seglow, J. University of London. Religion, Justice and Well-Being: The Normative Foundations 
of Public Policy in a Multi-faith Society. 
Spalek, B. University of Birmingham. An Examination of Partnership Approaches to 
Challenging Religiously-Endorsed Violence Involving Muslim Groups and Police. 
Sreberny, A. School of Oriental and African Studies. Framing Muslims: Structures of 
Representation Post-9/11. 
Valentine, G. University of Leeds. Sexuality and Global faith Networks: A Social Topography. 
Voas, D. University of Manchester. An Online Centre for British Data on Religion. 
 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL WORKERS’ GUILD 
Davis, F.  University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). The Experience of Being a Catholic 
Professional. 
 
CENTRE FOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY/QUINN CENTRE 
Davis, F. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). Remittances, Migration and Social 
Enterprise. 
 
ESRC 
Aspinall, P., Hashem, F. and Song, M, University of Kent. Investigation of the Range of 
Identity Choices available to Mixed Race Young People in Britain. 
King-Hele, S. University of Manchester (Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research). 
The Secularization Debate: An Examination of Evidence of Changes in Religious Affiliation, 
Belief and Attendance in Developed Nations. 
Wadia, K.  University of Warwick (CRER) Muslim Women and Political Participation in 
England and France.  
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Jackson, R. (and team). University of Warwick (WRERU). Religion in Education: Contribution 
to Dialogue or Factor of Conflict in Transforming European Societies.  
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EUROPEAN UNION 
Woodhead, L. University of Lancaster. An Examination of the Political and Public Policy 
Debates Surrounding the Muslim Headscarf in Eight European Countries. 
Holdaway, S., Sack, F., Hebberecht, P. and Fijnaut, C. Universities of Sheffield, Hamburg, 
Ghent and Tilburg. Migrants in the Police: Policies and Experiences of Ethnic Migrant Police 
Officers.   
 
EUROSOURCE PROGRAMME 
Francis, L. and Williams, E. University of Warwick (WRERU). Religion as a Social Force in 
Europe. 
 
HOME OFFICE 
Ram-Prasad, C. and Griffith-Dickson, G. University of Lancaster/Lokahi Foundation. What 
Works: The Role of Religion in Successful Post-Immigration Integration in the UK. 
Reader, I., Billings, A. and Heelas, P. University of Lancaster. The Burnley Project: 
Evaluating the Contribution of Interfaith Dialogue to Community Cohesion.  
 
JOHN TEMPLETON FOUNDATION 
Savage, S. and Liht, J. University of Cambridge. Psychology of Fundamentalism. 
 
JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION 
Ali, M. QED. Tensions Between New and Settled Migrants in Bradford.  
Byron, S. Kings College, London. Ethnic Diversity and Dynamics in the Housing Market. 
Clarke, L. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Fathering in Early-Middle 
Childhood among UK South Asians. 
Ghate, D. Thomas Coram Research Unit. Understanding Fatherhood: Masculinity, Diversity 
and Change. 
Hickman, M. London Metropolitan University. Rhythms and Realities of Everyday Life: 
Community Cohesion in Diverse Neighbourhoods. 
Horwath, J. University of Sheffield (Centre for the Study of Childhood and Youth). Religious 
Beliefs and Parenting Practices: A Descriptive Study. 
Kintrea, K. University of Glasgow. Young People and Territoriality: An Exploration. 
Mir, G. University of Leeds. Women, Faith and Social Cohesion. 
Phillips, D. University of Leeds. Building Shared Visions of Housing Futures in Bradford: New 
Migrants and Settled Groups. 
Richardson, L. University of Manchester. Hitting the Glass Ceiling: Housing and Ethnicity. 
Shafi, W. Communityspeak. Women Working Together Towards Excellence: The OurLives 
Project. 
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LEVERHULME TRUST 
Baker, C and Miles-Watson, J. William Temple Foundation. Faith and Traditional Capitals: 
Defining the Public Scope of Religious Capital. 
Modood, T. University of Bristol (Research Centre for the Study of Migration and Citizenship 
and University College London (Migration Research Unit). Migration and Citizenship 
Programme. (8 linked projects focusing around 3 aspects of human mobility and its 
consequences: 1. The diversity of Human Movement; 2. Settlement Issues of Migrants and 
Descendants; 3. Impact of, and Interaction With, Receiving Societies. 
Stansfield, G. University of Exeter. Ethnopolitics: Ethnicity, Politics and Society (world-wide 
study). 
 
PORTSMOUTH AND BIRMINGHAM ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESES 
Stankeviciute, J. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). Social Capital and Migration. 
 
WESTHILL ENDOWMENT TRUST  
Jackson, R. (and team). University of Warwick (WRERU). Developing the Interpretive 
Approach to Religious Education. 
Jackson, R. (and team). University of Warwick (WRERU). Evaluation of Building E-Bridges: 
Interfaith Dialogue Using ICT in Primary Schools.  
 
  
 
189 
SECTION 2: OTHER PROJECTS 
Anwar, M. University of Warwick (CRER). Ethnic Minorities and Participation in the British 
Electoral System. 
ap Sion, T. University of Warwick (WRERU). Prayer and the Religious Development of Young 
People. 
Carey, F. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). The Conceptual Links Between the 
Notions of Justice and Poverty and the Application of this Theoretical Framework to Social 
Problems in Zambia. [Peter Dawe donation]. 
Davis, F. and Stankeviciute, J. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). A National 
Mapping of the Church‟s Work on Migration. 
Davis, F., Stankeviciute, J. and Rossiter, J. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). A 
Review of Caritas Europa Lobbying on EU Social Policy.  
Francis, L. University of Warwick (WRERU). Collation of a Qualitative Database on Young 
People‟s Attitudes Across 15 Value Domains.  
Francis, L. and Robbins, M. University of Warwick (WRERU). Teenage, Religion and Values. 
Francis, L. and Robbins, M. University of Warwick (WRERU). Values, Religion and Human 
Rights. 
Francis, L. and Robbins, M. University of Warwick (WRERU). [Various Charitable Funders]. 
Religion and Mental Health. 
Lankshear, D. University of Warwick (WRERU). An Investigation into and Promotion of the 
Spiritual Health of Students Attending Church of England Secondary Schools.  
Scott, P. and Scrimpshire, S. University of Manchester (Lincoln Theological Institute). 
Religion and Climate Change. 
Wadia, K. University of Warwick (CRER). Integration Indicators and Generational Change. 
Wilkes, G. University of Cambridge (von Hügel Institute). Ethical Approaches to Contemporary 
Problems Created by War for Civilans. 
 
 
